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Abstract 
 
The existing ―rights‖ paradigm in Aboriginal law accepts Crown sovereignty claims grounded in 
ethnocentric conceptions of terra nullius and discovery, and views Aboriginal rights as arising 
out of prior occupation. The Supreme Court of Canada has shaken this paradigm by 
characterizing Crown sovereignty as merely de facto until reconciled with Aboriginal 
sovereignty and legitimated by a treaty, by developing the duty to consult, and by characterizing 
reconciliation as a process that is part of a generative constitutional order. The moves the Court 
toward a new paradigm rooted in the principle of the equality of peoples in which treaties 
provide a framework for sharing sovereignty. As part of the Canadian federation, Aboriginal 
sovereignty can strengthen Canada‘s territorial integrity and contribute to Canada‘s economic 
development.  
 
In the past, courts allowed the ―act of state‖ doctrine to shield Crown assertions of sovereignty 
from scrutiny. This doctrine protects Canada‘s territorial integrity, but does not shield the 
Crown‘s actions from legal and constitutional scrutiny. The fundamental constitutional principle 
of rule of law and the de facto doctrine will protect interests that relied on assumptions of Crown 
sovereignty that lacked constitutional legitimacy. 
 
The transformation in the fundamental principles of Aboriginal law has parallels to Thomas 
Kuhn‘s description of a paradigm shift in the natural sciences. The rights paradigm is in a 
―crisis‖ with moral and practical dimensions. It is incommensurable with the equality paradigm, 
and therefore the choice of paradigms will depend on normative criteria. Fundamental principles 
of the Canadian constitution, international standards of human rights and the perspectives of 
growing numbers of practitioners in the field that are of Aboriginal ancestry are all forces that 
will complete the shift to the equality paradigm. 
 
An equality paradigm will result in the abandonment of some Aboriginal law doctrines, and the 
modification of others. Aboriginal title is inconsistent with an equality paradigm because it 
assumes the legitimacy of the Crown‘s claims to sovereignty, gives the Crown a superior title, 
and limits Aboriginal nations to a ―burden‖ of only limited and subordinate rights. The fiduciary 
relationship rooted in the ―honour of the Crown‖ will grow into a non-hierarchical relationship 
with reciprocal obligations. 
  
Decisions of courts can play a supporting role, but only negotiations and treaties can build a 
genuine partnership, effective and equitable sharing of sovereignty and ultimately reconciliation 
between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples in Canada.  
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Introduction 
 
The dominant paradigm in Aboriginal law assumes that courts cannot question Crown 
sovereignty claims and that Aboriginal rights arise out of prior occupation.
1
 In two seminal 
decisions, the Supreme Court of Canada undermined this paradigm by qualifying Crown 
sovereignty as de facto until reconciled with Aboriginal sovereignty and legitimated by a treaty.
2
 
This qualification is consistent with an emerging paradigm that accepts the equality of 
Aboriginal and settler peoples and requires these peoples to negotiate how they will share 
sovereignty in Canada.
3
 
This paper offers evidence of a growing sense that for both principled and practical 
reasons the existing paradigm (―the rights paradigm‖) of Aboriginal law should be replaced. This 
paradigm views Aboriginal peoples as morally and legally inferior to European peoples because 
it is grounded in the ―settlement thesis‖, which apparently views Aboriginal peoples as too 
uncivilized to be considered sovereign entities. This paradigm allows the Crown to fill this 
jurisdictional vacuum by default and without need to establish its sovereignty through conquest 
or cession. While this paradigm recognizes some Aboriginal rights, including Aboriginal title, 
these flow from the operation of the Crown‘s laws, and are therefore inferior to the Crown‘s 
sovereign powers. 
                                                 
1
 See below, text accompanying notes 17 to 24. 
2
 Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 [Haida Nation] and 
Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 2004 SCC 74, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 
550 [Taku River]. 
3
 See also Brian Slattery, ―Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the Crown‖ (2005) 29 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 433 at 
436-443, [Slattery, ―Honour of the Crown‖]. Slattery stated, at 436, that the Haida Nation and Taku River decisions 
mark the emergence of ―a new constitutional paradigm governing Aboriginal rights‖. For further discussion of 
Slattery‘s view of the implications of this paradigm, see below, text accompanying notes 157 to 160. 
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The Supreme Court‘s statement that treaties are necessary to reconcile sovereignties 
offers the promise of a new paradigm that views Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples as 
equals, and therefore recognizes Aboriginal sovereignty (―the equality paradigm‖).4 The equality 
paradigm recognizes Aboriginal peoples as partners in a modern Canada – a Canada founded on 
treaties, a Canada that rejects the racism and injustices of the past and that can fulfil the promise 
of reconciliation inherent in the affirmation of Aboriginal rights in section 35(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982.
5
 
Aboriginal peoples have always maintained that they have not foregone or ceded their 
sovereignty, and leading scholars of Aboriginal law have long recognized that these claims have 
merit.  Two decades have passed since Michael Asch and Patrick Macklem commented on the 
Supreme Court of Canada‘s first consideration of section 35(1) in R. v. Sparrow,6 including, in 
particular, the Court‘s apparently uncritical acceptance of the Crown‘s claims of sovereignty 
over Aboriginal peoples and their territories. In their view  
                                                 
4
 The label ―equality‖ does not refer to the equality rights provision in the Australian Racial Discrimination Act. 
although the use of the label is consistent with the spirit of the Australian High Court‘s ruling that this provision was 
not consistent with Queensland‘s attempt to extinguish native title rights (Mabo v. Queensland, [1988] HCA 69, 166 
C.L.R. 186). The High Court found that the equality rights provision was ‗a moral entitlement to be treated in 
accordance with standards dictated by the fundamental notions of human dignity and essential equality which 
underlie the international recognition of human rights‖ (ibid. at 216). For a discussion of the first Mabo decision see 
Peter H. Russell, Recognizing Aboriginal Title: The Mabo Case and Indigenous Resistance to English-Settler 
Colonialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005) at 207-213 [Russell, The Mabo Case]. 
Since this label for the new paradigm refers to the equality of peoples it is consistent with the conclusion of 
the Australian High Court in Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2), [1992] HCA 23, 175 C.L.R. 1 at 57-58 [Mabo No. 2] that 
continuing to allow the common law to rely on Crown sovereignty and terra nullius to deny Aboriginal rights would 
―…destroy the equality of all Australian citizens before the law. The common law of this country would perpetrate 
injustice if it were to continue to embrace the enlarged notion of terra nullius and to persist in characterizing the 
indigenous inhabitants of the Australian colonies as people too low in the scale of social organization to be 
acknowledged as possessing rights and interests in land…‖ In Mabo No. 2 the Court rejected terra nullius as a 
ground for finding that native title did not survive the Crown‘s acquisition of sovereignty, but it did not shift to a 
paradigm that fully respected the equality of peoples because it believed that the ‗act of state‘ doctrine precluded the 
court from questioning the Crown‘s use of the terra nullius doctrine to deny Aboriginal sovereignty. See the 
discussion of the ‗act of state‘ doctrine in Chapter 2, below.  
5
 Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
6
 R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [Sparrow, cited to S.C.R.]. 
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the assertion of Canadian sovereignty over [A]boriginal peoples, as well as the contingent 
theory of [A]boriginal right[s] that it generates, ultimately rest on unacceptable notions 
about the inherent superiority of European nations…We believe it abhorrent that Canada 
was constituted in part by reliance on a belief in the inequality of peoples and that such 
belief continues to inform political and legal practice…‖7 
 
Asch and Macklem challenged the ―legal imagination‖ to reject the settlement thesis and to 
construct a new foundation for Canadian federalism and Canadian sovereignty. They 
acknowledged that even though this approach holds great promise it may generate 
apprehensions, such as a concern that recognizing Aboriginal sovereignty might lead to a 
―constitutional hiatus‖.8 
The Supreme Court‘s acknowledgement that Crown sovereignty lacks legitimacy unless 
rooted in a treaty is only one of a number of cracks in the foundation of the rights paradigm. The 
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples called for the removal of racist and ethnocentric 
doctrines from Canada‘s foundations and called for recognition of shared sovereignty.9 In the 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations General Assembly also 
affirmed the principle that indigenous peoples are equal to all other peoples and condemned 
doctrines that conflict with this principle.  Justice Binnie foreshadowed a reframing of Canadian 
sovereignty by the Supreme Court when he stated ―Aboriginal peoples do not stand in opposition 
to, nor are they subjected by, Canadian sovereignty. They are part of it.‖10 
                                                 
7
 Michael Asch & Patrick Macklem, ―Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An Essay on R. v. Sparrow‖ 
(1991) 29 Alta. L. Rev. 498 at 510. See also Patrick Macklem, ―First Nations Self-Government and the Borders of 
the Canadian Legal Imagination‖ (1991) 36 McGill L.J. 382 [Macklem, ―Legal Imagination‖] and Patrick Macklem, 
―Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples‖ (1993) 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1311 [Macklem, 
―Distributing Sovereignty‖]. For an analysis of how the content of the Aboriginal title doctrine fails to comply with 
principles of equality see Richard Bartlett, ―The Content of Aboriginal Title and Equality Before the Law‖ (1998) 
61 Sask. L. Rev. 377. 
8
 Ibid. at 512-517. 
9
 See below, text accompanying notes 397-398. 
10
 Mitchell v. Minister of National Revenue., 2001 SCC 33 at para. 135, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 [Mitchell]. 
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All of these developments make it easier for the Canadian ―legal imagination‖11 to rise to 
Asch and Macklem‘s challenge than it was two decades ago. While the Supreme Court has not 
formally pronounced the death of the old paradigm, its formulation of the duty to consult and 
accommodate and its recognition that Aboriginal societies‘ cultural security and continuity 
deserve protection demonstrate that the new paradigm is already leaving its mark on the law. 
 This paper reviews the roots of the rights paradigm and outlines some of the broader 
implications of the new equality paradigm. It considers how the territory of Aboriginal nations 
came to be reduced to Aboriginal title, a doctrine premised on the superiority of European 
peoples, and argues that replacing Aboriginal title with a renewed respect for Aboriginal 
sovereignty is consistent with the continued integrity of Canada as a state and is an approach that 
holds the greatest promise for reconciliation. 
As the power balance in North America shifted toward European settler nations and their 
successors, the initial respect of the settler states for Aboriginal sovereignty and a government-
to-government relationship dissipated. In Canada, courts presumed that Crown sovereignty had 
displaced Aboriginal sovereignty, even though courts in the United States continued to recognize 
Aboriginal sovereignty, albeit in a ―diminished‖ form. 
Even though Canadian courts did not acknowledge continuing Aboriginal sovereignty, 
this did not leave Aboriginal peoples without common law rights, rooted in pre-existing 
Aboriginal culture and customs. In particular, Aboriginal rights to land, or ―Aboriginal title‖ 
could arise from Aboriginal occupancy that predated Crown sovereignty. Nevertheless, 
Aboriginal rights were eclipsed by the dominance of the settler society until the Supreme Court‘s 
                                                 
11
 Asch & Macklem, supra note 7 at 512-517, and above, text accompanying notes 7-8; see generally Macklem, 
―Legal Imagination‖, supra note 7. 
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decision in Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney-General)
12
 became a catalyst for the 
development of the law of Aboriginal rights and, in particular, Aboriginal title. This was 
reinforced by the entrenchment of Aboriginal rights in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
13
 
Nevertheless, the doctrine of Aboriginal title that has emerged combines a high evidentiary 
burden with only limited rights that are vulnerable to public interest considerations.  
 In Haida Nation and Taku River the Supreme Court recognized that Aboriginal peoples 
were sovereign and that the Crown‘s assertions of sovereignty could only achieve legitimacy 
after honourable negotiations with Aboriginal peoples. Recognition of the equal sovereign status 
of Aboriginal peoples and their nations forms the legal and constitutional foundation of the 
equality paradigm.  By applying fundamental constitutional principles to limit the scope of the 
‗act of state‘ doctrine it is possible to scrutinize the legitimacy of Crown sovereignty without 
threatening the unity or territorial integrity of Canada. A court can recognize the continuing 
sovereignty of an Aboriginal nation and declare the need for a treaty to legitimize the Crown‘s 
sovereignty over the nation‘s territory without creating a legal ―hiatus‖ or vacuum. Even though 
treaty negotiations take time, courts can protect the interests of third parties in the interim by 
applying the de facto doctrine and the constitutional guarantee of the rule of law. The Supreme 
Court did not combine its recognition of Aboriginal sovereignty in Haida Nation and Taku River 
with explicit recourse to the de facto doctrine, but it did impose a duty to consult and, if 
necessary, accommodate. This duty parallels the de facto doctrine by preserving the rule of law 
and existing third party interests, and it does so in a manner that is respectful of the interests and 
sovereignty of Aboriginal peoples until sovereignty claims are reconciled. 
                                                 
12
 [1973] S.C.R. 313, 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145 [Calder cited to S.C.R.]. 
13
 Supra note 5. 
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 Aboriginal sovereignty is compatible with Canada‘s constitution and with federalism.  
Fears that recognizing Aboriginal sovereignty and then legitimizing Crown sovereignty would be 
costly or that the interests of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples will inevitably conflict are 
unwarranted. In particular, they fail to take into account the benefits a just settlement will bring 
to all Canadians. Affirming the sovereignty of Aboriginal nations and recognizing their right to 
self-determination in treaties negotiated in accordance with the principle of the equality of 
peoples will also strengthen Canada‘s claim to territorial integrity in international law. 
 The Supreme Court has not expressly returned to the objective of reconciling sovereignty 
claims since Haida Nation and Taku River. Subsequent decisions did not conflict with this aim 
and enhanced some aspects of the legal foundation for recognizing Aboriginal sovereignty. In 
particular, the Supreme Court‘s most recent formulations of the purpose of section 35 offers 
strong evidence that the Court‘s perspective has matured beyond the rights paradigm that favours 
the sovereign powers of the Crown to one that places Aboriginal peoples and the Crown on an 
equal plane.
14
 The Court has expressed its agreement with Brian Slattery‘s conception of section 
35 as a ―generative‖ constitutional order in which section 35 serves a ―dynamic and not merely a 
static function.‖15 This understanding of section 35 holds greater potential for achieving 
reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples than the doctrines of Aboriginal 
rights and title as previously formulated. Indeed, if the Supreme Court is prepared to apply the 
fundamental features of Slattery‘s theory of the generative structure of Aboriginal rights,16 then 
                                                 
14
 See Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43 [Rio Tinto] and Beckman v. Little 
Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53 [Beckman] and discussion of these decisions below. 
15
 Rio Tinto, ibid. at para. 38, quoting Slattery, ―Honour of the Crown‖, supra note 3 at 440. 
16
 See Brian Slattery, ―The Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights‖ (2007) 38 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 595 [Slattery, 
―Generative Structure‖] and Brian Slattery ―The Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title‖ (2006) 85 Can. Bar. Rev. 255 
[Slattery, ―Metamorphosis‖]. 
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this would preclude a concept of Aboriginal title that relies on the doctrine of discovery to 
provide the Crown with its underlying title.  
Until the Supreme Court of Canada expressly disavows any further reliance on the 
doctrines of discovery and terra nullius and the priority these doctrines afford to Crown 
sovereignty the adoption of a new paradigm in Aboriginal law will be incomplete. This paper 
will argue that the Supreme Court must continue on the path to a new Aboriginal law, because 
refusing to scrutinize unilateral assertions of sovereignty by the Crown would be contrary to 
fundamental principles of the Constitution and international law. Moreover, the Supreme Court‘s 
renewal of the foundations of Aboriginal law is a necessary response to a crisis in Aboriginal law 
that bears many similarities to a process first described by Thomas Kuhn with respect to how a 
―paradigm shift‖ occurs in the natural sciences. Kuhn‘s description of a paradigm in crisis 
illuminates the parallel processes occurring in Aboriginal law. Founding Aboriginal law on an 
assumed superiority of settler peoples and states has created a moral crisis. Attempting to 
alleviate the resulting injustices through the paradigm of Aboriginal rights and title has proved 
impractical and ineffective and is causing a crisis in application.  
 Although it would be premature to attempt to describe the full range of consequences of 
grounding Aboriginal law in the principle of the equality of peoples, it is apparent that a claim to 
Aboriginal title sells short the full range of sovereign powers still possessed by Aboriginal 
peoples, and that a number of other doctrines that arose from the rights paradigm will also need 
to be reconsidered. These doctrines include the inalienability of Aboriginal land, the 
extinguishment of Aboriginal rights, and the nature of the fiduciary relationship between 
Aboriginal peoples and the Crown. Most importantly, the process of legitimizing Crown 
sovereignty holds the promise of reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples. 
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Chapter 1: From Sovereignty to Aboriginal Title 
  
 The history of European recognition of Aboriginal sovereignty and the development of 
Aboriginal title reveals that imperial attitudes toward Aboriginal sovereignty were determined 
more by expediency than law. Aboriginal nations were treated as sovereign nations as long as 
this suited the Crown‘s purposes. Thereafter, only the prior occupation of land by Aboriginal 
societies was recognized through the doctrine of Aboriginal title. The rights to land recognized 
by this doctrine were subject to the superior rights and title of the settler state, and vulnerable to 
extinguishment. 
1.1 Early Respect for Aboriginal Sovereignty 
 
 The extent to which European powers viewed Aboriginal nations as sovereign in law 
during the early days of settlement remains controversial. At minimum, however, initial 
assertions of sovereignty were not accompanied by serious efforts to govern or conquer 
Aboriginal peoples. In those early days, since Aboriginal nations ―were well able to defend 
themselves‖, relations with them were ―conducted on a basis of rough equality‖.17 
 Since at least early in the 17
th
 century, English courts had legal principles to govern 
imperial law, as distinct from the ―municipal law‖, which applied to the internal affairs of 
England, and systems of ―colonial municipal law‖ that applied in imperial possessions. The 
                                                 
17
 Brian Slattery, ―Understanding Aboriginal Rights‖ (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727 at 733 [Slattery, ―Aboriginal 
Rights‖]. For a description of the ―government to government‖ relationship between First Nations and the British in 
the years leading up to the Royal Proclamation of 1763 (infra, note 33) and the associated Treaty of Niagara, see 
also John Borrows, ―Constitutional Law from a First Nation Perspective: Self-Government and the Royal 
Proclamation‖ (1994) 28 U.B.C. L. Rev. 1 at 11-15 [Borrows, ―Royal Proclamation‖]. On the Crown‘s respect for 
inherent Aboriginal rights of self-determination and the ―nation to nation‖ relationship reflected in the negotiation 
and content of the Georgian and Victorian treaties see generally James [sákéj] Henderson, ―Empowering Treaty 
Federalism‖ (1994) 58 Sask. L. Rev. 241 [Henderson, ―Treaty Federalism‖], and see especially ibid. at 250-258. 
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sources of imperial law included statutes of Parliament, instruments issued under the royal 
prerogative, Crown usage and practice, and the Roman law of nations, or jus gentium.
18
 
 At least some British observers and officials acknowledged that ―discovery‖ gave Britain 
only a right of ―pre-emption‖, ―an exclusive right as amongst European states of acquiring 
sovereignty over native peoples and lands by conquest or cession.‖19 Also, colonial statutes, 
judges and commentators of the late 17
th
 and early 18
th
 centuries operated on the premise that 
discovery alone did not end the sovereignty of Aboriginal peoples but considered it to have been 
surrendered only after conquest or through the consent of the Aboriginal nation by treaty.
20
 
 Even though imperial law supported assertions of Crown sovereignty, it accepted that 
Aboriginal customary law and certain property rights continued after the assumption of Crown 
sovereignty unless specifically abrogated, inconsistent with British sovereignty, or 
unconscionable.
21
 The colonial law doctrine of sovereign succession presumed that the British 
Crown respected the rights and property of inhabitants, and the purpose of this law was to 
―reconcile the interests of local inhabitants across the empire to a change in sovereignty‖22 
Similarly, the ―doctrine of continuity‖ presumed that Aboriginal laws, customs and property 
rights continued after a change in sovereignty unless extinguished, voluntarily surrendered by 
treaty, or inconsistent with the sovereignty of the new regime.
23
 
                                                 
18
 Mark D. Walters, ―Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut (1705-1773) and the Legal Status of Aboriginal Customary 
Laws and Government in North America‖ (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 785 at 789-90 [Walters, ―Mohegan 
Indians‖]. See also, generally, Slattery, ―Aboriginal Rights‖, ibid. at 736-741. Slattery referred to the same body of 
law as ―colonial law‖ or ―imperial constitutional law‖, ibid. at 737. 
19
 Ibid. at 793. 
20
 Ibid. at 792-95.  
21
 Slattery, ―Aboriginal Rights‖, supra note 17 at 737-39 and N.K. Zlotkin, ―Judicial Recognition of Aboriginal 
Customary Law in Canada: Selected Marriage and Adoption Cases‖ [1984] 4 C.N.L.R. 1. 
22
 Mitchell, supra note 10 at para. 144, Binnie J. See also the discussion at ibid. paras. 145-150. 
23
 Ibid. at paras. 10, 61 and 62 and sources cited therein including Slattery, ―Aboriginal Rights‖, supra note 17 at 
738 and Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) [McNeil, Aboriginal 
Title] at 171-74. 
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For rights to land, or Aboriginal title, imperial law only provided the foundation. The 
group‘s customs determined how the right was expressed and how those rights were allocated 
among the members of the group. Therefore, Slattery has described Aboriginal title as ―an 
autonomous body of law that bridges the gulf between native systems of tenure and the European 
property systems applying in the settler communities. It overarches and embraces these systems, 
without forming part of them.‖24 
 A case that may support early judicial recognition of Aboriginal sovereignty, and at least 
illustrates the continuity of pre-existing Aboriginal laws in territories claimed by Britain is the 
protracted 18
th
 century case of Mohegan Indians, by their Guardians v. The Governor and 
Company of Connecticut.
25
 The Mohegan claimed that the colony of Connecticut had wrongfully 
deprived them of land reserved to them by treaty. The governor and council of Massachusetts, 
having been commissioned by the Crown to hear the dispute, ruled in favour of the Mohegan in 
1705. This was followed by a complex series of events that resulted in several decisions of 
Commissions of Review and two decisions of the Appellate Committee of the Privy Council, and 
the proceedings did not end until the final Appellate Committee decision was approved by the 
Crown in 1773.
26
   
 Mark D. Walters‘ detailed review of Mohegan Indians found that the relevant rulings 
were equivocal, at best, on whether British law recognized Aboriginal nations on reserved lands 
as internationally sovereign states.
27
 In his view, assessments that took the case as judicial 
                                                 
24
 Slattery, ―Aboriginal Rights‖, ibid. at 744-45.  
25
 (1705-73), unreported [Mohegan Indians], cited in Walters, ―Mohegan Indians‖, supra note 18 at 786. 
26
 Walters, ―Mohegan Indians‖, ibid. at 805. 
27
 Ibid. at 820, 829. Walters cites as advocates of the position that the case supports recognition of full sovereignty, 
inter alia, R.L. Barsh & J. Henderson, The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1980) at 32 and B.A. Clark, Native Liberty, Crown Sovereignty: The Existing Aboriginal Right of 
Self-Government in Canada (Montreal; Kingston: McGill-Queen‘s University Press, 1990) at 39-45. See also Robert 
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support for Aboriginal sovereignty placed too much weight on the reasons of Commissioner 
Daniel Horsmanden in a 1743 interim ruling on jurisdiction. In that ruling, Horsmanden 
described the Indians as ―a Separate and Distinct People…they are treated with as Such, they 
have a Polity of their own, they make Peace and War with any Nation of Indians when they think 
fit, without controul from the English.‖28 However, he agreed that the case demonstrated 
recognition of Aboriginal customary laws and government in reserved lands within colonial 
boundaries, and at least some measure of Aboriginal independence from local colonial 
governments and courts.
29
 
 Two decisions in the proceedings provide particularly strong support for Walter‘s 
conclusion. First, the Appellate Committee of the Privy Council rejected the colony‘s argument 
that the Crown‘s commissioning of an imperial court to hear the land dispute violated the 
colony‘s charter. This demonstrated that the Privy Council considered the Mohegan a national 
unit under the Crown‘s imperial sovereignty even though the Mohegan nation was located within 
the boundaries of the colony. Second, a Commission of Review ruling in 1738 recognized the 
continuity of Aboriginal government and customary law by acknowledging the Mohegan 
government and applying customary law to determine that one Ben Uncas, who signed a release 
of all Mohegan claims, was the rightful ―sachem‖ (chief or king) of the Mohegan.30 
 When the English needed Aboriginal nations as allies, they respected their sovereignty, as 
they did during and after the Seven Years War, which ended with the Treaty of Paris in 1763. In 
                                                                                                                                                             
N. Clinton, ―Book Review of The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty by Russell Lawrence Barsh and James 
Youngblood Henderson‖ (1979-1980) 47 U. Chicago L. Rev. 846 at 852, where Clinton concluded that Mohegan 
Indians affirmed ―the autonomous and sovereign status of the Indian tribes.‖   
28
 Ibid. at 820, quoting Governour & Company of Connecticut & Mohegan Indians by their Guardians; Certifyed 
Copy of Book of Proceedings, before Commissrs. of Review, 1743 in Colonial Office Records, Public Record Office 
(Kew), London, England 323/20 at 192. 
29
 Ibid.at 829. 
30
 Ibid. at 813-18. 
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R. v. Sioui,
31
 Justice Lamer (as he then was) considered the relationship between First Nations 
and European powers in 1760 to determine whether a document that guaranteed the Huron 
certain rights was a treaty. He found that after the English suffered crushing defeats at the hands 
of the French in 1755, they realized that they needed the co-operation of the Aboriginal peoples 
if they wished to control North America, and that hostile Aboriginal peoples would compromise 
the safety and development of colonies. European powers pursued a ―generous policy‖ and ―did 
everything in their power‖ to secure the alliance or neutrality of Indian nations in treaties. They 
recognized certain Aboriginal ownership rights over land, sought terms of trade that would give 
Aboriginals a fair return, and limited interference in the internal affairs of Aboriginal nations. All 
of this indicated that they regarded Aboriginal nations as independent.
32
 
 The Royal Proclamation of 1763 reflected this ―generous‖ policy and recognized some 
Aboriginal rights. To foster positive relations with Aboriginal nations, Britain promised to 
respect their territories and to reserve to them land that had not been purchased by the Crown:  
[I]t is just and reasonable, and essential to Our Interest and the Security of Our Colonies, 
that the several Nations or Tribes of Indians, with whom We are connected, and who live 
under Our Protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the Possession of such Parts 
of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having been ceded to, or purchased by Us, are 
reserved to them, or any of them, as their Hunting Grounds…‖33 
                                                 
31
 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025, 70 D.L.R. (4th) 427 [Sioui cited to S.C.R.]. 
32
 Ibid. at 1053-55. See also Borrows, ―Royal Proclamation‖, supra note 17 at 14. Borrows observed that although 
the Articles of Capitulation at the end of the Seven Years War were apparently drafted without the input of 
Aboriginal nations, the power possessed by those nations in 1760 resulted in terms that reflected the interests of 
Aboriginal nations ―as much as if they were present and in agreement at the signing‖. Article 40 stated that the 
―Indian allies‖ would have liberty of religion and ―shall be maintained in the Lands they inhabit, if they chose to 
remain there; they shall not be molested on any pretence whatever‖, Borrows, ―Royal Proclamation‖ ibid., quoting J. 
Sullivan, ed., The Papers of William Johnson, vol. 3 (Albany: New York State University Press, 1921-1962) at 457.  
33
 George R., Proclamation, 7 October 1763 (3 Geo. III), as reproduced in Canada, Report of the Royal Commission 
on Aboriginal Peoples: Looking Forward, Looking Back, vol. 1 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at 
Appendix D [Report, vol. 1]. The Royal Commission found that this text is truer to the original text of the 
Proclamation printed by the King‘s Printer, Mark Baskett, London, 1763, than the reproduction at R.S.C., 1985, 
App. II, No. 1 [Royal Proclamation]. 
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The Proclamation also declared that only the Crown could purchase reserved lands, and it barred 
anyone else, including colonial governments, from doing so.
34
 
 At the same time, however, the Royal Proclamation favoured British perspectives not 
shared by Aboriginal people. Statements in the Proclamation that implied sovereignty over the 
territories of Aboriginal nations did not accord with the Aboriginal understanding of a 
―government to government‖ relationship with the Crown.35 In addition, although Aboriginal 
nations wanted their territories to be free from encroachment by Europeans, the Proclamation set 
out a process for removing land from Aboriginal nations.
36
 
 Although the Royal Proclamation began as a unilateral declaration of the Crown, this 
changed with the Treaty of Niagara of 1764.
37
 In the winter that followed the Royal 
Proclamation, people of the Algonquins and Nippising Nations acted as messengers for the 
British. Bearing the Royal Proclamation, they summoned numerous First Nations to a ―peace 
council‖ at Niagara in the summer of 1764. Approximately 2,000 chiefs, representing over 24 
Aboriginal nations, attended. They had come from at least as far as Nova Scotia, Hudson Bay, 
and the Mississippi.
38
 
 At the conference, Superintendent of Indian Affairs William Johnson read the terms of 
the Royal Proclamation, but the terms of the treaty itself were recorded through a Covenant 
Chain and the exchange of wampum belts. The ―Gus-Wen-Tah‖, or Two-Row Wampum 
symbolized the nature of the relationship between the parties that the treaty established, and this 
                                                 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Borrows, ―Royal Proclamation‖, supra note 17 at 12-13. 
36
 Ibid. at 16-19. 
37
 Ibid. at 20, citing E.B. O‘Callaghan, ed. Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, vol. 
7 (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Co., 1856) at 648.  In Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada (A.G.) (2000), 51 O.R. 
(3d) 641, 195 D.L.R. (4
th
) 135 leave to appeal dismissed (2001), 158 O.A.C. 199 (S.C.C.) [Chippewas of Sarnia] at 
para. 56, the Ontario Court of Appeal described the Treaty of Niagara as a ―watershed‖ event in Crown-First 
Nations relations.  
38
 Ibid. at 20-23 (citations omitted). For a similar account, see Chippewas of Sarnia, ibid at para. 54. 
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wampum had been used previously between the Haudonosaunee (Iroquois) and Europeans.
39
 In 
1983, the Haudenosaunee described this wampum to the Parliamentary Special Committee on 
Indian Self-Government: 
There is a bed of white wampum which symbolizes the purity of the agreement. There are 
two rows of purple, and those two rows have the spirit of your ancestors and mine. There 
are three beads of wampum separating the two rows and they symbolize peace, friendship 
and respect. 
 These two rows will symbolize two paths or two vessels, travelling down the same 
river together. One, a birch bark canoe, will be for the Indian people, their laws, their 
customs and their ways. The other, a ship, will be for the white people and their laws, 
their customs and their ways. We shall each travel the river together, side by side, but in 
our own boat. Neither of us will try to steer the other's vessel.
40
 
 Therefore, while the Treaty of Niagara accepted the Royal Proclamation‘s guarantee of 
Aboriginal possession of unceded lands, it did not accept the Royal Proclamation‘s assertions of 
British sovereignty over Aboriginal territory. Accordingly, Superintendent William Johnson, 
who had read the Proclamation at Niagara, was dismayed when he learned of a treaty completed 
about a year later, which included an ―expression of subjection‖. He stated that the same people 
―had subscribed to a Treaty with me at Niagara‖, that he was convinced that they ―never mean or 
intend anything like this‖, that this must have resulted from poor interpretation or some other 
mistake, and ―that they can not be brought under our laws, for some Centuries.‖ 41 He added that 
the Aboriginals did not have any word for anything like ―subjection‖, and ―if it were fully 
explained to them…it might produce infinite harm…. I dread its consequences, as I recollect that 
                                                 
39
 Ibid. at 23-24. See also Mitchell, supra note 10  at paras. 127-28. The British deliberately chose this method of 
recording the treaty because they believed that it would tie Aboriginals to the terms of the peace treaty ―according to 
their own forms of which they take the most notice…‖, Borrows, ―Royal Proclamation‖, ibid. at 22, quoting C. 
Flick, ed., The Papers of Sir William Johnson, vol. 4 (Albany, N.Y.: The University of the State of New York, 1925) 
at 329. 
40
 Mitchell, ibid. at para. 127, citing House of Commons, Special Committee on Indian Self-Government, Indian 
Self-Government in Canada: Report of the Special Committee (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1983) back 
cover. This passage is also quoted in Borrows, ―Royal Proclamation‖, ibid. at 24.  
41
 Borrows, ―Royal Proclamation‖, ibid. at 24-25, citing P. Williams, The Chain (LL.M. Thesis, York University, 
1982) [unpublished] at 83. 
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some attempts toward Sovereignty not long ago, was one of the principal causes of all our 
troubles…‖
42
 The Treaty of Niagara, therefore, did not accept the premise of superior Crown 
sovereignty that was implicit in the Royal Proclamation. Instead, as symbolized by Two-Row 
Wampum, the Crown and First Nations recognized each other as equal and autonomous and 
pledged peaceful co-existence. 
 
1.2 Sovereignty is Denied; Aboriginal Title is Born 
 
 Despite Johnson‘s protestations and the long history of treaties and alliances that dealt 
with Aboriginal nations as sovereign entities, the ascending power of the British and their 
successors in North America eventually caused claims of continuing Aboriginal sovereignty to 
be cast aside or demoted.  
 This was evident in the decisions rendered by Chief Justice Marshall of the United States 
Supreme Court early in the 19
th
 century,
43
 which remain the best-known and most influential 
treatments of the discovery doctrine and its implications for Aboriginal sovereignty and 
Aboriginal title. Although the Marshall Court did not recognize Indian nations as retaining a 
sovereignty that was equal to that of the United States, it did recognize some residual 
sovereignty, and acknowledged that the laws and rights of North America‘s ―ancient possessors‖, 
its Aboriginal peoples, had not been annulled by assertions of sovereignty by powerful 
newcomers from Europe.
44
 
                                                 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 5 L.Ed. 681 (1823) [McIntosh, cited to U.S.], Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 
U.S. 1, 8 L. Ed. 25 (1831) [Cherokee, cited to U.S.] and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 8 L. Ed. 483 (1832) 
[Worcester cited to U.S.]. 
44
 Worcester, ibid. at 543-544. 
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 Since the tension between ancient possession and the assertion of sovereignty by 
newcomers continues to be a central challenge for courts when applying  s. 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, Marshall‘s exposition of the law that flowed from this tension remains 
important. This is especially true because Marshall‘s judgments were grounded in British 
imperial law,
45
 not law particular to the United States, and because they continue to be cited by 
Canadian judges. For example, Justice Hall‘s dissenting reasons in Calder referred to McIntosh 
as ―the locus classicus of the principles governing [A]boriginal title‖ and also quoted extensively 
from Worcester.
46
 In R. v. Van der Peet, Chief Justice Lamer said that the Marshall decisions are 
―as relevant to Canada as they are to the United States".47 
 The issue of sovereignty was squarely before the Marshall court in Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia.
48
 The State of Georgia had adopted Draconian laws directed against the Cherokee 
Nation, and, if valid, those laws would have dispossessed the Cherokees from their land and 
made them subject to Georgian state law instead of their own laws. The Cherokee Nation 
brought an action in the Supreme Court, claiming that the Georgian laws at issue were contrary 
                                                 
45
 It has also been suggested that Marshall grounded his findings on Indian title on long-term custom or usage, 
especially long-term statutory usage; see Eric Kades, ―History and Interpretation of the Great Case of Johnson v. 
M’Intosh‖ (2001) 19 L.H.R. 67 at 107-110. However, since these are also sources of imperial law, the distinction 
may be of little consequence. For the nature of imperial law and its sources, see supra note 18 and accompanying 
text. For Marshall‘s judgments being grounded in imperial law, see Calder, supra note 12 at 382-383, quoting 
Norris J.A. in R. v. White and Bob (1965), 52 W.W.R. 193 at 212-13, aff‘d (1965) 52 D.L.R. (2d) 481 (S.C.C.), and 
at 387-88, citing reliance by Marshall C.J. on Campbell v. Hall (1774), 1 Cowp. 204, 98 E.R. 1045. See also Brian 
Slattery, Ancestral Lands, Alien Laws: Judicial Perspectives on Aboriginal Title (Saskatoon: University of 
Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1983) at 35-36. The roots of the discovery doctrine have been traced to Spanish 
theologian and jurist Francisco de Vitoria, professor of theology at the University of Salamanca and advisor to the 
Spanish Crown, and a proclamation of Pope Paul III in 1537 that Indians and other peoples discovered by Christians 
should be allowed to maintain their liberty and the possession of their property. See Michael C. Blumm, ―Retracing 
the Discovery Doctrine: Aboriginal Title, Tribal Sovereignty, and Their Significance to Treaty-Making in the United 
States‖ (2003-2004) 28 Vt. L. Rev. 713 at 719-721 citing, inter alia, Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title (1947) 32 
Minn. L. Rev. 28 at 45, citing Bull Sublimis Deus (1537). 
46
 Calder, supra note 12 at 380-85.  
47
 [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at para. 35, 137 D.L.R. (4th) 289 [Van der Peet], citing Slattery, ―Aboriginal Rights‖ supra 
note 17 at 759. 
48
 Supra note 43. 
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to a treaty between the United States and the Cherokee Nation, and sought an injunction to 
restrain Georgia from enforcing its laws within Cherokee territory.  
 The Supreme Court could only deal with the Cherokees‘ claim under its original 
jurisdiction if the Cherokee Nation could show that it qualified as a ―foreign state‖.  It is not 
surprising that the Cherokees lost their argument that they were a sovereign foreign state; it is 
surprising that they only lost it by a margin of three to two, with the Chief Justice siding with the 
majority. After all, the Cherokees had asked the settlers‘ court, the United States Supreme Court, 
to rule on the ambit of their nation‘s power and territory. Although the Chief Justice took a 
moderate position, the other majority decisions were much less kind to the Cherokees‘ claim.
 Chief Justice Marshall stated that a majority of the court accepted arguments that the 
Cherokees were ―a distinct political society, separated from others, capable of managing its own 
affairs and governing itself‖.49 This was evident from the treaties made with the Cherokees, 
which recognized them as capable of ―maintaining the relations of peace and war‖ and of being 
responsible, as a political entity, for treaty violations ―or for any aggression committed on the 
citizens of the United States by any individual of their community.‖50 For Marshall, C.J., 
however, this was not enough to make the Cherokee Nation a ―foreign state‖. He did not ground 
his conclusion on the nature of the Cherokee Nation or the content of treaties made with the 
Cherokees. Instead, he considered the general status of ―Indians‖ and ―Indian territories‖, and 
determined that they were ―domestic dependent nations‖ that were ―in a state of pupilage‖. The 
relationship between the United States and Indian Nations resembled that ―of a ward to his 
guardian‖.51 
                                                 
49
 Ibid. at 16. 
50
 Ibid. 
51
 Ibid. at 16-17.  
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 Marshall‘s characterization of Indian Nations has been criticized as ―…ahistorical, made 
up out of whole cloth‖.52 Indeed, the Chief Justice seems to have come to his conclusion about 
the status of Indian Nations more from an early sense of ―manifest destiny‖53 than an analysis of 
the status of Indian Nations in law. He stated that Indian territory is ―admitted to compose a part 
of the United States‖, and that ―[i]n all our maps, geographical treatises, histories, and laws, it is 
so considered.‖54 
 The concurring judgment of Justice Johnson ridiculed the notion that people ―so low in 
the grade of organized society as our Indian tribes most generally are‖ could be a ―state‖.55 
Moreover, Indian tribes are ―unknown to the books that treat of states‖ and would be regarded by 
the law of nations as ―nothing more than wandering hordes… and having neither laws or 
government.‖56 In his view, the Cherokee treaty rights only amounted to the ability to occupy, 
―as hunting grounds, just what territory we chose to allot them.‖57 
 According to Justice Baldwin, also concurring, if the Cherokee Nation could not be 
considered a foreign state, because otherwise ―the sovereign power of the people of the United 
States and union must hereafter remain incapable of action over territory to which their rights in 
full dominion have been asserted with the most rigorous authority.‖58 This, however, overlooked 
numerous treaties in which the United States government had expressly promised not to enter 
Indian Territory except as expressly permitted by treaty or by the Indian nation. Only Justice 
                                                 
52
 Blumm, supra note 45 at 750.  
53
 For the relationship between the doctrine of discovery and the principle of manifest destiny see Robert J. Miller et 
al., Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the English Colonies (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010) at 82-83. 
54
 Cherokee, supra note 43 at 17. 
55
 Ibid. at 21. 
56
 Ibid. at 27-28. 
57
 Ibid. at 24. 
58
 Ibid. at 49. 
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Thompson‘s dissent, with which Justice Story concurred, considered the significance of these 
treaties, including several with the Cherokee Nation.  
 Justice Thompson found that these treaties were open to no other interpretation than that 
the United States considered at least some Indian Nations within its borders as fully sovereign 
foreign nations. He referred to treaty terms that gave express permission for United States troops 
to pass through the Aboriginal nation, that included terms for the exchange of prisoners, and that 
contained extradition provisions that were analogous to terms the United States had entered into 
with England. He also observed that a treaty with the Cherokees declared that any citizens of the 
United States that settled in Cherokee territory would forfeit the protection of the United States 
and that the Cherokees could punish them as they pleased. Thompson J. also observed that the 
ratification process for this treaty was identical to the process that the United States used to ratify 
all treaties with sovereign nations.
59
 
 Canadian courts have focused most of their attention on Marshall‘s decisions in 
McIntosh
60
 and Worcester,
61
 which considered Aboriginal rights to land. In McIntosh, Marshall 
said that European powers adhered to a ―discovery principle‖, whereby ―discovery gave title… 
against all other European governments, which title might be consummated by possession‖ and 
which ―gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the 
natives…‖ Marshall C.J. acknowledged that the rights of Aboriginal peoples, though not 
disregarded, were impaired. They were ―admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a 
legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own 
discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily 
                                                 
59
 Ibid. at 61, 65, 70-71. 
60
 Supra note 43. 
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 Supra note 43. 
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diminished…‖ They could not sell their land to anyone they pleased, because ―discovery gave 
exclusive title to those who made it.‖62 
 Chief Justice Marshall elaborated on the discovery principle and the land rights of 
Aboriginal peoples in Worcester.
63
 He began by ridiculing the presumption behind the discovery 
principle that he had recognized in McIntosh: 
America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct people, 
divided into separate nations, independent of each other and of the rest of the world, 
having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their own laws. It is 
difficult to comprehend the proposition that the inhabitants of either quarter of the globe 
could have rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabitants of the other, or over 
the lands they occupied; or that the discovery of either by the other should give the 
discoverer rights in the country discovered which annulled the pre-existing rights of its 
ancient possessors.
64
 
The lack of ―rightful claims of dominion‖ of Europeans over Aboriginal peoples or their land 
was not determinative for the Chief Justice, who, seemingly reluctantly and without explanation, 
invoked the principle of ―might makes right‖: 
But power, war, conquest, give rights, which, after possession, are conceded by the 
world; and which can never be controverted by those on whom they descend. We 
proceed, then, to the actual state of things, having glanced at their origin; because holding 
it in our recollection might shed some light on existing pretensions.
65
 
 Nevertheless, the rights of the Aboriginal peoples sounded more robust in Worcester than 
they had in McIntosh. The discovery principle ―did not affect the rights of those already in 
possession, either as [A]boriginal occupants, or as occupants by virtue of a discovery made 
before the memory of man. It gave the exclusive right to purchase, but did not found that right on 
a denial of the right of the possessor to sell.‖66 
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 McIntosh, supra note 43 at 573-74. 
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 Supra note 43. 
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 Mitchel v. United States
67
 offers a good overview of the law of Aboriginal title that 
emerged from the trilogy. In Mitchel, the Court found that a transfer of Indian title directly to a 
non-Indian that was subsequently ratified by the Crown should be exempted from the general 
rule that Indian land was alienable only to the Crown. Justice Baldwin reviewed the law as it 
stood when the subject land was under the dominion of Great Britain, and found that this law 
accorded with what the Court had found in McIntosh.
68
 In summary, he described Aboriginal 
title as follows: 
1) Nature of the Interest: Indian title was a right to exclusive enjoyment ―in their own way and 
for their own purposes.‖ Indians were ―considered as owning‖ the lands they occupied, and the 
law protected their possession. The ultimate fee was in the Crown. The Crown could grant the 
fee while the land remained in the possession of the Indians, but possession could not be taken 
without their consent. It was a ―settled principle, that their right of occupancy was ―as sacred as 
the fee simple of the whites.‖69 
 
2) Collective nature of the right: Indians owned the land ―by a perpetual right of possession in 
the tribe or nation inhabiting them, as their common property, from generation to generation, not 
as the right of the individuals located on particular spots‖.70 
 
3) Test for Aboriginal title: Whether land was possessed or occupied by Indians should be 
considered ―with reference to their habits and modes of life‖. Therefore, ―their hunting grounds 
were as much in their actual possession as the cleared fields of the whites‖.71 
 
4) Extinguishment: Indian title was extinguished if the land was abandoned, ceded to the 
government, or if there was an ―authorized‖ sale to individuals. The land could then be granted 
disencumbered of the right of occupancy, ―or enjoyed in full dominion by the purchasers from 
the Indians.‖72 
 
                                                 
67
 34 U.S. 711, 9 L.Ed. 283 at 758-59 (1835) [Mitchel, cited to U.S.]. Chief Justice Marshall remained on the bench, 
but the judgment of the court was delivered by Justice Baldwin. 
68
Ibid at 746. 
69
 Ibid. at 745-46. Baldwin J. had already referred to the interest being akin to owning and ―as sacred as the fee‖ in 
obiter in Cherokee, supra note 43 at 48. 
70
 Ibid. at 745. 
71
 Ibid. at 746. 
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 Ibid. at 746. 
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 Even though Justice Baldwin viewed these principles as having been established in the 
colonies before they were ―adopted by the king in the Royal Proclamation‖73 they recognized 
greater rights than Canadian courts have included in the modern doctrine of Aboriginal title, as 
outlined in the following section. Also, in the United States these principles operated in a context 
of the Supreme Court‘s recognition of Indian sovereignty, even though it did not recognize 
Indian nations as foreign states.  Full Indian sovereignty would not have been compatible with 
stipulations that the ultimate fee is with the government and that the Indian interest can be 
―extinguished‖ in favour of the government.  
 
1.3 Aboriginal Title in Canada 
 
 Canadian courts considered the Royal Proclamation and Aboriginal title not long after 
Confederation in St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen.74  At issue was 
whether the federal government or the Province of Ontario had control of land and resources on 
land that had been ceded by treaty in 1873. The outcome depended on the nature of the interest 
Aboriginal nations had in the land at the time of the union and before the land was ceded.
75
 The 
Privy Council observed that if the Aboriginal group held the fee simple in the territory that they 
had surrendered by treaty then Ontario could not have benefited from the cession because the 
land would not have been vested in the Crown at the time of the union. In that case, the land 
                                                 
73
 Ibid at 746. 
74
 (1885), 10 O.R. 196 (Ch.), aff‘d  (1886), 13 O.A.R. 148, aff‘d (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577, aff‘d (1888), 14 App. Cas. 
46 (P.C.) [St. Catherine’s Milling].  
75
 See e.g. arguments of counsel, ibid. at 199-203 (Ch.) and Patterson J.A.‘s observation, ibid. at 168, that counsel on 
both sides appealed to opposing views of the ―recognition or disregard by European powers of the rights of natives 
of the countries they discovered or conquered or seized on this continent…‖ 
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would not have been caught by s. 109 of the British North America Act, 1867
76
 which gave to 
each province the beneficial interest of the Crown in all lands in that province which were vested 
in the Crown at the time of the union. The Privy Council found that this, however, ―was not the 
character of the Indian interest. The Crown has all along had a present proprietary interest in the 
land, upon which the Indian title was a mere burden.‖77 If Aboriginal title is a ―mere burden‖ on 
the Crown‘s underlying title it is a weak interest that is inferior to the Crown‘s ―ultimate title‖. 
The essence of this unflattering 19
th
 century characterization of Aboriginal title remains intact in 
the 21
st
 century. 
 Of course, in the 19
th
 century there was no duty to consult Aboriginal peoples about 
decisions that affected their interests, and so the peoples whose rights were at issue in the 
litigation in St. Catherine’s Milling had no voice in these proceedings.78 While the Privy Council 
did not describe a robust Aboriginal interest, at least it acknowledged that a legal interest of 
some sort existed. The argument that Aboriginal title contained any substantive and enforceable 
right to unceded lands had received little traction in the Canadian courts that considered St. 
Catherine’s Milling. At first instance, the Chancellor found that Great Britain‘s colonial policy 
toward Aboriginal populations was that they were ―heathens and barbarians‖79 who had no 
proprietary title nor ―any such claim thereto as to interfere with the plantations, and the general 
                                                 
76
 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3 (U.K.). 
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 St. Catherine’s Milling, supra note 74 at 552-554 (P.C.)  
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 The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples observed that St. Catherine’s Milling was decided without any 
participation by the Aboriginal peoples whose rights were affected (Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples: Restructuring the Relationship, vol. 2 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1996) [Report, 
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prosecution of colonization.‖80 He ruled in favour of the Province‘s ownership of the land, a 
ruling that was upheld in all subsequent appeals and finally by the Privy Council.  
 It was not until the appeal reached the Supreme Court of Canada that the view that the 
Royal Proclamation had reserved to Aboriginal peoples a ―title‖ that included a proprietary 
interest received any judicial support, and then only from the two dissenting Justices, Strong and 
Gwynne JJ., who were outnumbered by four Justices who ruled that the appeal should be 
dismissed. The judgment of Justice Henry is notable for the candour with which he 
acknowledged that the practice of treating with Aboriginal nations was not grounded in the 
honour of the Crown or Aboriginal sovereignty. It was just an expedient measure to mollify 
Aboriginal nations while they were powerful: ―In the first settlement of the country to assert 
sovereignty and to put that assertion into operation would have caused war, and it was necessary 
to treat with the Indians from time to time in order to facilitate settlement.‖81 
 Lord Watson delivered the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council that 
dismissed the further appeal. He emphasized the Proclamation‘s description of the reserved lands 
as ―part of Our dominions and territories‖ and characterized the tenure of the Indians as ―a 
personal and usufructuary right, dependent on the good will of the Sovereign‖.82 He did not 
consider it necessary to express an opinion on ―the precise quality of the Indian right‖.83 
 This was not much of an endorsement for Aboriginal title from the Privy Council. Given 
the climate of the times, however, the result could have been worse. European imperialism was 
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 St. Catherine’s Milling, supra note 74 at 640-42 (S.C.C.). 
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at its most powerful, and had become infused with racism.
84
 This was reflected in Cooper v. 
Stuart,
85
 a decision that the Privy Council delivered only a year after its decision in St. 
Catherine’s Milling. In that case, Lord Watson, again speaking for the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council, treated the interests of native inhabitants of the Colony of New South Wales as 
undeserving of legal significance by finding that the territory was ―…practically unoccupied, 
without settled inhabitants or settled law, at the time when it was peacefully annexed to the 
British dominions.‖86 This terra nullius doctrine still prevailed in Australia when the Australian 
High Court first recognized Aboriginal title in 1992, in Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2).
87
 
 For much of the 20
th
 Century, Canadian law remained indifferent, at best, to the rights of 
Aboriginal peoples. The litigation of land claims was hindered by a 1927 amendment to the 
Indian Act that required a license for soliciting funds for legal claims. This remained in force 
until 1951.
88
 In 1990, the Supreme Court of Canada observed that for fifty years after the 
publication of a 1916 constitutional textbook, Aboriginal rights to land were not even the subject 
of academic literature.
 89
 By the late 1960s both the policy and actions of Canadian governments 
presumed that Aboriginal land claims were not legally enforceable. It was mainly the Calder 
decision in 1973 that caused a reassessment of this position.
90
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 The Supreme Court‘s decision in Calder91 was a chapter in the long struggle of British 
Columbia‘s Nisga‘a for recognition of their rights to land. The Nisga‘a‘s aims were modest. 
They did not seek to have their rights to land determined; they only sought a declaration that 
those rights had not been extinguished. Their action was unsuccessful, and their appeals were 
dismissed. 
 Judson J. (Martland  and Ritchie JJ. concurring) found that the Nishga‘a retained some 
sort of rights to the land after sovereignty, but that the Crown had extinguished their rights by 
enacting legislation to open their lands to settlement and by alienating some of the Nishga‘a land 
on terms that were inconsistent with the continued existence of their interest. These findings 
were fatal to the claim when they were combined with the concurrence of these Justices with 
Justice Pigeon‘s opinion that the appeal had to be dismissed on procedural grounds.92 
 Although the court did not need to rule on the nature of Aboriginal title, Judson J. 
concluded that Aboriginal title existed independently of the Royal Proclamation, because ―the 
fact is that when the settlers came, the Indians were there, organized in societies and occupying 
the land as their forefathers had done for centuries. This is what Indian title means and it does 
not help one in the solution of this problem to call it a ‗personal or usufructuary right‘‖.93 This 
re-characterization of Aboriginal title was of lasting significance because it placed the source of 
Aboriginal title in the common law and not in the good graces of the Crown, and it framed it as 
an interest in land and not as merely a personal interest. However, in spite of the recognition that 
Indians were ―organized in societies‖ the Court did not acknowledge that the land was the 
territory of a sovereign Aboriginal nation, for that would not have been consistent with the rights 
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paradigm that recognized only the Crown‘s sovereignty. However, by recognizing the collective 
dimension to Aboriginal title the Court tacitly acknowledged that the society must have had had 
some capacity to regulate the use of its land.
94
 
 The spirited dissent of Justice Hall (Spence and Laskin JJ. concurring), also breathed life 
into the doctrine of Aboriginal title by contending that the Aboriginal title of the Nisga‘a had not 
been extinguished. Their title did not depend on treaty, executive order or legislative enactment, 
and Hall J. observed that at common law, possession itself was proof of ownership, and 
―[u]nchallenged possession is admitted here.‖95 He described Aboriginal title as a claim for ―an 
equitable title or interest, a usufructuary right and a right to occupy the lands…which does not in 
any way deny the Crown‘s paramount title‖.96 Hall J. found that the Crown bore the onus of 
proving extinguishment, which would require a statute that demonstrated a ―clear and plain‖ 
intent to extinguish, and the Crown did not discharge this onus.
97
 This criterion for 
extinguishment was later adopted by the Supreme Court for determining whether extinguishment 
had occurred before constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal rights.
98
 Justice Hall‘s dissent 
motivated governments to return to land claims negotiations, which ultimately resulted in a 
settlement for the Nisga‘a.99 
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 The Supreme Court revisited the law of Aboriginal title in Guerin v. R.
100
 It found that 
the Crown had breached its fiduciary duty to the Musqueam Indian Band by leasing surrendered 
reserve land on much less favourable terms than had been approved by the Band. The Musqueam 
Band could not transfer its interest directly to a third party, and so the Band had to surrender the 
land and then have the Crown lease the land. Justice Dickson stated that the Crown was under an 
equitable obligation, a trust-like fiduciary duty, to deal with the land for the benefit of the Indian 
Band. The fiduciary relationship arose from the nature of Aboriginal title, and its inalienability 
except to the Crown. A breach of the duty resulted in the same liability as would have been 
assessed for a breach of trust.
101
 
 As to the nature of Aboriginal title itself, Dickson J. said that while it ―does not, strictly 
speaking, amount to beneficial ownership, neither is its nature completely exhausted by the 
concept of a personal right.‖102 The unique qualities of Aboriginal title and the historical 
relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples caused the court to describe the interest 
itself and the fiduciary relationship it gives rise to as sui generis.
103
 
 In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia
104
 the Supreme Court of Canada heard an appeal 
brought by the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples. They had initially claimed ownership of their 
territory and jurisdiction over it, but the appeal to the Supreme Court was limited to a claim for 
Aboriginal title and self-government. The Supreme Court of Canada ordered a new trial because 
of defects in the pleadings and errors in the trial judgment. To give guidance to the judge at a 
new trial, the Court considered the nature of Aboriginal title. 
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 Chief Justice Lamer, in a judgment concurred in by the majority of the Court, 
acknowledged that Aboriginal title was now protected by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
and remained subject to the traditional limitation that Aboriginal title lands were inalienable 
except to the Crown.
105
 It ―arises out of the prior occupation of land by [A]boriginal peoples and 
out of the relationship between the common law and pre-existing systems of aboriginal law, and 
is a burden on the Crown‘s underlying title.‖106 In summary, he found: 
1) Nature of the Interest: Aboriginal title is a ―right to the land itself‖ which ―confers the right 
to use land for a variety of activities.‖ However, it is ―subject to an inherent limit that the 
activities may not be irreconcilable with the nature of the attachment to the land which forms the 
basis of the particular group‘s attachment to that land.‖ Since the Crown did not gain its 
underlying title until it ―asserted sovereignty‖ and a burden on that title could not have existed 
before the Crown had title, Aboriginal title ―crystallized‖ when sovereignty was asserted.107  
 
2) Collective nature of the right: Aboriginal title is held by all members of an Aboriginal 
group. That ―community‖ makes decisions with respect to the land.108 
 
3) Test for Aboriginal title: An Aboriginal group must show that ―their connection with the 
piece of land was of central significance to their distinctive culture‖. The court will presume that 
this is met if the Aboriginal group can demonstrate ―exclusive‖ occupation of the land pre-
sovereignty and that the group has maintained a substantial connection with the land since that 
time.
109
 
Present occupation can be relied on as proof of pre-sovereignty occupation if there is continuity 
with pre-sovereignty occupation, and an ―unbroken chain of continuity‖ need not be shown. Both 
the common law and the Aboriginal perspective on land should be taken into account in the test 
for occupancy.
110
 
The Aboriginal group must show ―exclusive‖ occupation ―at sovereignty‖. ―Exclusivity‖ is a 
common law principle and this requirement should be applied with caution, and in a manner that 
places equal weight on Aboriginal and common law perspectives.
111
  
 
(4) Extinguishment: Following Sparrow, the Court found that extinguishment of Aboriginal 
title prior to 1982 required legislation with ―clear and plain‖ intent to extinguish, and that since 
Confederation only the federal government held this power.
112
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 The foregoing describes an Aboriginal title that is but a shadow of the Indian title that 
emerged from Marshall‘s decisions.113 Moreover, Delgamuukw foresaw that a broad range of 
legislative objectives could provide grounds for an infringement of this constitutionally protected 
right,
114
 albeit subject to compensation.
115
 
 Canadian courts have applied Marshall‘s ―discovery‖ theory in support of the Crown‘s 
ultimate title to the land, but have neglected Marshall‘s finding that Aboriginal peoples retained 
a form of internal sovereignty.
116
 Without the sovereignty component, ―the moral coherence of 
his theory collapses and we are left with the old story that Marshall sought to deny – that the 
Crown obtained full sovereignty over [A]boriginal peoples by mere discovery.‖117 The Marshall 
decisions led to American law acknowledging that Indian sovereignty is residual, which meant 
that the United States government bore the onus of showing it had been diminished.
118
 Canadian 
courts acknowledged only that Aboriginal peoples‘ property rights survived Crown sovereignty; 
they were silent on what happened to Aboriginal sovereignty. 
 Courts in the United States have not always followed the principles established by the 
Marshall Court. This has caused an erosion of the domestic sovereignty of Aboriginal nations, 
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and compensation for takings of Indian lands has been limited to lands recognized by treaty or 
statute.
119
 However, this does not take away from Marshall‘s conception of Indian title, which 
Canadian courts have cited repeatedly but have not fully implemented. In effect, Marshall 
recognized that Indians maintained full ownership rights over their land, subject only to the 
federal government‘s overriding sovereignty. This gave the federal government the underlying 
title but not beneficial ownership, and the only practical consequence of this was the restriction 
on the alienability of the land.
120
 Therefore, Indian title did not include an inherent limit,
121
 and 
the test for occupancy was straightforward and referred only to the ―habits and modes of life‖122 
of the Indians, not a combination of common law and Aboriginal perspectives. The prejudice that 
can result to Aboriginal title claims from the latter approach has been underlined by the Supreme 
Court‘s decision in R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard.123 Marshall‘s simpler approach may well have 
been due to his having recognized a continuing, though diminished Aboriginal sovereignty. 
Therefore, as long as the territorial limits of the Aboriginal nation were not in dispute, the land 
within that territory would be subject to Indian title. 
1.4 Aboriginal Title – A Subordinate Right 
 
Since Delgamuukw confirmed that the Aboriginal interest ―does not amount to beneficial 
ownership‖124 it is not surprising that the Court did not describe its status in terms as glowing as 
the American court‘s description of Indian title being ―as sacred as the fee simple of the 
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whites.‖125 Indeed, Justice La Forest opined that the amount of compensation for infringement 
would not be determined based on the value of the land in fee simple, but would depend on what 
was required to preserve the Honour of the Crown.
126
 Contrast this with the view taken of Indian 
title by the United States Supreme Court in 1938, that ―[f]or all practical purposes, the tribe 
owned the land. Grants of land subject to the Indian title by the United States, which had only the 
naked fee, would transfer no beneficial interest. The right of perpetual and exclusive occupancy 
of the land is not less valuable than full title in fee.‖127 Therefore, in addition to being 
subordinate to the Crown‘s ultimate title, in Canada Aboriginal title is a lesser interest than the 
fee simple interest that other landowners take for granted. 
 The American Supreme Court has quashed federal grants that ignored Indian title because 
the United States government could not grant what it did not have.
128
 While it is too early to say 
whether the Canadian version of Aboriginal title can withstand a direct conflict with a Crown 
grant to a private party, it is unlikely to be hardy enough to survive. Thomas Isaac has offered a 
plausible rationale for why a fee simple interest would defeat Aboriginal title. This rationale is 
based in part on the Supreme Court‘s holding in Delgamuukw that the government can infringe 
Aboriginal title, and that compensation would be payable for the infringement.
129
 Isaac‘s view is 
consistent with the Ontario Court of Appeal‘s decision in Chippewas of Sarnia,130 even though 
the Court did not ground its decision on justifiable infringement. The Court held that fee simple 
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interests were valid even though the Crown patents on which they were based had been issued 
without a valid surrender of Indian reserve lands. As Isaac noted, the Court stated that it favoured 
the interests of the third party purchasers because ―[a]pparently valid acts of public officials are 
relied on by the members of the public at large in planning their affairs…The rights of a party 
aggrieved by the error must be reconciled with the interests of third parties and the interests of 
orderly administration.‖131 Moreover, Aboriginal rights ―…do not and cannot exist in a vacuum. 
In the Canadian legal tradition, no right is absolute, not even constitutionally protected 
Aboriginal rights.‖132 Although it is difficult to argue with the Court‘s desire to balance the 
interests of affected parties, Aboriginal title emerges from the ruling not as a robust property 
right but as a fragile interest that is vulnerable to public interest considerations. 
 Kent McNeil described Chippewas of Sarnia as amounting to ―judicial extinguishment‖ 
of Aboriginal title by ―present-day judicial discretion‖, notwithstanding that section 35(1) had 
been understood to bar extinguishment of Aboriginal title without the consent of the title 
holders.
133
 He observed that the Court‘s views on the validity of Crown patents and on the 
application of the good faith purchaser rule to legal interests contradicted entrenched legal 
principles and jurisprudence,
134
 and that the Court used the sui generis nature of Aboriginal title 
as an ―additional justification for applying equitable principles to deny remedies against the 
present possessors of the disputed lands.‖135 Accordingly, the decision indicated that ―regardless 
of the legal validity of [Aboriginal title]claims, judges will not necessarily allow those claims to 
prevail if they conflict with the claims of other Canadians who did not participate in and were 
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not aware of the wrongs that were committed.‖136 Although McNeil acknowledged the need for 
the courts to balance Aboriginal rights with the rights of innocent third parties, he criticized the 
Court for failing to achieve a balance in Chippewas of Sarnia, and for ignoring the Chippewas‘ 
willingness to negotiate and to waive claims of possession or damages against most of the 
possessors.
137
 
McNeil‘s concerns about the Court‘s disposition and its departures from established law 
led him to suggest that this decision invites a reappraisal of the role of the courts in the 
adjudication of Aboriginal claims.
138
 Slattery echoed these concerns when he commented that 
problematic aspects of the rejection of Aboriginal title claims in Marshall/Bernard
139
 might be 
due to courts being ―torn between a desire to right a great historical wrong – the dispossession of 
Indigenous peoples – and deep misgivings about doing so at the expense of third parties and the 
larger society.‖140 These misgivings suggest that the problem is not with the terms in which the 
doctrine of Aboriginal title is formulated or applied, but rather lies in viewing the issue as 
property claims in conflict when it is really one of sovereignties in need of reconciliation. While 
the courts are competent to adjudicate the former, the latter must ultimately be resolved through 
a political process. 
 Aboriginal title recognizes rights that arise out of prior occupation of land, but it does not 
acknowledge that this land was the territory of sovereign Aboriginal nations. Courts constructed 
the doctrine of Aboriginal title as a means of affirming that assertions of Crown sovereignty did 
not extinguish all property rights, but this failed to acknowledge that these assertions also did not 
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extinguish Aboriginal sovereignty. Although the conception of Indian title developed by the 
United States Supreme Court under Chief Justice Marshall attempted to maintain Indian 
sovereignty and ownership rights as much as possible without denying the overriding 
sovereignty of the settler state, Canadian courts have traditionally not recognized Aboriginal 
sovereignty at all. They have acknowledged Aboriginal title as only a quasi-ownership right that 
is subject to limitations that serve the interests of the new sovereign. 
The foregoing discussion has shown that as the settler society‘s power grew it no longer 
respected Aboriginal nations as equals but instead recognized only limited rights arising out of 
prior occupation. This is consistent with J.C. Smith‘s hierarchical characterization of Aboriginal 
title as the result of the domination of one political system over another. Peaceful occupation of 
servient (Aboriginal) political systems could only be achieved if the dominant European settler 
states recognized a property relationship between the servient system and at least some of the 
land it was occupying. However, the property relationship of the servient system was not fully 
incorporated into the dominant legal system. The result is that Aboriginal title straddles the legal 
systems of both societies, and courts have difficulties dealing with it. The only solution, Smith 
writes, is a political settlement.
141
 
Today‘s Canadian courts reject notions of the innate superiority of European nations, but 
they have not yet rejected the hierarchical legal doctrines that rest on such notions. They would 
not tolerate the characterization of Indian tribes offered by Justice Johnson in Cherokee,
142
 as 
uncivilized and lacking in laws or government. They should be equally uncomfortable with how 
closely his characterization of the land rights the Cherokee Nation had retained under treaty 
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corresponds to the contemporary Canadian doctrine of Aboriginal title: ―...for not to be able to 
alienate without permission of the remainder-man or lord, places them in a state of feudal 
dependence.‖143 Justice Hall, dissenting in Calder, observed that at an earlier time Aboriginal 
peoples were erroneously viewed as ―wholly without cohesion, laws or culture, in effect a 
subhuman species‖144 and he observed that even though Chief Justice Marshall had enlightened 
views on Aboriginal rights in other respects, the Chief Justice nevertheless described Indian 
tribes as ―fierce savages whose occupation was war...‖.145 Before Canadian courts can truly 
claim to have rejected these racist or ethnocentric sentiments of the past, they must also reject the 
assumption of the Crown‘s underlying title upon which the doctrine of Aboriginal title depends.  
 It follows that Aboriginal title is a poor vehicle for taking Canada to the reconciliation 
promised by s. 35(1). Aboriginal title serves the hierarchical relationship between settler and 
Aboriginal societies. This contradicts fundamental principles of the equality of peoples. The 
doctrine of Aboriginal title depends on inequality for its foundation because it defines Aboriginal 
title as a sui generis burden on the Crown’s ultimate title. Unless granted by treaty, however, the 
Crown‘s hold on the ultimate title depends on an ethnocentric perspective that assumed that 
Aboriginal peoples were too primitive to be recognized as sovereign nations and that therefore 
pre-contact North America was a terra nullius.
146
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 The doctrine of Aboriginal title cannot be part of an Aboriginal law that is rooted in the 
principle of the equality of peoples and that allows courts to question the legitimacy of Crown 
assertions of sovereignty. The next chapter examines how recent decisions of the Supreme Court 
of Canada are consistent with an equality paradigm that places the sovereignty claims of 
Aboriginal peoples and the Crown on an equal plane and that allows Crown assertions of 
sovereignty to be questioned. 
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Chapter 2: A New Recognition of Sovereignty and Equality 
 
2.1 Sovereignty in Haida Nation and Taku River 
 
The transformative nature of the decisions in Haida Nation
147
 and Taku River
148
 has 
prompted commentators to describe them as introducing ―a new constitutional paradigm 
governing Aboriginal rights‖,149 and to suggest that ―a fundamental restructuring of Canadian 
[A]boriginal law may be underway"
150
 in which ―the form of the law might be restructured to 
ensure meaningful constitutional dialogue on substantive matters between [A]boriginal nations 
and non-[A]boriginal governments‖.151 These comments were prompted by the statements in 
Haida Nation and Taku River that indicated that the Supreme Court would no longer defer to 
Crown assertions of sovereignty over Aboriginal nations that had not entered into a treaty with 
the Crown.
152
 This was particularly remarkable because in earlier cases the Supreme Court had 
granted Crown sovereignty a decisive and pivotal role in defining the rights ―recognized and 
affirmed‖ by s. 35(1). This included incorporating occupancy of land at the time the Crown 
―asserted sovereignty‖ into the test for establishing Aboriginal title,153 and describing the 
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purpose of the constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal rights as providing a framework for 
reconciling the prior occupation of Canada by Aboriginal peoples ―with Crown sovereignty.‖154 
 Chief Justice McLachlin delivered the judgment of the Court in both of the concurrently 
released judgments. In Taku River, she departed from earlier statements of the purpose of s. 
35(1). She said that the purpose of this section ―is to facilitate the ultimate reconciliation of prior 
Aboriginal occupation with de facto Crown sovereignty.‖155 Similarly, in Haida Nation, she said 
that the Crown‘s duty of honourable dealing toward Aboriginal peoples arose ―from the Crown‘s 
assertion of sovereignty over Aboriginal people and de facto control of land and resources that 
were formerly in the control of that people.‖156 Notably, McLachlin C.J.C. referred to control, 
not ownership of the land and resources, thus using terminology more consistent with 
governmental jurisdiction than with rights. If the Crown‘s sovereignty were not in question, its 
control of land and resources would be legal, not just de facto. 
 Brian Slattery contrasted the meaning of de facto (―illegal or illegitimate but accepted for 
practical purposes‖) with de jure (―rightful, legitimate, just or constitutional, and …[in] full 
compliance with all legal requirements‖).157 He concluded that the Court‘s ―choice of language‖ 
indicates that Crown claims of sovereignty will be ―legally deficient until there has been a just 
settlement of [Aboriginal] rights through negotiated treaties‖,158 which, as Slattery also pointed 
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out, was confirmed by the Chief Justice‘s description of the role of treaties.159 This description 
came in a passage that also expressly recognized the sovereignty of Aboriginal nations: 
Treaties serve to reconcile pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty with assumed Crown 
sovereignty, and to define Aboriginal rights guaranteed by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982. Section 35 represents a promise of rights recognition… This promise is realized 
and sovereignty claims reconciled through the process of honourable negotiation. It is a 
corollary of s. 35 that the Crown act honourably in defining the rights it guarantees and in 
reconciling them with other rights and interests. This, in turn, implies a duty to consult 
and, if appropriate, accommodate. 
… 
Put simply, Canada's Aboriginal peoples were here when Europeans came, and were 
never conquered. Many bands reconciled their claims with the sovereignty of the Crown 
through negotiated treaties. Others, notably in British Columbia, have yet to do so. The 
potential rights embedded in these claims are protected by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982. The honour of the Crown requires that these rights be determined, recognized and 
respected. This, in turn, requires the Crown, acting honourably, to participate in processes 
of negotiation. While this process continues, the honour of the Crown may require it to 
consult and, where indicated, accommodate Aboriginal interests.
160
 
Mark D. Walters described this passage as ―one of the most important Canadian judicial 
statements on [A]boriginal rights since 1982‖. He also observed that ―for the first time, the Court 
has recognized that it is ‗Aboriginal sovereignty‘, not just distinctive [A]boriginal societies or 
[A]boriginal occupation, that must be reconciled with Crown sovereignty.‖161 
 Walters observed that the full implications of the ideas from Haida Nation and Taku 
River remain unclear.
162
 Recognizing Aboriginal sovereignty has profound implications for 
Aboriginal rights, since it implies rights to self-determination and to jurisdiction over the 
territory to which that sovereignty applies. It will undoubtedly also affect the interpretation of 
past and future treaties. This is because the Chief Justice‘s comment indicated that Aboriginal 
sovereignty not only pre-existed ―assumed Crown sovereignty‖, but continues at least until 
                                                 
159
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sovereignty claims are reconciled through negotiation. It is highly unlikely that Aboriginal 
peoples will voluntarily relinquish their sovereignty in future negotiations,
163
 and there are good 
reasons to believe that Aboriginal nations did not do so in past treaties.
164
 It follows that Canada 
is, and will continue to be, a country with a sharing of sovereignty between federal, provincial, 
and Aboriginal governments.
165
 The belief that there is room for both Aboriginal sovereignty and 
Crown sovereignty in a federal Canada comes with a solid pedigree, which can be traced at least 
to the Treaty of Niagara of 1764. It was endorsed by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples (RCAP), has academic support,
166
 and the Supreme Court‘s movement toward this 
vision of Canadian federalism was foreshadowed by the concurring judgment of Justices Binnie 
and Major in Mitchell.
167
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 The facts in Haida Nation and Taku River presented the Supreme Court with an 
opportunity to consider the question of sovereignty. In both cases, Aboriginal groups with no 
prior treaty with the Crown were involved in treaty negotiations. Although framed in terms of 
claims to Aboriginal title and Aboriginal rights, these applications did not seek an interlocutory 
injunction, but sought judicial review of the jurisdiction of the government to make certain 
decisions affecting the land without adequate consultation or accommodation. 
 In Haida Nation, the Haida people‘s opposition to the government‘s grant to 
Weyerhaeuser of a right to harvest certain old-growth forests was, on one level, as the Court 
said, a conflict between the title claimed by the Haida people and the Crown‘s legal title. On 
another level, however, it was a conflict about jurisdiction. The Court implicitly recognized this 
when it asked whether the government was required to consult with the Haida about ―decisions 
to harvest the forest‖ and to accommodate Haida concerns about ―what if any forests in Block 6 
should be harvested…‖.168 The Province of British Columbia held legal title to the land,169 and 
these decisions could be viewed as the exercise of managerial rights that are an incident of 
ownership. However, since the subject of the Aboriginal title claim of the Haida people was their 
―traditional homeland‖,170 the claim amounted to more than just a claim to title, or ownership of 
land. The claim amounted to an assertion of jurisdiction to regulate logging, and so the 
underlying issue was whether that jurisdiction belonged to the Haida Nation or the Province of 
British Columbia.
171
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 The Supreme Court found that the Province had a duty to consult and accommodate, 
which is ―part of a process of fair dealing and reconciliation that begins with the assertion of 
sovereignty and continues beyond formal claims resolution.‖172 McLachlin C.J. observed in 
Haida Nation that the case was ―the first of its kind‖ to reach the Supreme Court, and that the 
court‘s task was to establish a ―general framework for the duty to consult, and accommodate, 
where indicated, before Aboriginal title or rights claims have been decided.‖173 She concluded 
that the Province had failed to engage in meaningful consultation.
174
 Earlier in the judgment, she 
had acknowledged that the ―[t]he stakes are huge‖ and that the Haida feared that without 
consultation and accommodation, they may be deprived of forests that are vital to them. 
Although the Haida‘s claim is strong, it may take many years to prove.175 
 The chambers judge had determined that the evidence showed that certain conclusions 
were ―inescapable‖. Among other things, the Haida had inhabited the Haida Gwaii176 
continuously since at least 1774, they had never been conquered, and they had never surrendered 
their rights by treaty.
177
 Although not pleaded as such, these facts, combined with the Crown 
having acknowledged that the Haida were qualified to engage in treaty negotiations should all be 
strong grounds for the Haida to claim that they remain sovereign. 
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2.2 Sovereignty, Legitimacy and the Act of State Doctrine 
 
 What if the Haida Nation obtained a declaration confirming their continuing sovereignty? 
Would this trump Canada‘s de facto sovereignty, and amount to a declaration that the Haida 
Nation is a foreign state, and that the Haida Gwaii are no longer not part of Canada? 
 The answer to this question is ―no‖. The act of state doctrine places limits on the 
justiciability of the validity of Crown assertions of sovereignty over a foreign land or people. It 
has been said that ―it is simply not the business of Canadian judges to start dismantling the 
Canadian state‖.178 At the same time, however, recognizing Haida sovereignty would have 
profound significance for issues relating to legal rights and obligations within Canada, and these 
issues are within the jurisdiction of Canadian courts. Accordingly, ―… it is possible to subject 
Crown sovereignty to critical reinterpretation without denying its existence.‖179 In Sparrow, the 
Supreme Court quoted with approval Professor Lyon‘s view that section 35 ―calls for a just 
settlement for Aboriginal peoples‖ and ―renounces the old rules of the game under which the 
Crown established courts of law and denied those courts the authority to question sovereign 
claims made by the Crown.‖180 Hence, the act of state doctrine only prevents a court from 
declaring that the Haida Gwaii are outside of Canada; it cannot be used to shield the Crown from 
claims that do not seek to dismantle Canada but rather to unite it by furthering the reconciliation 
sought by section 35.  
                                                 
178
 Walters, ―Morality‖, supra note 116 at 502, citing, inter alia, Vajesingji Joravarsingji and others v. Secretary of 
State or India in Council, [1924] L.R. 51 Ind. App. 357 (P.C.) at 360, Lord Dunedin.  
179
 Ibid. at 502-03. 
180
 Sparrow, supra note 6 at 1105-06, citing Noel Lyon "An Essay on Constitutional Interpretation" (1988) 26 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 95 at 100. Walters also makes this point: ibid. at 503. The Supreme Court appears to have 
implicitly renewed its approval of Lyon‘s bold interpretation of section 35 in Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para. 20: 
―Where treaties remain to be concluded, the honour of the Crown requires negotiations leading to a just settlement 
of Aboriginal claims: R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at pp. 1105-6‖. Although Lyon is not named, the 
quotation of his passage straddles the pages cited and provides the best support for the proposition it is cited for. 
  45  
 
 
 
 The Australian High Court considered itself bound by Crown claims of sovereignty when 
it recognized native title for the first time in 1992.
181
 None of the High Court Justices dissented 
from Justice Brennan‘s description of the ―act of state‖ doctrine as barring any dispute between 
the judicial and executive branches of government as to whether a territory is within the 
dominion of the Crown. This meant that the question of whether a territory has been acquired by 
the Crown is not justiciable in domestic courts, and is exclusively a matter for international 
law.
182
 Brennan J. distinguished, however, between the fact of acquisition of territory from the 
legal consequences of that acquisition under domestic law, such as the body of law that is in 
force in the new territory. The latter falls within the jurisdiction of domestic courts.
183
 
 The position taken by the Australian High Court is consistent with English law, which 
accepted Crown assertions of sovereignty as conclusive even if they were inconsistent with 
international law.
184
 Justice Hall addressed the act of state doctrine in Calder,
185
 but he did not 
challenge the doctrine itself, only its application by the Court of Appeal to deny the survival of 
Aboriginal title after sovereignty. He found that ―the Court of Appeal completely ignored the 
rationale of the doctrine which is no more than recognition of the Sovereign prerogative to 
acquire territory in a way that cannot be later challenged in a municipal Court.‖186 
 According to John Borrows, Hall J.‘s comments in Calder suggest that he would have 
allowed Crown assertions of sovereignty to be scrutinized if there were a treaty with an 
Aboriginal nation. He based this argument specifically on Hall J.‘s statement that the act of state 
doctrine applies when a ―Sovereign, in dealings with another Sovereign (by treaty of cession or 
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conquest) acquires land.‖187 He discounted Hall J.‘s statement that the use of the Crown‘s 
prerogative ―cannot be later challenged‖ as contrary to the history of parliamentary democracy‘s 
development as an ―attempt to restrict and constrain the Crown‘s prerogative powers‖.188 
Borrows also argued that the act of state doctrine must yield to the primacy of the constitution, 
including, in particular, constitutional principles of judicial independence and the rule of law.
189
 
 In Macklem‘s view, Crown claims of sovereignty must fall within the purview of 
domestic constitutional law because the content of Aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed in 
section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 depend on the legitimacy of those claims.
190
 
 The act of state doctrine did not deter Chief Justice McLachlin from scrutinizing the 
Crown‘s assertion of sovereignty to the extent necessary to conclude that, in the absence of a 
treaty, Crown sovereignty was only de facto and not de jure. However, she did not deny Crown 
sovereignty altogether. Having recognized ―pre-existing‖ Aboriginal sovereignty, she could have 
said that in the absence of a treaty Aboriginal sovereignty continued, and that there was no basis 
for Crown sovereignty. Instead, she recognized that that the Crown was sovereign at the same 
time that she described it as lacking in legal legitimacy. 
 The Supreme Court‘s approval of Lyon‘s view that courts may question sovereign claims 
made by the Crown offers an answer to why the act of state doctrine does not prevent the Court 
from questioning the legitimacy of the Crown‘s sovereignty. If Lyon is right, then the act of state 
doctrine must yield to the constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal rights in s. 35 at least to the 
extent necessary to achieve the purpose of section 35, which he described as ―a just settlement 
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for [A]boriginal peoples.‖191 That is, while the act of state doctrine prevents courts from 
―dismantling the Canadian state‖,192 for the purposes of domestic Canadian law it cannot be used 
to shield the Crown‘s assertion of sovereignty from legal and constitutional scrutiny. 
 This interpretation of Lyon‘s assertion is consistent with the context in which it appears. 
Lyon understood that one of the ―ground rules‖ of the courts before 1982 was that Aboriginal 
land claims were always subject to Crown assertions of sovereignty and title, but he challenged 
the Supreme Court of Canada to determine Aboriginal rights in accordance with higher standards 
of constitutional and international law.
193
 Anticipating the Supreme Court‘s distinction between 
legality and legitimacy in Reference re Secession of Quebec,
194
 Lyon argued that established 
legal doctrines must yield to constitutional principles and constitutional standards of 
legitimacy.
195
 
 If the purpose of the act of state doctrine is to prevent the judiciary from interfering with 
executive powers over foreign policy,
196
 then its ability to fulfill this purpose is not compromised 
by limiting its application to that realm. This is consistent with the Supreme Court‘s conclusion 
that it had jurisdiction to address the question of whether Quebec has a right to secede from 
Canada unilaterally. The Supreme Court found that this was not a matter of ―pure‖ international 
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law, which would be beyond the Court‘s jurisdiction.197 The question did not require the Court to 
―purport to act as an arbiter between sovereign states or more generally within the international 
community.‖198 Moreover, the Court was only giving an opinion on ―certain legal aspects of the 
continued existence of the Canadian federation.‖199 The Court also said that although it was wary 
about speculating about certain political matters, ―the Reference questions are directed only to 
the legal framework within which the political actors discharge their various mandates.‖200 The 
same reasoning would allow the Court to conclude that it can question Crown assertions of 
sovereignty to the extent necessary to achieve the purposes of section 35. 
 The Supreme Court recently confirmed that not even the Crown‘s prerogative power over 
foreign relations is immune from constitutional scrutiny. In Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr
201
 
the Court held: 
The prerogative power is the "residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority, which at any 
given time is legally left in the hands of the Crown"… It is a limited source of non-
statutory administrative power accorded by the common law to the Crown. 
… 
In exercising its common law powers under the royal prerogative, the executive is not 
exempt from constitutional scrutiny. It is for the executive and not the courts to decide 
whether and how to exercise its powers, but the courts clearly have the jurisdiction and 
the duty to determine whether a prerogative power asserted by the Crown does in fact 
exist and, if so, whether its exercise infringes the Charter or other constitutional 
norms.
202
 
 
 Since Canada is a constitutional democracy, every exercise of governmental power must 
be consistent with the constitution. At the same time, courts must respect that it is the 
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responsibility of the executive to choose among a range of constitutional options.
203
 The Court 
concluded that the conduct of Canadian officials in the course of interrogations had contributed 
to Mr. Khadr‘s ongoing detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba by the United States government. 
This conduct violated Canada‘s international human rights obligations and Mr. Khadr‘s rights 
under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
204
 The Court limited the 
remedy to a declaration that Mr. Khadr‘s Charter rights had been infringed. It allowed the Prime 
Minister‘s appeal of the Federal Court of Appeal‘s order that the Canadian government must ask 
the United States to return Mr. Khadr to Canada, in view of the Court‘s respect for the 
executive‘s prerogative powers, the limits of the Court‘s institutional competence and the 
responsibility of the executive. The Court was satisfied that the declaration would provide a legal 
framework for the executive to consider the appropriate action to take in respect of Mr. Khadr.
205
 
If all actions of the government of a constitutional democracy must conform to the 
constitution then it is difficult to see why even a seizure of territory, if unconstitutional, could be 
saved by the act of state doctrine. However, it is not necessary, for the purpose of this analysis, to 
determine that question. By qualifying Crown‘s sovereignty as de facto, McLachlin C.J. was not 
addressing Canada‘s territorial integrity in the manner that this might be viewed by international 
law. She was only referring to deficiencies in the legitimacy of the sovereignty of the Crown 
over Aboriginal peoples and their territories, based on standards of legitimacy in Canada‘s 
constitution. Only treaties that reconcile ―pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty with assumed 
Crown sovereignty‖ 206 can remedy those deficiencies. 
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 The extent to which section 35 allows assertions of Crown sovereignty to be challenged 
notwithstanding the act of state doctrine must be limited by the objectives of section 35 itself, 
which include ―the reconciliation of [A]boriginal peoples and non-[A]boriginal peoples‖.207 This 
means that Canada‘s territorial integrity must be immune from challenge. A judicial declaration 
that purported to remove from Canada some of its territory, along with the Aboriginal or non-
Aboriginal Canadian citizens who occupy that territory, would evoke among many Canadians 
negative emotions that would be inconsistent with furthering the objective of reconciliation. 
 Therefore, any declaration that Crown sovereignty over a particular Aboriginal nation 
was only de facto and not de jure would not demonstrate a deficiency in the Crown‘s sovereignty 
in international law; it would only determine that the Crown‘s assertion of sovereignty failed to 
meet Canadian constitutional standards of legitimacy. The consequences of this declaration and 
an accompanying finding that the Aboriginal nation‘s ―pre-existing‖ sovereignty remained intact 
would therefore be limited by their purpose and context. However, these declarations would  
affect the legal relationship between the Aboriginal nation and the Crown, as will be considered 
in chapter 4, below. 
 
2.3 The De Facto Doctrine and the Rule of Law 
 
 A declaration that Canadian sovereignty over a particular territory lacks legitimacy might 
cause concern about the security of property and other interests in the territory. For example, 
would the declaration invalidate all Crown acts, such as the permission to re-open a mine that 
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was contested in Taku River, or would it jeopardize the fee simple interest of a suburban 
homeowner? 
 By characterizing the Crown‘s sovereignty as de facto, Chief Justice McLachlin has 
reminded us that the the de facto doctrine and the constitutional guarantee of the rule of law will 
ensure that interests based on more than a century of reliance on Crown sovereignty will not 
suddenly vanish. The most important precedent for protecting existing interests after existing 
laws are declared invalid is the Supreme Court of Canada‘s decision in Reference re: Manitoba 
Language Rights.
208
 Since 1890 all of Manitoba‘s laws had been enacted exclusively in English, 
contrary to mandatory constitutional requirements. This meant that all of these laws were invalid, 
but the Court recognized that simply declaring this, without more, would create a ―legal 
vacuum…with consequent legal chaos in the Province of Manitoba.‖209 This would have violated 
the rule of law, a fundamental principle of the Constitution. The rule of law ―requires the 
creation and maintenance of an actual order of positive laws which preserves and embodies the 
more general principle of normative order. Law and order are indispensable elements of civilized 
life.‖210 Therefore, although Manitoba‘s laws lacked legal legitimacy they could not simply be 
quashed; they had to remain in place until they could be replaced with laws that were 
constitutionally legitimate. 
 The Supreme Court therefore ordered that rights and obligations that arose under 
Manitoba‘s invalid unilingual laws would continue to have the same effect as if they had arisen 
                                                 
208
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under valid enactments, and that this would continue for as long as necessary for Manitoba to 
enact its laws in a valid form. In addition, since Manitoba needed a valid legal system while 
Manitoba complied with its obligations, the Court deemed all laws that would be in force but for 
their constitutional defect ―temporarily valid‖.211  
 In support of these measures, the Court relied on the de facto doctrine and the 
―constitutional guarantee of the rule of law‖.212 The Court adopted Judge Albert Constantineau‘s 
definition of the de facto doctrine: 
 The de facto doctrine is a rule or principle of law which, in the first place, justifies 
the recognition of the authority of governments established and maintained by persons 
who have usurped the sovereign authority of the State, and assert themselves by force and 
arms against the lawful government; secondly, which recognizes the existence of, and 
protects from collateral attack, public or private bodies corporate, which, though 
irregularly or illegally organized, yet, under color of law, openly exercise the powers and 
functions of regularly created bodies; and, thirdly, which imparts validity to the official 
acts of persons who, under color of right or authority, hold office under the 
aforementioned governments or bodies, or exercise lawfully existing offices of whatever 
nature, in which the public or third persons are interested, where the performance of such 
official acts is for the benefit of the public or third persons, and not for their own personal 
advantage.
213
 
 
Accordingly, the Court found that the de facto doctrine protected ―justified expectations‖ of 
those who had relied on the acts of administrators of invalid laws and on the efficacy of public 
and private corporations that owed their existence to those laws.
214
 However, the doctrine did not 
―…validate the authority under which the acts took place. In other words, the doctrine does not 
give effect to unconstitutional laws.‖215 Since the de facto doctrine did not validate the authority 
under which the acts took place, as soon as the Supreme Court rendered its judgment and 
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declared Manitoba‘s unilingual laws invalid, officials and entities in Manitoba could no longer 
derive any ―colour of authority‖ from these laws.216 This meant that the de facto doctrine could 
only offer a partial solution to the prospect of a legal vacuum. 
 Nevertheless, the Court granted temporary validity to the unilingual laws of Manitoba. It 
did this by combining the de facto doctrine with the constitutional rule of law guarantee. It stated 
that this guarantee would not tolerate the absence, in Manitoba, of a ―valid and effectual legal 
system for the present and future‖. This guarantee required that the rights and obligations that 
arose under invalid Manitoba Acts and which would not be saved by the de facto or other 
doctrines
217
 would have the same force they would have had if they had arisen under valid laws 
―for that minimum period of time during which it would be impossible for Manitoba to comply 
with its constitutional duty...‖.218   
Though in essence the Court only relied on the constitutional rule of law guarantee to 
expand the traditional scope of the de facto doctrine, it observed that ―analogous support‖ for 
doing so was available in cases that applied the doctrine of state necessity, which allows 
governments to justify otherwise illegal conduct on the grounds of a public emergency.
219
 In that 
situation, ―…to ensure the rule of law, the Courts will recognize as valid the constitutionally 
invalid Acts of the Legislature.‖220 Courts have done this in circumstances where ―a failure to do 
so would lead to legal chaos and thus violate the constitutional requirement of the rule of law‖.221 
Although this doctrine has more often been invoked to uphold actions taken by the executive or 
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the legislative branch of government in emergency situations, the Supreme Court found that the 
doctrine will also apply where the the Constitution could otherwise be used to create ―chaos and 
disorder‖,222 and that a legal void created by judicial invalidation of unconstitutional laws can 
qualify as a situation of state necessity.
223
  
 The honour of the Crown requires the Crown to negotiate a just settlement,
224
 but 
reaching such a settlement would take some time. To preserve law and order in the interim it 
would not be enough to grant temporary validity to unconstitutional laws, as in Manitoba 
Language Reference, because the defect would lie not just in the validity of laws, but in the 
invalidity of the law-maker: in the constitutional legitimacy of the Crown‘s sovereignty over the 
territory in question. In Manitoba Language Reference, the Court observed that its declaration of 
validity of most laws of Manitoba passed after 1890 did not affect the legality of the Manitoba 
Legislature or its powers, since these derive from the Constitution.
225
 
As observed in Haida Nation, in the absence of a treaty the Crown can have no more than 
de facto sovereignty over territory subject to a pre-existing Aboriginal sovereign.
226
 If a court 
found that the Crown‘s sovereignty over a particular territory lacked legitimacy, preserving the 
rule of law until a de jure sovereign could assume power may require granting temporary 
validity to the Crown‘s sovereignty. Simply giving effect to invalid laws for a temporary period 
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would not be enough, for this would confer no authority to govern. Maintaining law and order, 
even temporarily, requires an ability to adopt new legislation to respond to changing needs. 
 In Manitoba Language Reference the Supreme Court did not grant even temporary 
authority to govern in a manner that would include enacting further unconstitutional legislation. 
The Court expressly precluded unconstitutional Acts passed after the date of the judgment from 
having even temporary validity.
227
 However, it does not appear that Manitoba attempted to 
persuade the Court that it had a continuing need to legislate in English only; instead, the Court‘s 
reference to laws that had recently been enacted in both languages suggested the contrary.
228
 We 
cannot be sure, therefore, that the Supreme Court would not have allowed Manitoba to enact new 
unconstitutional laws if Manitoba had demonstrated a pressing need to do so. 
 When Manitoba Language Reference is considered as a whole, it provides significant 
support for at least a conditional power to grant temporary authority to an unconstitutional 
sovereign. The definition the Court quoted for the de facto doctrine placed recognizing the 
authority of unconstitutional governments at the heart of the de facto doctrine: ―...[t]he de facto 
doctrine...in the first place, justifies the recognition of the authority of governments established 
and maintained by persons who have usurped the sovereign authority of the State, and assert 
themselves by force and arms against the lawful government.‖229 Aboriginal peoples that have 
not reconciled their sovereignty with the Crown‘s sovereignty have had their sovereignty 
usurped by the Crown. Even though the Crown did not conquer those peoples,
230
 it is prepared to 
back its assertions of sovereignty with force and arms.  The Supreme Court also observed that 
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―[l]aw and order are indispensible elements of civilized life‖,231 and quoted with approval the 
proposition that "... the rule of law expresses a preference for law and order within a community 
rather than anarchy, warfare and constant strife. In this sense, the rule of law is a philosophical 
view of society which in the Western tradition is linked with basic democratic notions."
232
 
Leaving a power vacuum or considerable uncertainty with respect to where the authority to 
govern lies would bring a heightened risk of anarchy and strife, and so would not be consistent 
with maintaining the rule of law. Therefore, if convinced of the pressing need to give temporary 
validity to a de facto government, a Court could ground a decision to do so on analogous grounds 
to those applied to give temporary validity to unconstitutional laws in Manitoba Language 
Reference. 
 If the de facto doctrine was not enough to give temporary validity to unconstitutional 
laws in Manitoba Language Reference, this doctrine would not be enough to give temporary 
validity to an unconstitutional sovereign. To give continuing effect to either unconstitutional 
laws or governments, a court must invoke an enlarged de facto doctrine that is supported by the 
constitutional guarantee of the rule of law in a manner analogous to the doctrine of state 
necessity.
233
 
 Perhaps the most cogent argument in support of the ability of a court to give temporary 
validity to an unconstitutional sovereign is that the Supreme Court of Canada did this in Haida 
Nation. The Court noted that based on ―voluminous‖ evidence the chambers judge had found, as 
―inescapable conclusions‖, that the Haida had inhabited the Haida Gwaii continuously since at 
least 1774, and that they ―had never been conquered [and] never surrendered their rights by 
                                                 
231
 Manitoba Language Reference, supra note 208 at 749. 
232
 Ibid., quoting E.C.S. Wade and G.G. Phillips, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 9th ed. by A.W. Bradley 
(London: Longman, 1977) at 89. 
233
 Manitoba Language Reference, supra note 208 at 758. See also above, text accompanying notes 219-223. 
  57  
 
 
 
treaty.‖234 Although the chambers judge had not reached firm conclusions on the extent to which 
the Haida would establish Aboriginal title, the Supreme Court noted that he thought it ―fair to 
say that the Haida claim goes far beyond the mere ‗assertion‘ of Aboriginal title‖.235 The 
chamber judge‘s findings that the Haida had never been conquered and had never surrendered 
their rights by treaty were particularly significant because this meant that the Haida‘s pre-
existing Aboriginal sovereignty had not yet been reconciled with assumed Crown sovereignty,
236
 
that the Crown had only de facto control of land and resources that were formerly in the control 
of the Haida,
237
 and that the purpose of section 35(1) of the Constitution remained unsatisfied 
because prior Haida occupation had not been reconciled with de facto Crown sovereignty.
238
 
 In Manitoba Language Reference the Supreme Court carefully considered how 
unconstitutional unilingual laws could be granted temporary validity until the constitution could 
be complied with, and found that this could be done with an enlarged de facto doctrine. In Haida 
Nation, however, the Supreme Court took for granted that the unconstitutional, de facto nature of 
the Crown‘s sovereignty over the Haida people and their territory could continue indefinitely. To 
be sure, the Court did not entirely overlook the lack of constitutional legitimacy of the Crown‘s 
sovereignty, because it imposed obligations on the Crown to negotiate treaties to reconcile 
sovereignties,
239
 to fulfil ―a promise of rights recognition‖ in section 35 240  and to consult and, if 
appropriate, accommodate.
241
 However, conspicuous by its absence was any overt consideration 
of whether the extraordinary measure of granting temporary validity to a de facto and 
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unconstitutional sovereign was justified, and, if so, for how long this could continue to be 
justified. 
A set of criteria for granting temporary validity to unconstitutional laws was set out in in 
Attorney General of the Republic v. Mustafa Ibrahim,
242
 and these were reproduced by the 
Supreme Court in its discussion of this case in Manitoba Language Reference. The Supreme 
Court observed that the issue in Ibrahim was different from the issue it had to decide. At issue in 
Ibrahim was the validity of an unconstitutional law passed to meet the needs of an emergency, 
while the issue in Manitoba Language Reference was whether unconstitutional laws could be 
given temporary validity to avoid an emergency.
243
 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court considered 
it useful to quote the following conditions applied in Ibrahim: 
(a) an imperative and inevitable necessity or exceptional circumstances; 
(b) no other remedy to apply; 
(c) the measure taken must be proportionate to the necessity; and 
(d) it must be of a temporary character limited to the duration of the exceptional 
circumstances.
244
 
   
These conditions for validating an unconstitutional law should apply at least as strongly 
for validating an unconstitutional sovereign. Even assuming that the first three conditions could 
be met in the context of Haida Nation, to satisfy the fourth condition a court must consider the 
duration of the exceptional circumstances. That is, how long will the existing de facto sovereign 
and the laws promulgated under the authority of that sovereign be allowed to remain in place? In 
Manitoba Language Reference, the Court concluded that the unconstitutional laws could remain 
effective for only ―the minimum period necessary for translation, re-enactment, printing and 
publishing of the unilingual Acts of the Manitoba legislature‖ and reserved the issue of how long 
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constitutionally invalid laws could remain in place.
245
 The Court later determined that question 
based on an agreement between the parties and the interveners.
246
 The length of time complex 
negotiations will take cannot be known from the outset, but as in Manitoba Language Reference 
the time the temporary validity is allowed to continue should remain within the supervision of 
the Court and limited to the minimum time necessary to correct the constitutional deficiency and 
in a manner consistent with the constitutional guarantee of the rule of law.  
 Another important issue is whether the de facto doctrine will extend permanent protection 
to vested third party interests, and this will be addressed further in Chapter 4. In Manitoba 
Language Reference, the Supreme Court found that the doctrine saved ―rights, obligations and 
other effects which have arisen out of actions performed pursuant to invalid Acts…by public and 
private bodies corporate, courts, judges, persons exercising statutory authority powers and public 
officials. Such rights, obligations and other effects are, and will always be, enforceable and 
unassailable.‖247 According to the Court, the doctrine only protected the reliance of third parties 
on official acts, not the invalid laws themselves.
248
 However, Dale Gibson and Kristin Lercher 
suggest that the doctrine extends to all legal consequences of invalid laws.
249
 In the United 
States, for example, Confederate governments were referred to as ‗de facto’ governments and the 
protection given to the actions of de facto public officers was extended to the consequences of 
laws enacted by de facto governments.
250
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2.4 The Duty to Consult and the Equality Paradigm 
 
 So far, this discussion of Haida Nation and Taku River has focussed on the Supreme 
Court‘s treatment of sovereignty, in particular its description of Crown sovereignty as only de 
facto, and the Court‘s requirement for treaties to reconcile Crown sovereignty and Aboriginal 
sovereignty. However, together with Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of 
Canadian Heritage)
251
 these cases are best known for their contribution to the foundations of the 
Crown‘ duty to consult. 
Others have written about the duty to consult, and this paper will not attempt to canvas all 
of its implications,
252
 nor will it consider all of the possible theoretical foundations for this 
emerging doctrine.
253
 Instead, this discussion will posit that it was no accident that issues of 
sovereignty and the duty of consult coincided in Haida Nation and Taku River. These issues are 
linked because the duty to consult and accommodate is a direct result of the Crown‘s unilateral 
assertion of sovereignty over Aboriginal nations.  
 In Haida Nation, McLachlin C.J.C. explained that the duty to consult Aboriginal peoples 
and accommodate their interests ―is grounded in the honour of the Crown‖.254 In turn, the 
Crown‘s obligation to treat Aboriginal peoples honourably flows from its assertion of 
sovereignty over those peoples and their territories: 
The jurisprudence of this Court supports the view that the duty to consult and 
accommodate is part of a process of fair dealing and reconciliation that begins with the 
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assertion of sovereignty and continues beyond formal claims resolution. Reconciliation is 
not a final legal remedy in the usual sense. Rather, it is a process flowing from rights 
guaranteed by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. This process of reconciliation flows 
from the Crown's duty of honourable dealing toward Aboriginal peoples, which arises in 
turn from the Crown's assertion of sovereignty over an Aboriginal people and de facto 
control of land and resources that were formerly in the control of that people. As stated in 
Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, 2001 SCC 33, at para. 9, "[w]ith this assertion 
[sovereignty] arose an obligation to treat aboriginal peoples fairly and honourably, and to 
protect them from exploitation" (emphasis added).
255
 
This reinforces what the Court had already said about the need to reconcile Crown 
sovereignty with Aboriginal sovereignty in the pivotal passages in paragraphs 20 and 25 of 
Haida Nation quoted above.
256
 By recognizing Aboriginal sovereignty and by acknowledging 
that Crown sovereignty lacked constitutional legitimacy the Court contradicted the rights 
paradigm. Consequently, it was appropriate for the Court to consider whether remedies available 
for rights enforcement would be adequate when the need to ―reconcile sovereignties‖ implied 
that the conflict was between competing claims of jurisdiction over land and resources. 
McLachlin C.J.C. acknowledged that the Haida could seek an interlocutory injunction for 
breach of an alleged Aboriginal right, but she also found that this may not be an adequate or 
optimal remedy. She allowed that an injunction ―may not capture the full obligation on the 
government alleged by the Haida‖. 257 Moreover, ―[w]hile Aboriginal claims can be and are 
pursued through litigation, negotiation is a preferable way of reconciling state and Aboriginal 
interests.‖ For these and other reasons, she concluded that interlocutory injunctions would not 
adequately secure Aboriginal interests.
258
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Thus, by asserting sovereignty and taking control of land and resources formerly in 
control of an Aboriginal people the Crown has assumed a duty to act honourably. The Supreme 
Court appears to take for granted that the Crown‘s de facto sovereignty is sufficient to allow it to 
continue to govern until a treaty can reconcile the competing sovereignties, though, as discussed 
above, this position may be defensible as consistent with the constitutional guarantee of the rule 
of law. In the meantime, in its exercise of de facto control the Crown must have due regard to the 
interests of the Aboriginal people whose sovereignty has never been legitimately relinquished or 
compromised. This must happen immediately, and cannot await the negotiation of a treaty or 
proof of an Aboriginal right: 
To limit reconciliation to the post-proof sphere risks treating reconciliation as a distant 
legalistic goal, devoid of the "meaningful content" mandated by the "solemn 
commitment" made by the Crown in recognizing and affirming Aboriginal rights and 
title: Sparrow, supra, at p. 1108. It also risks unfortunate consequences. When the distant 
goal of proof is finally reached, the Aboriginal peoples may find their land and resources 
changed and denuded. This is not reconciliation. Nor is it honourable.
259
 
Although the Court is still using the language of ―rights and title‖, the duty to consult and 
accommodate is a remedy that befits the Court‘s recognition of a clash of jurisdiction between 
sovereign peoples. One is the Aboriginal nation that has a constitutionally protected claim to 
continuing sovereignty, and the other is the Canadian state that is in de facto control but lacks a 
treaty that could lend constitutional legitimacy to that control.  This state of affairs obligates the 
Crown to negotiate a treaty – and in the meantime it must respect the legitimate interests of the 
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Aboriginal nation.
260
 These obligations flow from the honour of the Crown, which the Court has 
described as a constitutional principle in its own right.
261
  
2.5 Aboriginal Sovereignty Today 
 
 The proposition that Aboriginal sovereignty can be part of the federal fabric of Canada, 
interwoven with federal and provincial sovereignty, is neither new nor radical.
262
 In fact, it is 
more than a proposition; it is already embodied in the Canadian constitution. In Campbell v. 
British Columbia (Attorney General), the British Columbia Supreme Court rejected a 
constitutional challenge to the Nisga‘a Final Agreement and the settlement legislation passed by 
Parliament and the Legislative Assembly of the Province of British Columbia, and found that the 
Agreement constituted a ―treaty‖ under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.263 The plaintiffs 
alleged that the treaty violated the Constitution because it purported to give the Nisga‘a 
government legislative jurisdiction. The treaty provided for limited circumstances in which laws 
made by the Nisga‘a government would prevail over federal or provincial laws.264 
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 The most significant challenge to the jurisdiction of the Nisga‘a government265 alleged 
that the power to make laws that prevail over federal or provincial laws was unconstitutional 
because the Constitution Act, 1867
266
 had distributed all legislative power between Parliament 
and the legislative assemblies, and that this distribution was ―exhaustive‖. Therefore, the 
plaintiffs argued, an Aboriginal government could not make laws that prevailed over federal or 
provincial laws without first amending the constitution to authorize this. 
 The Court found that the distribution of powers in the Constitution Act, 1867 was limited 
to powers that had previously belonged to the provinces, and no more.
267
 It found support for this 
in Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band,
268
 where Dickson C.J. said that the relationship between 
Aboriginal peoples and the sovereign had never depended on who the particular representatives 
of the Crown were. Dickson said that ―…federal-provincial divisions that the Crown has 
imposed on itself are internal to itself‖ 269 and therefore these divisions could not alter the 
relationship between the sovereign and Aboriginal peoples.
270
 
 Therefore, there is no constitutional barrier to judicial recognition of the sovereignty of 
an Aboriginal nation. Nevertheless, some non-Aboriginals may still be apprehensive; they may 
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worry about the costs of reconciling this sovereignty with de facto Crown sovereignty, or they 
may fear that the negotiations themselves might ―destabilize the state‖.271 
 The concern about the costs of recognizing Aboriginal sovereignty must be weighed 
against the importance of respecting constitutional principles and the value in having a 
foundation for the Canadian state consistent with the principle of the equality of peoples. Canada 
and its imperial predecessors chose long ago to pave the way for settlement by treating with 
Aboriginal nations instead of attempting to conquer them in war. This was a wise choice, but the 
project of honourable treaty making remains incomplete. 
 In his classic article Original Indian Title, Felix S. Cohen debunked the myth that the 
history of land settlement in the United States was a history of ―whole-sale robbery.‖272 
Although Cohen acknowledged that the record is not without its ―dark pages‖, it also reflected a 
policy that recognized Aboriginal property rights and purchased land from Aboriginal peoples 
with their consent.
273
 He observed that the policy of purchase persisted even after the military 
strength and numbers of the settlers might have enabled them to take the land by force. He 
attributed the continuation of this policy in spite of this shift in power to ―our national 
proclamation that all men were created equal‖.274 
 American purchases of Indian lands often came at a high price to the federal treasury. In 
1835, the federal government spent 5 million dollars, out of a total annual budget of only 17.6 
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million dollars, to purchase a tract of land from the Cherokee.
275
 Cohen observed that the 
expenditures made for the sake of fair dealing with Indians were probably the wisest investments 
the United States could ever have made. They ―…cemented the loyalty of Indians to the United 
States, a loyalty which has been an important factor in every war we have fought, and as well in 
all our years of peace…Each year Indian contributions to our economy run to many times the 
amount we have paid the Indians for their lands…‖276 
 Similarly, gains for Aboriginal peoples in Canada will benefit the greater Canadian 
society. Recent Canadian history has produced ample evidence of this. In 1992, the 
Saskatchewan and federal governments concluded the Treaty Land Entitlement Framework 
Agreement with twenty-eight entitlement bands. It settled unfulfilled promises of land under 
Treaties 4 and 6, as well as illegal or unethical government conduct that had resulted in reserve 
land being expropriated without compensation. The Agreement included $445 million in 
compensation, which entitlement bands could use to purchase additional reserve land from 
private owners or the Crown. The Agreement allowed some of the land to be purchased in urban 
municipalities, and included a procedure for establishing reserves in urban centres.
277
 
 Entitlement bands viewed urban reserves as instruments of economic and social 
development, that would facilitate new employment opportunities and enhanced services to band 
members.
278
 These hopes are being realized, together with a ‗bonus‘ of benefits to the larger 
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community. Municipal leaders from Prince Albert and Saskatoon have hailed the social and 
economic benefits that urban reserves have brought to their communities.
279
 
 The mutuality of interests exemplified by the Saskatchewan experience with land claims 
settlement and urban reserves helps to dispel the popular notion that Aboriginal peoples and the 
larger society have competing values that will inevitably lead to conflicts over land use and 
resource management, because Aboriginal peoples are opposed to ―development‖.280 
 Another well-known example of conflict dissolving into co-operation once Aboriginal 
interests are respected and Aboriginal peoples are accepted as partners is the Mackenzie Valley 
natural gas pipeline project. Aboriginal opposition stopped this massive development proposal in 
the 1970s, but the project has now been revived as a business partnership between the Aboriginal 
Pipeline Group, the Mackenzie Valley Aboriginal Pipeline Corporation and four oil and gas 
companies.
281
 Therefore, while it is true that Aboriginal peoples typically feel a strong bond to 
the land and have an ethic of stewardship, they also seek development to improve their economic 
and social conditions. Conversely, Canadian society as a whole is increasingly recognizing the 
need for stewardship of the natural environment and the importance of a healthy ecology. 
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 Recognizing Aboriginal sovereignty will also demonstrate respect for the right of 
Aboriginal peoples to self-determination, and this will strengthen the legitimacy of Canada‘s 
territorial integrity in the eyes of international law. In Reference re Secession of Quebec, the 
Supreme Court found that the right of a people to self-determination is now so entrenched that it 
has a status beyond ‗convention‘ ―…and is considered a general principle of international 
law.‖282 The Supreme Court found that ―peoples‖ that have this right may consist of only a 
portion of the population of an existing state that share a common culture and language. 
Normally, a people will realize its right to self-determination, including pursuit of its political, 
economic, social and cultural development, within an existing state. However, a right to external 
self-determination, which includes the establishment of an independent state, can arise under 
some extraordinary circumstances. It may be claimed by peoples under colonial rule or foreign 
occupation, whose ―…‗territorial integrity‘, all but destroyed by the colonialist or occupying 
[p]ower, should be fully restored…‖283 
 There is little doubt that Aboriginal peoples in Canada have a right to self-determination 
under international law, a right recently underlined by article 3 of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which provides that ―Indigenous peoples have 
the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.‖284 It is not clear whether the 
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circumstances of Canada‘s Aboriginal peoples support a right to external self-determination. The 
answer may well depend on Canadian law and the Canadian government. International law 
entitles a state to maintain its territorial integrity and to have that integrity recognized by other 
states so long as its government ―represents the whole of the people or peoples resident within its 
territory, on the basis of equality and without discrimination, and respects the principles of self-
determination in its internal arrangements.‖285 Sheltering Crown assertions of sovereignty over 
Aboriginal peoples from scrutiny and then allowing those assertions to limit Aboriginal rights 
does not treat those peoples ―on the basis of equality‖ and does not respect their right of internal 
self-determination. Accordingly, adopting an equality paradigm that places Crown and 
Aboriginal sovereignty on an equal footing would strengthen the support for its territorial 
integrity that Canada can expect from international law.  
 Recent criticism of Canada‘s record by two United Nations committees should concern 
Canada. The United Nations Human Rights Committee expressed concerns that RCAP‘s 
recommendations have not been implemented, and noted that RCAP observed that Aboriginal 
governments would not be viable without a greater share of lands and resources. The Committee 
emphasized that the right of self-determination required that all peoples must be able to ―…freely 
dispose of their natural wealth and resources and must not be deprived of their own means of 
subsistence.‖ The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination stated that it was 
concerned that Aboriginal peoples were experiencing difficulties establishing Aboriginal title 
over land, and that no Aboriginal group had yet proven Aboriginal title.
286
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 Crown assertions of sovereignty can only be legitimate, and ―sovereignties reconciled‖ 
after negotiations founded on principles consistent with the equality of peoples. Compared to 
litigation, negotiation also provides more flexibility for crafting mutually acceptable outcomes 
that enhance the relationship between the parties, and poses fewer risks to societal peace. A 
framework that focuses on rights rather than sovereignty tends to force courts to resolve conflicts 
between Aboriginal rights claims and other interests. Solutions imposed by courts tend to create 
winners and losers, and may not necessarily be conducive to furthering reconciliation.
287
 
2. 6 The Supreme Court and the Equality Paradigm Since Haida Nation and Taku 
River 
 
 If the statements about sovereignty in Haida Nation and Taku River marked such a 
fundamental shift in Aboriginal law, why is this not obvious in all of the Court‘s subsequent 
decisions on Aboriginal rights? 
 Most likely, this is just due to the method of the common law. As McLachlin J. (as she 
then was) said in Van der Peet, ―legal principles evolve on an incremental, pragmatic basis.‖288 
This would also be consistent with Cass Sunstein‘s advice that when confronted with ―nationally 
crucial issues‖ the courts should act as catalysts for democratic debate and deliberation instead of 
attempting to settle debates with sweeping decisions.
289
 In three of the decisions that are of 
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interest, R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard,
290
 Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of 
Canadian Heritage)
291
 and R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray,
292
 it was not necessary for the Court to 
consider the legitimacy of assertions of Crown sovereignty, and the court did not comment on 
this issue. None of these cases involved an Aboriginal nation that had not signed any treaty with 
the Crown. Although an existing treaty is consistent with the continuation of Aboriginal 
sovereignty, it suggests that at least some degree of mutual recognition and reconciliation of 
sovereignties has occurred. 
The Supreme Court‘s two most recent decisions that consider the foundations of 
Aboriginal law disclose further indications of a paradigm shift.  In both Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. 
Carrier Sekani Tribal Council
293
 and Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation294 the 
court applies and refines the duty to consult, a doctrine that is consistent with an equality 
paradigm. The Court‘s language and approach to the issues continues to demonstrate a shift 
away from the old rights paradigm, most notably with the approval the Court expressed for Brian 
Slattery‘s theory of a ―generative‖ constitutional role for section 35.295  
2.6.1 Marshall/Bernard  
Marshall/Bernard concerned members of the Mi‘kmaq people in Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick who had been charged with violating provincial legislation by engaging in 
commercial logging on Crown lands without authorization. The accused defended these charges 
on the grounds that their activities came within the scope of the treaty rights or Aboriginal title 
rights of the Mi‘kmaq people. There was no suggestion that the ―Peace and Friendship‖ treaties 
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between the Mi'kmaq and the British Crown had ceded land. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
found that the convictions entered by the trial judges should be upheld because the evidence of 
occupation did not establish Aboriginal title. Sovereignty was not in issue because, by definition, 
Aboriginal title is a burden on the Crown’s underlying title. The date of the Crown‘s assertion of 
sovereignty was relevant to the analysis, however, because the test for occupancy is applied as of 
that date. Hence, the Court observed that the courts below had accepted that the British had 
established sovereignty in the middle of the 18
th
 century.
296
 
 The Supreme Court‘s decision in Marshall/Bernard has been criticized for giving 
insufficient weight to Aboriginal laws and perspectives.
297
 This reminds us of the difficulties that 
courts face when attempting to determine rights in land by applying an inequitable doctrine that 
straddles two different legal systems and cultural perspectives.
298
 If it were acknowledged that 
Aboriginal title claims are really conflicts between competing sovereignties, then it would be 
apparent that the issues between the sovereigns can only be resolved through negotiations. The 
court‘s role would be limited to recognizing that Aboriginal sovereignty continues, and to 
providing a framework for negotiations that defines the rights and duties of the parties until a 
settlement is reached (see Chapter 4, below). This would be consistent with Justice LeBel‘s 
observation that the questions of Aboriginal title and access to resources are complex, and are 
important to all communities in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. He wrote that all interested 
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parties should have an opportunity to be involved in any litigation or negotiation, and that 
summary conviction proceedings are not well-suited to resolving these issues.
299
 
 
2.6.2 Mikisew Cree and Sappier/Gray 
 If Haida Nation and Taku River truly mark a new approach to section 35, then the 
Court‘s previous focus on Crown sovereignty in its formulation of the section‘s purpose300 needs 
a more egalitarian and inspiring replacement. A year later, the Court appeared to offer the needed 
makeover in the first paragraph of its judgment in Mikisew Cree. Justice Binnie, delivering the 
judgment of the Court, stated that ―[t]he fundamental objective of the modern law of 
[A]boriginal and treaty rights is the reconciliation of aboriginal peoples and non-aboriginal 
peoples and their respective claims, interests and ambitions.‖301 
 Unfortunately, another year later, in Sappier/Gray 
302
 the Court did not repeat Justice 
Binnie‘s formulation of the purpose of s. 35. Moreover, Justice Bastarache repeated the 
―reconciliation with the sovereignty of the Crown‖ formulation. Perhaps this was another 
instance where exclusive Crown sovereignty was accepted without reflection because of the facts 
and issues of the two appeals that the Court heard together. The three respondents were 
individual Aboriginal persons who had been charged with unlawfully possessing or cutting 
Crown timber. The Supreme Court upheld their defence of these charges based on an Aboriginal 
right to harvest wood for personal use that was exercised on lands that their respective First 
Nations had traditionally harvested. Therefore, although the respondents invoked their rights as 
members of Aboriginal groups, they did so in a manner that was consistent with the existing 
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rights paradigm. Moreover, the respondents had also advanced a treaty right to harvest timber. 
The Supreme Court did not have to decide the validity of this argument because one of the 
respondents had not pursued it on appeal and because the Court considered it unnecessary to do 
so for the others since it had found in favour of the claimed Aboriginal right. The Court also 
observed that the Crown had admitted that the latter defendants were the beneficiaries of valid 
treaties, and that the defendants relied on this admission.
303
 While it would be wrong to assume 
that a treaty extinguishes the sovereignty of either party to the treaty, it is reasonable to view it as 
a signal that some reconciliation of sovereignties has occurred. In sum, the issues and the factual 
context of these cases made it much less likely that the Court would consider sovereignty than in 
the context of Haida Nation. In Haida Nation there was no treaty and an Aboriginal title claim 
was brought in the context of a jurisdictional dispute between the Crown and an Aboriginal 
people over the management of resources. 
On closer examination, however, Sappier/Gray reveals a formulation of the purpose of 
section 35 that elevates the discussion beyond just a preoccupation with rights that remain in the 
face of Crown sovereignty to a focus on the territory and jurisdiction of Aboriginal nations. In 
Van der Peet
304
 the Supreme Court had said that to qualify as an Aboriginal right, an activity had 
to be ―…an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the 
[A]boriginal group claiming the right".
305
 The limitations of the Van der Peet test were criticized 
by separate dissenting reasons of Justices L'Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin (as she then was), and 
by academics.
306
 A common criticism was that limiting Aboriginal rights to activities that were 
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integral to an Aboriginal culture prior to first contact with Europeans was too restrictive. In 
Sappier/Gray Justice Bastarache stated that the Van der Peet analysis needed flexibility ―because 
the object is to provide cultural security and continuity for the particular [A]boriginal society.‖307 
He also offered the first explanation of what the Court means by ―culture‖ in this context,308 and 
explained that this refers to ―…an inquiry into the pre-contact way of life of a particular 
[A]boriginal community, including their means of survival, their socialization methods, their 
legal system, and, potentially, their trading habits.‖309 Further, a practice undertaken for survival 
purposes, such as sustenance, can meet the test, although it would be the distinctive ―means of 
sustenance‖, not sustenance itself, that could qualify as integral to a distinctive culture.310  
 Justice Bastarache‘s reformulation of the Van der Peet test enjoyed the unanimous 
support of the Court. It recognized that section 35 protects the cultural security of these societies, 
including their means of survival and their legal system.
311
 However, the Court continued to limit 
its discussion, as it did before Haida Nation and Taku River, to Aboriginal societies without 
recognizing that these societies were nations. This seems to ignore that the elements of culture 
identified by the court, especially the society‘s means of survival and its legal system, depend on 
the society‘s jurisdiction over its territory, which is an incident of sovereignty. The best way to 
protect the culture of an Aboriginal nation is to recognize that nation‘s sovereignty.  
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 Perhaps the Court was not prepared, without more evidence, to accept the proposition 
that all pre-contact Aboriginals societies were sovereign nations with jurisdiction over territory. 
If so, two responses to this can be offered. The first is that more evidence for this proposition is 
not needed because its truth is self-evident and has already been implicitly acknowledged by the 
Court. The second response is that the court‘s hesitancy to acknowledge that all Aboriginal 
societies are nations can be overcome by bridging the gap between the disciplines of law and 
anthropology so that the former can recognize what the latter has demonstrated. 
 Support for the first response is outlined by Brian Slattery, who has demonstrated that 
Aboriginal societies have a right to their territories. This right flows from the ―Principle of 
Territoriality‖, which holds that ―every human society whose members draw the essentials of life 
from territories in their possession …has a right to these territories as against other societies and 
individuals.‖312 He defends this principle on the grounds that were it untrue, then a society would 
not have the right to protect its territories, even though they are essential to the survival of the 
society. This, however, would violate fundamental rights to life and to the ―necessaries of 
life‖.313 Slattery elaborates that we know that the well-being of all individuals is integrally 
connected to their membership in a social group. To advance the well-being of its members, a 
social group must have the capacity to act in the interests of its members and to defend them 
from attack. Hence, Aboriginal societies ―had rights to the territories they occupied at the time of 
European contact, to the extent they needed them to survive and flourish…‖314 
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 The Supreme Court implicitly accepted Slattery‘s view in Haida Nation, when it 
acknowledged ―pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty‖ and called for honourable negotiations and 
treaties to reconcile sovereignties. We ordinarily understand both sovereignty and the capacity to 
enter into treaties as residing in nations or states that have jurisdiction over territories.
315
  
 In her dissent in Van der Peet, Justice McLachlin (as she then was) had already expressed 
the view that Aboriginal peoples have a right not to be deprived of their territories. She said that 
a ―fundamental understanding – the Grundnorm of settlement in Canada – was that the 
[A]boriginal people could only be deprived of the sustenance they derived from the land and 
adjacent waters by solemn treaty with the Crown‖ on terms that would provide a replacement 
source for their livelihood.
316
 Here, too, McLachlin J. posits a right of Aboriginal peoples not to 
be deprived of their territories without consent. Her use of the term ―Grundnorm‖ is revealing, 
because of its association with the work of Hans Kelsen, a legal theorist in the area of 
international law. He used this term to denote the most ―fundamental norm‖, or ―norm of norms‖ 
and it reflects an ideology of a state based on the rule of law.
317
 This is consistent with an 
interpretation of her later comments in Haida Nation and Taku River that Crown sovereignty is 
not constitutionally valid unless based on a treaty. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Sappier/Gray – to provide ―cultural security and continuity‖ for the Aboriginal society. Both conceptions appear to 
capture some features of why an Aboriginal nation would wish to preserve its territory. See also Patrick Macklem, 
―Distributing Sovereignty‖, supra note 7 at 1327-1335, who also rejected prior occupancy as providing a theoretical 
foundation for Aboriginal government, but considered prior sovereignty to be a stronger candidate. 
315
 Justice Bastarache implicitly accepted the continued existence of Aboriginal sovereignty and territories in R. v. 
Kapp, 2008 SCC 41 at para. 103, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483. He concurred with the result reached by the majority but 
departed from their reasons by applying section 25 of the Charter. In his view, the shield offered by this section 
against Charter scrutiny should protect ―interests associated with [A]boriginal culture, territory, sovereignty or the 
treaty process.‖ 
316
 Van der Peet, supra note 47 at para 272 [emphasis in original]. 
317
 Norberto Bobbio & Danilo Zolo, ―Hans Kelsen, the Theory of Law and the International Legal System – A Talk‖ 
online: (1998) 9 E.J.I.L. 355 at 1-2 (PDF). 
  78  
 
 
 
  The second response to the Supreme Court‘s hesitancy to acknowledge that all 
Aboriginal societies were sovereign nations draws from anthropology. Catherine Bell and 
Michael Asch have called for the courts to shed the controlling influence of precedents grounded 
in a limited and ethnocentric understanding of Aboriginal peoples.
318
 In particular, they reviewed 
two introductory textbooks in anthropology written by leaders in the discipline but each 
representing opposing schools of thought within the discipline.
319
 Therefore, propositions agreed 
to by both of these authors could be presumed to have wide acceptance in the field of 
anthropology. Bell and Asch show that both authors agree on four basic propositions that are 
vital to formulating Aboriginal rights but that the courts have not yet fully incorporated into their 
understanding of Aboriginal peoples. In short, these propositions are 1) that it is not possible for 
human beings to live in groups without living in a society with cultural attributes, 2) that all 
societies are organized groups of people, in the sense that they are organized with respect to all 
aspects of social life and depend on each other for survival and well-being, 3) that no society 
exists that does not have jurisdiction over its members and its territory, and that this is exercised 
through a political system that includes institutions of law and leadership, and 4) that individual 
ownership of movable objects exists in all societies, and some form of land ownership exists in 
every society, though this ownership may be collective, not individual.
320
 Therefore, we need 
only remove the Court‘s unwarranted hesitation about acknowledging that all Aboriginal 
societies were sovereign nations to find that the object, identified in Sappier/Gray, of providing 
cultural security and continuity to Aboriginal societies must be applied to Aboriginal nations. To 
                                                 
318
 Catherine Bell & Michael Asch, ―Challenging Assumptions: The Impact of Precedent in Aboriginal Rights 
Litigation‖ in Michael Asch, ed., Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equality and Respect for 
Difference (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997) 38. 
319
 Ibid. at 66. These textbooks were M. Harris, Culture, People, Nature, 2
nd
 ed. (New York: Thomas Crowell 1975 
[1971] and L. Mair, An Introduction to Social Anthropology (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). 
320
 Ibid. at 66-71. 
  79  
 
 
 
provide Aboriginal nations with this security, we must recognize that they exist and affirm their 
territorial jurisdiction. 
2.6.3 Beckman and Rio Tinto 
 The Supreme Court did adopt language appropriate to a relationship between nations in 
its most recent decision on point, Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation.
321
 The Court 
described the historical role of treaties as  
the means by which the Crown sought to reconcile the Aboriginal inhabitants of what is 
now Canada to the assertion of European sovereignty over the territories traditionally 
occupied by First Nations. The objective was not only to build alliances with First 
Nations but to keep the peace and to open up the major part of those territories to 
colonization and settlement.
322
 
 
We could read the reference to ―what is now Canada‖ as a nod to the ―act of state‖ doctrine and 
the de facto sovereignty that it protects, all of which flowed from ―the assertion of European 
sovereignty.‖ Nevertheless, it is gratifying that the Court acknowledged the existence of 
―territories traditionally occupied by First Nations‖. 
 The Supreme Court‘s references in Beckman to First Nations and their territories rather 
than just to Aboriginal ―societies‖ may have been influenced by the dispute in Beckman having 
been related to the interpretation and effect of a modern treaty that recognized the existence and 
the traditional territory of the Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation. However, this is not the only 
indication that the Supreme Court is moving toward viewing the relationship between the Crown 
and First Nations as one between equals, to be managed as a continuing relationship between 
sovereigns.  Justice Binnie, delivering the judgement for seven of the nine Justices,
323
  expressed 
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the ―grand purpose‖ of section 35 as ―[t]he reconciliation of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
Canadians in a mutually respectful long-term relationship.‖324 This purpose is furthered by 
modern treaties, such as the 1997 treaty between these parties, ―…by creating a legal basis for 
fostering a positive long-term relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
communities.‖ 325 A treaty will not achieve this if it is interpreted ―…as if it were a commercial 
contract. The treaty is as much about building relationships as it is about the settlement of 
ancient grievances.‖326 This passage is consistent with a perspective that sees the parties as 
equals for two reasons. First, it is a useful reminder that treaties bind sovereign nations, and this 
means that fostering the relationships between the parties is more important than in a commercial 
contract. Second, the Supreme Court pointed out that the Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation 
received substantial benefits in exchange for surrendering ―all undefined Aboriginal rights, title 
and interests in its traditional territories‖.327 These benefits included title to ―settlement land‖, 
financial compensation, as well as sharing in land use planning, resource management, and 
resource exploitation in non-settlement lands. With these benefits came ―duties and obligations‖ 
and ―…the long-term interdependent relationship thus created will require work and good will on 
both sides for its success.‖328 Therefore, a treaty is not simply a fixed exchange of property rights 
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that is spent once the exchange is complete; it is a means by which sovereign nations share 
jurisdiction. 
Two weeks before releasing Beckman, the Supreme Court appeared to confirm the arrival 
of a new era for Aboriginal law in Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council.
329
  It 
did so in passing, in the context of a discussion about the source and context of the duty to 
consult, which it described as embodying ―what Brian Slattery has described as a ‗generative‘ 
constitutional order which sees ‗section 35 as serving a dynamic and not simply static 
function‘‖.330 According to Slattery, this means that  
…section 35 does not simply recognize a static body of specific Aboriginal rights, 
whose contours may be ascertained by the application of general legal criteria to 
historical circumstances – historical rights for short.  Rather, the section binds the Crown 
to take positive steps to identify Aboriginal rights in a contemporary form, with the 
consent of the Indigenous parties concerned – what we may call settlement rights. First, 
they represent contemporary restatements of Aboriginal rights in a form that renders them 
useful and commodious for indigenous groups in modern conditions. Second, settlement 
rights perforce take account of the interests of the broader society, of which Aboriginal 
people are members.‖331 
 
Slattery views this as consistent with the Court‘s comment in Haida Nation that reconciliation 
―is not a final legal remedy in the usual sense. Rather, it is a process flowing from rights 
guaranteed by s. 35(1)….‖332 Although he observes that the Court‘s ―choice of language‖ in 
Haida Nation indicates that the Court will consider the Crown‘s sovereignty over Aboriginal 
peoples ―legally deficient‖ without a just treaty,333 and though he views this as one aspect of a 
paradigm shift by the Court,
334
 the continuing sovereignty of Aboriginal peoples does not play a 
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direct role in Slattery‘s description of the generative structure of Aboriginal rights. However, 
Slattery views the conflict between pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty and de facto Crown 
sovereignty as creating a ―tension‖ that requires the Crown to deal honourably with Aboriginal 
peoples.
335
 In addition, when he elaborated on the contours of his ―generative‖ theory336 he 
described it as including ―Principles of Recognition‖, which ―represent the nature and scope of 
[A]boriginal title at the time of Crown sovereignty‖, and ―Principles of Reconciliation‖ that 
―govern the legal effects of [A]boriginal title in modern times.‖337 When these principles are 
examined in conjunction with the process Slattery foresees for applying them, the fundamental 
principles and practical consequences parallel those that would flow from respecting the 
continued sovereignty of Aboriginal peoples in accordance with the equality paradigm described 
in this paper.   
―Principles of Recognition‖ recognize rights of Aboriginal peoples that resemble the 
powers of a sovereign people. For example, the first basic characteristic Slattery envisages for 
principles of recognition is that  
they should acknowledge that all of the Indigenous peoples in Canada had historical 
rights to their homelands – the lands from which they drew their material livelihood, 
social identity, and spiritual nourishment – regardless whether they had developed 
conceptions of ―ownership‖, ―property,‖ or ―exclusivity,‖ and without forcing their 
practices into conceptual boxes derived from English or French law.‖338 
 
They also proceed from the premise that Aboriginal peoples are entitled to equal status in 
international law:  
They should draw inspiration from fundamental principles of international law and 
justice, principles that are truly universal, and not grounded simply in rules that European 
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imperial powers formulated to suit their own convenience, such as the supposed 
―principle of discovery.‖339 
Therefore, in relation to Aboriginal title, this would include ―the full unstinting recognition of the 
historical reality of [A]boriginal title, the true scope and effects of Indigenous dispossession, and 
the continuing links between an Indigenous people and its traditional lands.‖340 Slattery argues 
that this precludes, for example, limiting the Aboriginal title rights of nomadic peoples ―to only a 
fraction of their ancestral hunting territories‖.341 However, Slattery acknowledges that 
reconciliation must consider other factors, because ―to suggest that historical [A]boriginal title 
gives rise to modern rights that automatically trump third party and public interests constitutes an 
attempt to remedy one grave injustice by committing another.‖342 
To resolve this dilemma, Slattery invokes the Supreme Court‘s decisions in Haida Nation 
and Taku River 
which mark the emergence of a new constitutional paradigm governing Aboriginal rights. 
This paradigm views section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 as the basis of a generative 
constitutional order – one that mandates the Crown to negotiate with Indigenous peoples 
for the recognition of their rights in a form that balances their contemporary needs and 
interests with the needs and interests of the broader society.
343
 
Although Slattery does not cast the new paradigm in the sovereignty mold, his ―historical 
title‖ closely resembles the territory of a sovereign nation because, as noted above, it equates to 
the ―homelands‖ of Indigenous peoples, land which was important to their livelihood, their 
identity and their spirituality. Moreover, he considers recognition of the full scope of historical 
rights a prerequisite for reconciliation. Accordingly, Slattery‘s call for recognition of Aboriginal 
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title, as quoted above, goes far beyond the scope of the doctrine of Aboriginal title because it 
includes “ full unstinting recognition of …the true scope and effects of Indigenous 
dispossession‖ and it also exists today in the form of ―…continuing links between an Indigenous 
people and its traditional lands.‖344 Elsewhere, Slattery has written that Aboriginal peoples ―held 
sovereign status and title to the territories they occupied at the time of European contact and ... 
this fundamental fact transforms our understanding of everything that followed‖.345 Perhaps 
Slattery views ―Indigenous dispossession‖ as including a loss of sovereignty, but it seems more 
likely that it continues to live in the ―continuing links between an Indigenous people and its 
traditional lands.‖346 
If Slattery‘s ―Principles of Recognition‖ amount to recognition of Aboriginal sovereignty and 
the equality of peoples, his ―Principles of Reconciliation‖ contemplate a process that allows the 
reconciliation of Aboriginal sovereignty and Crown sovereignty.  Hence, Slattery writes ―the 
recognition of historical title, while a necessary precondition for modern reconciliation, is not in 
itself a sufficient basis for reconciliation, which must take into account a range of other 
factors.‖347  The ―Principles of Reconciliation‖ will only use the historical rights of Aboriginal 
peoples as the ―essential starting point‖ for a modern settlement, and courts could only 
implement an ―inner core‖ of these rights without negotiation.348 Other rights must be subject to 
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the outcome of treaty negotiations. The Principles developed by the Court should also include 
guidelines for accommodating the rights and interests that third parties hold within traditional 
territories and they should create ―strong incentives for negotiated settlements to be reached 
within a reasonable period of time.‖349 
 Therefore, while the doctrine of Aboriginal title is part of Slattery‘s understanding of the 
new paradigm, it has indeed undergone a ―metamorphosis‖. When framed in a manner adapted to 
his Principles of Recognition it is a more complete representation of the ―ancestral homeland‖ of 
an Aboriginal people than it would be under the common law doctrine of Aboriginal title, 
because it can serve the same function as recognizing Aboriginal sovereignty. While 
reconciliation requires recognition of this historical title, it also requires negotiation – and here 
Slattery‘s framework is also consistent with a need to reconcile sovereignties, since in his view 
courts can do no more than to enforce a core of Aboriginal rights and to provide incentives for 
reaching negotiated settlements.
350
 
 At first blush this may seem to unduly limit the involvement of courts in the adjudication 
of Aboriginal rights, but on closer examination, it only recognizes the traditional limits of the 
courts‘ appropriate role in a democracy. Courts are suited to adjudicating disputes about 
procedural and substantive rights. They have neither the political mandate nor the capacity to 
negotiate treaties, and as the Supreme Court has pointed out, this is what resolution of significant 
claims to land or territory requires.  
In conclusion, the Supreme Court has taken us to the threshold of a new paradigm for 
Aboriginal law that rejects discovery and terra nullius, accepts that Aboriginal sovereignty 
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continues, and that holds that only treaties can elevate the Crown‘s role from de facto 
sovereignty to a de jure sovereignty that is shared with Aboriginal peoples. To date its signals, 
while strong – especially in Haida Nation and Rio Tinto – are perhaps not beyond debate. In 
view of the huge cost of litigation and negotiation of claims it would be helpful for all parties in 
the process to have a clearer understanding of what fundamental rules should guide their efforts. 
Although a new paradigm brings new problems, an unambiguous adoption of the equality 
paradigm will provide needed answers to the pressing moral and practical crises that plague the 
rights paradigm and that are explored in the following Chapter.  
 
2.7 Asserting Aboriginal Sovereignty 
 
 When the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples brought their claim for ownership and 
jurisdiction in Delgamuukw
351
 they lacked the jurisprudential foundation to assert Aboriginal 
sovereignty that the Supreme Court has since provided in Haida Nation, Taku River, and 
subsequent decisions. Their claim also predated the moral support for scrutinizing Crown 
assertions of sovereignty that was offered in RCAP‘s Report, and its repudiation of the 
acceptance of Crown assertions of sovereignty based on concepts of terra nullius and 
discovery.
352
An Aboriginal nation, especially one that has not yet entered into a treaty with the 
Crown, has a solid legal and constitutional foundation for asserting its continuing sovereignty, as 
well as concomitant rights to territory and jurisdiction. It can also claim that Crown sovereignty 
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is not legitimate, and therefore remains only de facto, until a treaty reconciles the sovereignty of 
the Aboriginal nation with Canadian sovereignty.    
 Aboriginal sovereignty can also rely on the Supreme Court‘s decision in Quebec 
Secession Reference,
 where the Court elaborated on the ―foundational constitutional principles‖ 
of ―federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and respect for minority rights‖353 and also 
considered the right of a people to self-determination as a general principle of international law. 
 As noted above, the Supreme Court has already accepted that Aboriginal nations were 
sovereign when the Europeans arrived, and it called for sovereignty claims to be reconciled 
through the process of honourable negotiation.
354
  To the extent this has already occurred when 
past treaties were negotiated, this has given Aboriginal sovereignty a place in the Canadian 
federation, but this reconciliation needs to continue. The principle of federalism gives courts the 
responsibility ―to control the limits of the respective sovereignties‖,355 and a challenge of the 
Crown‘s unilateral assertion of sovereignty appeals to this responsibility of the court. 
 Aboriginal sovereignty can also find support in the principle of democracy, because 
―…democracy is fundamentally connected to substantive goals, most importantly, the promotion 
of self-government. Democracy accommodates cultural and group identities…Put another way, a 
sovereign people exercises its right to self-government through the democratic process.‖356 The 
values of democracy also include a commitment to social justice and equality.
357
 The Court also 
identified the protection of Aboriginal rights as an important underlying constitutional value.
358
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Particularly helpful for rebutting arguments that the Crown has ―effectively‖ established 
sovereignty over Aboriginal territories and peoples is the Supreme Court‘s response to an 
attempt to invoke the ―principle of effectivity‖ in support of an argument that Quebec could 
unilaterally secede from Canada.
359
 The Court observed that this argument failed to distinguish 
the right to act from the power to do so. The ability to act in a certain way does not determine the 
legal status or consequences of the act.
360
 Quebec is not entitled to act without regard to 
Canadian or international law just because it asserts the power to do so.
361
 The Court 
acknowledged that a successful unilateral secession would create a new legal order, but replied 
that this was an assertion of fact, not a statement of law. If it was being asserted as a matter of 
law, then ―it simply amounts to the contention that the law can be broken as long as it can be 
broken successfully. Such a notion is contrary to the rule of law, and must be rejected.‖362 
Just as it would not be lawful for Quebec to act without regard to Canadian or 
international law just because it asserts the power to do so, it is not consistent with the rule of 
law for the Crown to assert sovereignty over Aboriginal peoples by virtue of having achieved de 
facto or ―effective‖ sovereignty. What is needed, therefore, to satisfy section 35 and the 
constitutional guarantee of the rule of law are negotiations aimed at reconciling Crown and 
Aboriginal sovereignties. 
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Chapter 3: The Emerging Equality Paradigm 
 
The last chapter argued that the Supreme Court‘s recognition of Aboriginal sovereignty 
and the need to legitimize Crown sovereignty lays the foundation for a new equality paradigm of 
Aboriginal law. This chapter looks beyond these decisions and finds that prominent voices from 
a variety of perspectives are identifying moral and practical flaws in the rights paradigm, and are 
joining with Aboriginal leaders to call for a re-examination of fundamental principles of 
Aboriginal law. 
 
3.1 Are They Really Opposing “Paradigms”? 
 
This paper is obviously not using the term ―paradigm‖ in its classical sense,363 but in the 
sense in which it was famously used by Thomas Kuhn in relation to the natural sciences.
364
 
While it may not be prudent to attempt a holus-bolus transfer of Kuhn‘s notion of a paradigm to 
Aboriginal law,
365
 some reflection on Kuhn‘s paradigm may indicate whether apparent changes 
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in Aboriginal law amount to something as fundamental as a paradigm shift, and some potential 
parallels in the process of change may be worth considering.  
According to Kuhn, a paradigm governs, ―in the first instance, not a subject matter but 
rather a group of practitioners‖.366 It consists of ―the entire constellation of beliefs, values and 
techniques shared by members of a given community‖.367 At the same time, it also refers to ―one 
sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or 
examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal 
science‖ or ―exemplars‖.368  Learning these exemplars allows students to discover a way to see a 
new problem in the discipline as analogous to one seen before, ―to see a variety of situations as 
like each other‖ and to develop ―a time-tested and group-licensed way of seeing‖.369 
Kuhn also described paradigms as scientific achievements that ―some particular scientific 
community acknowledged for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice‖ and that 
were sufficiently open-ended to leave many problems to resolve.
370
 To the extent that a paradigm 
is grounded in a theory, the theory must ―seem better than its competitors‖.371 An accepted 
paradigm allows a scientist to take first principles, and an ―accepted model or pattern‖ for 
granted rather than having to construct them. It operates ―like an accepted judicial decision in the 
common law…an object for further articulation and specification under new or stringent 
conditions.‖372 
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A paradigm continues to govern a discipline until scientists perceive that there is a gap 
between theory and nature in the form of a significant ―anomaly‖, such as an anomaly that ―will 
clearly call into question explicit and fundamental generalizations of the paradigm.‖ The 
anomaly begins to receive attention by some of the eminent scholars of the discipline, though 
only rarely will scientists explicitly acknowledge the breakdown of the existing paradigm.  
Sometimes a stubborn anomaly will ultimately be solved within the scope of an existing 
paradigm, sometimes the anomaly is set aside for future consideration, but sometimes a 
paradigm in crisis will be replaced with a new paradigm. A new paradigm will be ―a 
reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals, a reconstruction that changes some of the 
field‘s most elementary generalizations as well as many of its paradigm methods and 
applications….When the transition is complete, the profession will have changed its view of the 
field, its methods and its goals.‖373  
If a new theory resolves a gap between the old theory and nature, then the new theory 
must make predictions that are different from the old. This means that the two must be logically 
incompatible – the new must replace the old. 374 A controversial aspect of Kuhn‘s view of 
paradigms and ―scientific revolutions‖ was his claim that a new paradigm is not only 
incompatible but also incommensurable with the previous one. Thus, Kuhn ascribed ―normative 
functions‖ to paradigms, such that the choice between competing paradigms could not be 
resolved by the objective criteria of normal science because each paradigm will satisfy its own 
criteria and will fail the criteria of its opponent. Different paradigms will generally have different 
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criteria for the legitimacy of problems and proposed solutions, and this may be their most 
distinguishing feature: 
…[S]ince no two paradigms leave all the same problems unsolved, paradigm debates 
always involve the question: Which problems are more significant to have solved? Like 
the issue of competing standards, that question of values can be answered only in terms 
of criteria that lie outside of normal science altogether, and it is that recourse to external 
criteria that most obviously makes paradigms revolutionary.
375
 
 
Although rudimentary, at least at first blush this sketch of Kuhn‘s description of 
paradigms suggests that the contest between grounding Aboriginal law on rights flowing from 
occupancy before Crown sovereignty and viewing it as a means of reconciling competing 
sovereignties is in many respects analogous to a contest between paradigms in the natural 
sciences. Defining Aboriginal rights as certain Aboriginal laws, customs and property rights that 
arise out of occupancy prior to Crown sovereignty
376
 is incommensurate with a paradigm for 
Aboriginal law that recognizes the sovereignty of Aboriginal nations and does not assume the 
legitimacy of Crown sovereignty.  
A paradigm grounded in the principle of the equality of peoples will indeed force a 
reconstruction of Aboriginal law ―that will change some of the field‘s most elementary 
generalizations‖ – it will cause many existing doctrines to be re-examined or discarded. In 
particular, the doctrine of Aboriginal title relies on the assumption that the Crown holds the 
ultimate title, and that prior occupation forms a sui generis burden on that title in favour of the 
Aboriginal occupants. In the past, the Crown‘s hold on the ultimate title relied on its assertions of 
sovereignty being accepted by courts without question. If these assertions must now find their 
validity elsewhere, then their mere utterance will not establish in the Crown a legitimate title that 
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is automatically superior to any claim Aboriginal peoples may make to the land. Therefore, it is 
no longer appropriate to class Aboriginal claims to land as ―burdens‖ because they are 
necessarily inferior to the Crown‘s superior interest. Under a new paradigm that relies on treaties 
to reconcile sovereignty claims, the respective rights and jurisdiction of the Crown and 
Aboriginal peoples will be determined by the treaty, not by the doctrine of Aboriginal title. 
Under the rights paradigm, Crown sovereignty claims were not open to question, which 
limited Aboriginal peoples to rights that arose out of prior occupation. Once the continuing 
sovereignty of Aboriginal peoples is recognized it becomes necessary to secure the consent of 
Aboriginal peoples, in treaties, to just terms for sharing sovereignty in a federal Canada. True 
consent will not be compatible with a priori doctrinal limitations on Aboriginal title or on the 
scope of Aboriginal rights in general. Indeed, the focus of the discussion under the equality 
paradigm will naturally shift from defining the ―rights‖ of Aboriginal peoples versus the 
Crown‘s exclusive sovereignty to ways sovereignty, and hence jurisdiction, should be shared 
between the Crown and Aboriginal nations. This, in turn, will have important implications for 
the role of the courts in defining the relationship between Aboriginal peoples and Canadians as a 
whole. 
 
3.2 What’s Wrong With the Old Paradigm? 
 
If there is indeed a contest between paradigms within Aboriginal law, then they must meet 
Kuhn‘s expectation that they will be incommensurable. There is no objective means to determine 
the superiority of one over the other, and the choice will ultimately be normative. Each paradigm 
is valid if judged by its own criteria. The existing paradigm can claim that although the territories 
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of Aboriginal peoples were not validly acquired by the standards of international law,
377
 Crown 
sovereignty exists in Canada as a practical reality. Aboriginal peoples, though no longer 
sovereign, have such rights as are recognized by the common law and treaties, and it is these 
rights that are affirmed by section 35 of the Constitution. 
Discomfort with the old paradigm does not principally originate with a flaw in its internal 
logic, though, as will be discussed below, there is increasing discomfort with difficulties in its 
practical application.  The biggest objection to the existing paradigm is that it is incommensurate 
with modern international and Canadian norms that reject the proposition that European peoples 
were superior to Aboriginal peoples and that their superiority allowed them to simply assume 
sovereignty over lands occupied by the latter.  
3.2.1 A Moral Crisis 
Before European settlers arrived in North America, the continent was not a land that 
belonged to no one, a terra nullius. The continent belonged to the Aboriginal nations that 
occupied it. These nations were sovereign - they governed themselves and the territories they 
occupied without being subject to the control of any other nation. This picture of North America 
before Europeans arrived is no longer controversial and is accepted by Canadian courts.
378
 
 What is more controversial than the initial sovereignty of Aboriginal nations is the 
question of whether or how the Crown gained sovereignty over Aboriginal nations and their 
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territories. At least until Haida Nation and Taku River, Canadian courts avoided this question, 
and simply deferred to Crown assertions of sovereignty.
379
 If the courts had examined these 
assertions, they would have found that they rely on an assumption that Aboriginal peoples were 
inherently inferior to European settler states, and were not worthy of the status and rights 
Europeans otherwise afforded to sovereign states.
380
 
 Assertions of sovereignty that do not rely on cession or conquest presume that Aboriginal 
nations are inferior to European nations.
381
 Methods invoked in North America to assert 
sovereignty, such as ―discovery‖, symbolic acts of planting a cross or a flag, or occupying a 
territory and gaining effective control over it would not have displaced a prior sovereign power 
according to European standards of international law at the time of colonization.
382
 
Consequently, assertions of sovereignty by these methods rested on the premise that North 
America, if not vacant in fact, was ―juridicially‖ a vacant territory, or terra nullius,383 a premise 
also known as the ―settlement thesis‖.384 
The Eurocentric views that formed the basis for terra nullius included seeing non-European 
lands as either completely or virtually vacant of inhabitants, and devaluing the culture of the 
Indigneous inhabitants that were there. They assumed that Indigenous peoples were nomadic and 
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that this foreclosed any claims to sovereignty or a territory. They also denied that Indigenous 
peoples had cultures that included property rights and spiritual values. Sometimes Europeans 
even denied the ―rationality‖ of Indigenous peoples.385  
Although this premise hardly requires rebuttal in view of present-day understandings of 
Aboriginal cultures and societies, it cannot be justified by either positive or natural law,
386
 and it 
is contrary to international law.
387
 
Patrick Macklem has shown that when the distribution of sovereignty in North America is 
viewed in terms of the formal and substantive equality of peoples, justice requires recognition of 
Aboriginal sovereignty. Aboriginal nations were denied formal equality because international 
law and European powers viewed them as ―insufficiently Christian or civilized to justify 
recognizing them as entitled to enjoy sovereignty over their lands and people.‖ Macklem 
observed that since this proposition is ―racist and ethnocentrist‖ it cannot stand as a valid reason 
for this denial. Therefore: 
…[b]oth excluding indigenous communities from the community of nations entitled to 
assert sovereignty over North America and continually refusing to recognize the inherent 
sovereignty of North America‘s indigenous population offends a commitment to formal 
equality of peoples. Respecting the formal equality of indigenous peoples entails placing 
them in the position they would have been in had they been treated formally equal to 
settling nations in the distribution of sovereignty…formal equality demands recognition 
of Indian government as an expression of inherent Indian sovereignty. Laws that facilitate 
the exercise of Indian governmental authority thus obtain some measure of normative 
validity from the ideal of formal equality of peoples.
388
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While formal equality merely asks whether like have been treated alike, substantive equality 
considers the effect of laws on social and economic circumstances. Macklem found that 
substantive equality concerns also support the case for Aboriginal sovereignty: 
Indian nations in North America constitute identifiable communities that have been and 
continue to be oppressed by a variety of social and economic forces. Regardless of the 
reasons behind such oppression, it has had a profound effect on the social and economic 
status of Indian people. A commitment to substantive equality suggests that the state 
attempt to remedy the oppression experienced by Indian nations. More specifically, the 
state ought to remove alien forms of economic, social, political, and legal organization 
that have been imposed on Aboriginal societies. Acknowledging a measure of 
sovereignty by the recognition and reconstruction of forms of Indian government would 
allow Indian nations to obtain greater control over their individual and collective 
identities. Such initiatives need not aim for equality of result, i.e., placing indigenous 
people in exactly the same position as nonindigenous people. Instead, the objective can 
be cast in terms of equality of resources; along the lines proposed by Kymlicka, the goal 
is to relieve indigenous people of many of the costs associated with reproducing their 
culture in the face of alien institutional structures.
389
 
A legal positivist might object that applying the doctrine of terra nullius to land that was 
occupied by Aboriginal peoples was considered ―perfectly legal‖ when it was used to dispossess 
those peoples of their land, and that therefore the international law rule of intertemporal law 
(whereby facts have to be judged by their contemporary standards) presents a legal barrier to 
challenging this dispossession.
390
 However, even the rule of intertemporal law may need to yield 
to current standards of human rights if past wrongs have continuing effects – if, for example, a 
link can be established between colonization and the current plight of an indigenous people. The 
rule of intertemporal law might not shelter ―past and ongoing wrongs‖, because ―a past violation 
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may have ongoing and continuing effects that are presently justiciable‖.391 Based on similar 
sentiments, the Australian High Court soundly rejected the terra nullius doctrine, even though it 
considered issues of sovereignty as beyond its jurisdiction. Justice Brennan stated that the 
common law should ―neither be nor be seen to be frozen in an age of racial discrimination.‖392 
 In short, what is wrong with the old paradigm is that it rests on a theory of the assumption of 
Crown sovereignty that viewed Aboriginal peoples as inferior to Europeans. To be sure, some 
time has passed since the underlying events occurred. Joseph William Singer recently suggested 
that time, in conjunction with political reality, may be the best argument to affirm current non-
Indian titles to land held in the United States, with its sole flaw being a lack of justice.
393
 He 
reviewed positivist, utilitarian and natural justice arguments in support of the status quo and 
found these lacking as well. He concluded that this leaves us ―in an uncomfortable place”.394  He 
recalled that ―[b]oth the great philosophers and our property law casebooks argue that the origins 
of property rights are crucial to determining their legitimacy but if our land titles have no 
legitimate root of title, then the whole system is placed in doubt.‖395 He writes that an answer 
will only come from rejecting ―the path of denial and repression. We must tell our history and 
tell it accurately – the good and the bad…We cannot trace our land titles to a just origin and we 
should stop pretending we can…‖396 Under the equality paradigm a legitimate title must show 
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more than a Crown assertion of sovereignty at its root – it must also be able to demonstrate a just 
derivation from Aboriginal sovereignty. 
RCAP also recognized that a paradigmatic shift is needed that repeals the doctrines on which 
Canada‘s foundations have rested, and that such a shift is a prerequisite for building a renewed 
relationship with Aboriginal peoples: 
To state that the Americas at the point of first contact with Europeans were empty 
uninhabited lands is, of course, factually incorrect. To the extent that concepts such as 
terra nullius and discovery also carry with them the baggage of racism and 
ethnocentrism, they are morally wrong as well. To the extent that court decisions have 
relied on these fallacies, they are in error. These concepts have no legitimate place in 
characterizing the foundations of this country, or in contemporary policy making, 
legislation or jurisprudence. If we are to build a renewed relationship between Aboriginal 
and non-Aboriginal people in Canada, we cannot do it by unilateral and demeaning 
assertions. Rather, we have to find or rediscover other ways to describe the foundations 
of this country, to recognize rather than dismiss the rights and contributions of Aboriginal 
peoples, and to undertake the difficult task of renewal through dialogue and agreement.
397
 
 Accordingly, the Commission‘s recommendation 1.16.2 called on the federal, provincial 
and territorial governments to acknowledge the fallacy of concepts such as terra nullius and the 
doctrine of discovery, declare that these concepts will play no further part in law making, policy 
development, or arguments presented to courts. It also asked that these governments commit to 
renewing the federation ―through consensual means to overcome the historical legacy of these 
concepts, which are impediments to Aboriginal people assuming their rightful place in the 
Canadian federation‖ and including a declaration to these same ends in a new Royal 
Proclamation and accompanying legislation.
398
 
As has already been alluded to, the existing paradigm also lacks consistency with 
international law. In 2007 the United Nations General Assembly approved the Declaration on the 
                                                 
397
 See Report, vol. 1, supra note 33 at 695. 
398
 Ibid. at 696.  
  100  
 
 
 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
399
 The recitals and articles of this Declaration are consistent with 
RCAP‘s recommendation that racist and ethnocentrist doctrines must be discarded and replaced 
with a new foundation. The preamble to the Declaration affirmed, among other things, ―that 
indigenous peoples are equal to all other peoples…‖ and ―…that all doctrines, policies and 
practices based on or advocating superiority of peoples or individuals on the basis of national 
origin or racial, religious, ethnic or cultural differences are racist, scientifically false, legally 
invalid, morally condemnable and socially unjust…‖ It also expressed concern that colonization 
and dispossession of their lands and territories have prevented indigenous peoples from 
exercising ―their right to development in accordance with their rights and interests,‖ and 
acknowledged a variety of international legal instruments that affirmed the right to self-
determination of all peoples. Accordingly, the Declaration included the following: 
Article 2 
Indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all other peoples and individuals 
and have the right to be free from any kind of discrimination… 
 
Article 3 
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.  
 
The existing Aboriginal rights paradigm in Canadian Aboriginal law is not consistent 
with these principles because it includes doctrines that rest on racist and ethnocentric 
assumptions that are inconsistent with the equality of peoples. When courts apply these 
doctrines, then these assumptions cannot be considered as solely the source of past injustices 
because they continue to be given effect, and so continue to limit the development of Aboriginal 
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peoples. The doctrine of Aboriginal title continues to assume that the interest of Aboriginal 
peoples is only a burden on the Crown‘s underlying title and subject to criteria, limits and 
qualifications imposed by the common law rather than Aboriginal peoples themselves.
400
 A 
judge recently remarked on one such inequity after a lengthy but inconclusive trial of an 
Aboriginal title claim. He observed that while Aboriginal interests are necessarily confined to the 
pleadings that frame the claim, when attempting to meet the test for justification of infringement 
of Aboriginal title the Crown is not confined to the pleadings when advancing the interests of the 
broader society. This means, ―the adversarial system restricts the examination of Aboriginal 
interests that is needed to achieve a fair and just reconciliation.‖401 
Since the assumptions underlying the doctrines of discovery and terra nullius are 
inconsistent with fundamental principles of the Canadian constitution
402
 and, as observed by 
Justice Brennan, the modern common law, then it is not difficult to see that this kind of 
contradiction between legal doctrine and the contemporary legal environment constitutes the 
equivalent, in law, of the kind of gap between theory and nature that Kuhn labelled an ―anomaly‖ 
that will call the old paradigm into question. 
In law, the ―group of practitioners‖ governed by a paradigm will include lawyers and 
judges, but, as in the natural sciences, a crisis in the acceptance of the old paradigm should also 
be evident to at least some leading scholars. Indeed, there are so many examples of the latter that 
it is not possible to list them all here.
403
 A recent and particularly powerful expression of the 
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crisis caused by this failure of the existing paradigm has come from Métis Professor Larry 
Chartrand,
404
 and it includes the following comment on the Supreme Court‘s acceptance of 
England having ―magically‖ acquired sovereignty over territory already occupied by Aboriginal 
nations: 
The implications of England‘s asserted sovereignty are profound. It means that peoples 
indigenous to the territory were not regarded as human enough to possess an independent 
sovereign ―interest‖ in the territory that England needed to recognize.  Any interest that 
such uncivilized peoples possessed would be entirely dependent on the domestic law of 
England and not on any principles of mutual respect as between independent nations.  All 
Canadian Aboriginal rights law flows from this misguided, discriminatory and ultimately 
genocidal understanding of the relationship and ought no longer to be tolerated.
405
 
 
Professor Chartrand also recalled the comments of Asch and Macklem
406
 that it is 
intolerable that a premise of the inherent superiority of European nations should form a 
foundation for Canadian sovereignty and the prevailing doctrine of Aboriginal rights. He calls 
for this doctrine to be abandoned in favour of a new one that eshews ―...colonial legal thought 
that displaces, discriminates, reduces and eliminates Aboriginal peoples‘ political and legal 
existence.‖407 He disagreed with Justice Binnie‘s comment in Mitchell that section 35 of the 
Constitution only began a new chapter, not a new book: ―A new chapter will not change the 
overall theme of the book or alter its direction in any significant or meaningful way. We need a 
new book.‖408 
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 We need not read further than the title of Professor Chartrand‘s article, ―…A Métis 
Professor‘s Journey‖, to appreciate that his call for a new paradigm for Aboriginal law is 
connected to his Aboriginal identity.  While it would normally be considered illogical, 
unpersuasive, or even unprofessional for a legal practitioner to invoke his or her ethnic or 
cultural heritage in aid of a legal argument, Kuhn‘s framework for paradigm shifts helps us to 
understand why such personal factors would influence the adoption or rejection of a new 
paradigm.  First, we should recall that a new paradigm will be incommensurable with the 
previous one, and that the choice of paradigms must be made on criteria that lie outside the 
―normal science altogether‖, criteria that are not objective but rather are normative and so tend to 
be value choices.
409
 In fact, Kuhn goes further than this, and says that the most fundamental 
aspect of incommensurability is that ―…in a sense … the proponents of competing paradigms 
practice their trades in different worlds.‖410 The sense in which Kuhn speaks of the proponents 
being in different worlds may be better understood with reference to some of the examples he 
offers. Kuhn argues that those who objected to Einstein‘s general theory of relativity because 
they did not believe that space could be ―curved‖ because ―it was not that sort of thing‖ were not 
wrong or mistaken.
411
 What had previously been meant by space was flat and unaffected by 
matter, for this was necessary for Newtonian physics to work. To accept Einstein‘s theory  
…the whole conceptual web whose strands are space, time, matter, force, and so on, had 
to be shifted and laid down again on nature whole. Only men who had together 
undergone or failed to undergo that transformation would be able to discover precisely 
what they agreed or disagreed about. Communication across the revolutionary divide is 
necessarily partial.‖412   
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Similarly, those who rejected Copernicus‘ claim that the earth moved were not wrong because to 
them the meaning of ―earth‖ included fixed position, so their ―earth‖ did not move.413 It is in this 
sense that Kuhn considers the proponents of competing paradigms to be practicing in different 
worlds: 
…[T]he two groups of scientists see different things when they look from the same point 
in the same direction. Again, this is not to say that they can see anything they please. 
Both are looking at the world, and what they look at has not changed. But in some areas 
they see different things, and they see them in different relations one to the other. That is 
why a law that cannot even be demonstrated to one group of scientists may occasionally 
seem intuitively obvious to another. Equally, it is why, before they can hope to 
communicate fully, one group or another must experience the conversion that we have 
been calling a paradigm shift. Just because it is a transition between incommensurables, 
the transition between competing paradigms cannot be made one step at a time, forced by 
logic and neutral experience. Like the gestalt switch, it must occur all at once (though not 
necessarily in an instant) or not at all.
414
 
 
Aboriginal practitioners come from different cultural worlds than non-Aboriginal practitioners, 
and so it is to be expected that their view of what should be the ―obvious‖ fundamentals of 
Aboriginal law will be intuitively different than their non-Aboriginal counterparts. Such 
formative influences are illustrated by the Aboriginal scholar John Borrows:  
How can Canada claim to own Indigenous peoples‘ land and resources? My grandfather 
asked me questions like this when I was still in grade school. My mother echoed these 
questions thoughout my childhood. Neither was legally trained, but both spent their 
formative years on the Cape Croker Indian Reserve in southern Ontario. They knew from 
experience, and that of their community, that something was not right about how Canada 
purported to take our homelands. Their questions about Canada‘s claims were a natural 
and common part of my young everyday life. They wanted answers, and they would ask 
anyone for help in their quest, including their children.
415
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Borrows observes that these kinds of questions have been circulating within Aboriginal 
communities for generations, but that it has really only been in the past 30 years that Indigenous 
peoples have gained a legal education,
416
 and that the first generation of Aboriginal law 
professors are only now beginning to be able to bring their influence to bear.
417
 Borrows made 
these comments in the foreword of a recent book that offers a critical analysis of the doctrine of 
discovery and its continuing influence in four countries, which is a collaboration of four 
Indigenous authors: Robert J. Miller, Jacinta Ruru, Larissa Behrendt and Tracey Lindberg. The 
authors have impressive academic credentials but make no apology for not taking an ―objective‖ 
or detached view of the law and call for the doctrine to be overruled. If competition between 
paradigms cannot be resolved by sheer force of logic in the natural sciences it is even less likely 
that this would be possible in law. It follows that the voices of Aboriginal scholars are 
particularly valuable in this debate because they are the most likely to be able to persuade their 
colleagues that there is a moral problem with the foundations of the discipline. 
 Finally, it should be a matter of pressing concern to all practitioners of Aboriginal law 
that their Aboriginal colleagues find that they need to find ways to function within a framework 
that they see as not only false but demeaning to their peoples. Larry Chartrand wrote that he 
considers Aboriginal rights doctrine ―unjust and inconsistent with fundamental human rights.‖418 
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This means that when his professional work forces him to function within the rights paradigm as 
a legal academic he is compelled to disclaim his own work: 
Although this paper is about applying the doctrine of Aboriginal rights and title as it is 
currently understood, I do so with the greatest hesitation because of a growing critical 
perspective of the jurisprudence surrounding this field of law and the fact that by 
uncritically applying Aboriginal rights doctrine I am indirectly supporting an inequitable 
legal regime. This paper does not intend to address the problem of inequality of peoples 
and how this inequality continues to be manifest in Canadian Aboriginal rights 
jurisprudence. Nor will I attempt to expose how Aboriginal law doctrine continues to be 
grounded in colonial ideology that, notwithstanding certain ―favourable decisions‖, 
ultimately continues to deny Aboriginal peoples true equality among the peoples of the 
world…I will assume, for the purposes of this paper that the current state of the law 
regarding Aboriginal rights and title in Canada is legitimate, even though I know it not to 
be.
419
 
 
As the foregoing discussion indicates, calls to address the moral crisis of the rights paradigm has 
come from a variety of sources, not solely Aboriginal practitioners, although the latter no doubt 
experience it most acutely. Modern Canadian and international law would not tolerate any 
attempt to introduce doctrines that are grounded in racism and ethnocentrism.  Building 
Aboriginal law on a foundation free of ―discovery‖ and terra nullius will relieve a burden of 
hypocrisy that is becoming increasingly difficult for all practitioners of Aboriginal law to bear. 
 3.2.2 A Crisis in Application 
According to the existing Aboriginal rights paradigm, the greatest entitlement that an 
Aboriginal nation can have to its own territory under Canadian law is Aboriginal title, which, in 
spite of its shortcomings,
420
 may be a highly valuable right. However, even though some 
Aboriginal peoples have expended great effort, through litigation, to establish this right, to date it 
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remains largely theoretical, since no action for Aboriginal title has yet succeeded in establishing 
the claim.
421
 
 Brian Slattery has acknowledged fundamental moral and conceptual problems with the 
doctrine of Aboriginal title, describing it as ―a legal riddle wrapped in a constitutional enigma 
inside a moral conundrum.‖422 In his view the shortcomings in the doctrine are at least in part 
due to the courts‘ concerns about the practical consequences of recognizing Aboriginal title:  
The courts are torn between a desire to right a great historical wrong – the unlawful 
dispossession of Indigenous peoples – and deep misgivings about doing so at the expense 
of third parties and the larger society...
423
 
Slattery warns that this conflict may cause courts to attempt to protect third party and societal 
interests by taking an excessively narrow approach to the content of Aboriginal title or by taking 
an overly generous view of how Aboriginal title may have been extinguished.
424
 This, however, 
will conflict with the goal of reconciliation. As discussed elsewhere in this paper, according to 
Slattery this challenge can only be overcome through a paradigmatic shift to a generative 
structure of Aboriginal rights that must be negotiated,
425
 with the involvement of courts limited 
largely to issues that cannot await the outcome of negotiations.
426
 
Attempts to establish Aboriginal title through litigation have shown that this strains the 
capacity of the courts and the litigants. The Supreme Court‘s decision in Delgamuukw427 added 
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much to our understanding of the doctrine of Aboriginal title, but it left the merits of the claims 
at issue undetermined. The Court concluded that it could not consider the merits of the claims to 
Aboriginal title and self-government because of shortcomings in the trial judge‘s treatment of 
oral histories and because of procedural defects. The latter resulted from the amalgamation on 
appeal of claims brought by individual Houses of the Gitksan and Wet‘suwet‘en nations into 
collective claims by the Aboriginal nations. The original trial had lasted over three years, and 
included 318 days of evidence and 56 days of legal argument.
428
 Although the Supreme Court 
ordered a new trial, the Justices unanimously urged the parties to seek a negotiated resolution 
because of the complex and competing interests at stake and in the interest of reconciliation.
429
  
Although the guidance provided by Delgamuukw might allow more efficient litigation, it has 
not considerably lessened the daunting nature of the task faced by an Aboriginal nation that 
seeks to assert an Aboriginal title claim in court. In Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia
430
 the 
British Columbia Supreme Court heard the plaintiff Nation‘s claim to Aboriginal title and other 
Aboriginal rights relating to land. The trial lasted over 339 days over the years 2002 to 2007. 
Justice Vickers found that he had to dismiss the claim because the law did not allow the plaintiff 
to reframe its case to seek declarations over only portions of an area claimed as a whole in the 
pleadings, although he expressed an unbinding opinion that Aboriginal title exists in a number of 
specified areas.
431
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Justice Vickers recognized that the Court had a role in the process of reconciliation,
432
 and 
concluded his judgment by commenting on this process. These comments followed 1,333 
paragraphs of applying the law to the evidence that had been heard in this lengthy trial. Having 
expended such a considerable effort attempting to operate within the confines of the existing 
Aboriginal rights paradigm, Justice Vickers expressed his conviction that an entirely different 
approach is needed: 
I confess that early in this trial, perhaps in a moment of self pity, I looked out at the 
legions of counsel and asked if someone would soon be standing up to admit that 
Tsilhqot'in people had been in the Claim Area for over 200 years, leaving the real 
question to be answered. My view at this early stage of the trial was that the real question 
concerned the consequences that would follow such an admission. I was assured that it 
was necessary to continue the course we were set upon. My view has not been altered 
since I first raised the issue almost five years ago. 
 
At the end of the trial, a concession concerning an Aboriginal hunting and trapping right 
in the Claim Area was made by both defendants. As I have already noted, that concession 
brings with it an admission of the presence of Tsilhqot'in people in the Claim Area for 
over 200 years. This leaves the central question unanswered: what are the consequences 
of this centuries old occupation in the short term and in the long term, for Tsilhqot'in and 
Xeni Gwet'in people?
433
 
 
Justice Vickers did not expect the existing Aboriginal rights paradigm to offer a means to answer 
this question. He agreed with Professor Slattery that section 35 ―does not simply recognize a 
static body of [A]boriginal rights, whose contours may be ascertained by the application of 
general legal criteria to historical circumstances‖434 and he commented specifically on the 
shortcomings of the doctrine of Aboriginal title: 
What is clear to me is that the impoverished view of Aboriginal title advanced by Canada 
and British Columbia, characterized by the plaintiff as a "postage stamp" approach to 
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title, cannot be allowed to pervade and inhibit genuine negotiations. A tract of land is not 
just a hunting blind or a favourite fishing hole. Individual sites such as hunting blinds and 
fishing holes are but a part of the land that has provided "cultural security and continuity" 
to Tsilhqot'in people for better than two centuries. 
A tract of land is intended to describe land over which Indigenous people roamed on a 
regular basis; land that ultimately defined and sustained them as a people. The 
recognition of the long-standing presence of Tsilhqot'in people in the Claim Area is a 
simple, straightforward acknowledgement of an historical fact.
435
 
 
Once again, Justice Vickers appeared to be observing the futility of debating whether the 
evidence satisfied the finer points of the doctrine of Aboriginal title. Although he stopped short 
of describing this ―historical fact‖ as the territory of a sovereign Tsilhqot‘in people436 his 
prescription echoes his earlier quotation of Chief Justice McLachlin‘s call in Haida Nation to 
fulfil the promise of section 35 by reconciling sovereignties through honourable negotiation and 
treaties:
437
 
Given this basic recognition, how are the needs of a modern, rural, Indigenous people to 
be met? How can their contemporary needs and interests be balanced with the needs and 
interests of the broader society? That is the challenge that lies in the immediate future for 
Tsilhqot'in people, Canada and British Columbia. 
As a consequence of colonization and government policy, Tsilhqot'in people can no 
longer live on the land as their forefathers did. How is a former semi-nomadic existence, 
one that cannot be replicated in a modern Canada, to be given "cultural security and 
continuity" in this twenty-first century and beyond? Governments and Tsilhqot'in people 
must find an accommodation that reconciles the historical Tsilhqot'in place in Canada 
with the place of their neighbours who come from all corners of the world.
438
 
 
The form that Justice Vickers expects ―accommodation‖ to take is not found within the doctrine 
of Aboriginal title. Instead, he agreed with Slattery that section 35 recognizes a body of 
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―generative‖ rights,439 and that therefore even full recognition of ―historical‖ title is not a 
sufficient condition for reconciliation. He echoed Slattery‘s concern that implementing historical 
title to the detriment of third party and public interests would create new injustices. He laments 
that ―[c]ourts should not be placed in this invidious position merely because governments at all 
levels, for successive generations, have failed in the discharge of their constitutional obligations. 
Inevitably this decision and others like it run the risk of rubbing salt into open wounds.‖440  
Justice Vickers‘ conviction that the doctrine of Aboriginal title will not provide a path to 
reconciliation is apparent from his comments on a preferred course. He advocated recognizing 
the rights of Aboriginal peoples to their ancestral homelands so that the process quickly moves to 
applying Slattery‘s ―Principles of Reconciliation‖.441 As noted above, those principles leave most 
substantive issues to negotiation, with courts playing largely a supporting role.
442
  
It is obvious from the above that after a truly gargantuan effort to do justice within the rights 
paradigm Justice Vickers concluded that its flaws meant that its application would not lead to a 
just solution, and that therefore it needed to be replaced with a fundamentally different approach. 
The co-authors of one commentary concluded that Tsilhqot’in Nation demonstrated that the 
problems in applying the Aboriginal title doctrine were so severe that that ―the very fabric of the 
law is torn.‖443 In their view, Justice Vickers was torn between his desire to promote 
reconciliation, the underlying objective of section 35, and the sometimes conflicting ―legally 
established rules.‖444 
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Not all who see problems with the application of the current paradigm see the answer in a 
fundamental change that includes recognition of Aboriginal sovereignty. Thomas Flanagan has 
recommended a radical strengthening of the property rights of Aboriginal peoples for pragmatic 
reasons. Flanagan is a well-known critic of the existing Aboriginal rights paradigm,
445
 but his 
criticism of the existing paradigm is not based on the Crown‘s sovereignty originating with the 
doctrines of discovery or terra nullius. He considers the morality of the historical use of these 
doctrines as irrelevant in the face of the long-continued possession by the settler states. In his 
view, the reality is simply that ―…Canada, the United States and all the other states of the 
Americas exist and their sovereignty is recognized throughout the world‖ and when Aboriginal 
leaders refer to their inherent sovereignty ―…this is only a rhetorical turn of phrase.‖446 
 Flanagan criticized the framework for Aboriginal title set out in Delgamuukw for 
maintaining constraints that have kept Canada‘s Aboriginal peoples from obtaining ―a workable 
system of property rights‖ and have ―conspired to imprison them within a regime of collective 
rights that fit badly with the needs of a market economy.‖447 Indeed, Flanagan‘s central objection 
to Aboriginal title is that he believes it will discourage the economic development of Aboriginal 
peoples. Its collective nature makes it more cumbersome to manage, and the principle of 
inalienability except to the Crown will make it more difficult to raise investment capital because 
the land cannot be sold or mortgaged. The ―inherent limit‖ on the use of Aboriginal title land will 
also reduce its value by restricting its use and by introducing uncertainty about the range of valid 
uses.
448
 While Flanagan acknowledged Kent McNeil‘s principled and constitutional objection to 
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the conditions under which the Crown could infringe Aboriginal title,
449
 most of Flanagan‘s 
objections relate to economics. Since only governments can infringe Aboriginal title: 
…the blockages imposed by one collectivist institution – aboriginal title – can be 
overcome only by another collectivist institution – government. In this scenario, politics 
is likely to trump economic rationality as elected officials use the power of government to 
make allocative decisions that ought to emerge from market transactions.
450
 
In his most recent book, Beyond the Indian Act: Restoring Aboriginal Property Rights,
451
 
Flanagan advocates a solution to the pragmatic difficulties he sees that bears a superficial 
resemblance to the equality paradigm because it rejects the rights paradigm‘s axiomatic 
assumption that the underlying title lies with the Crown. Flanagan and his co-authors Alcantara 
and Le Dressay (―Flanagan et al.‖) advocate an underlying title for Aboriginal Nations, a 
prescription they base on pragmatism, not principle.
452
  In support, they invoke the bestselling 
works of Hernando de Soto, which blame much of the poverty in the third world on an inability 
to gain title to land. Those excluded from holding title cannot partake of opportunities open only 
to those with capital.
453
 
The flaw in the approach taken by Flanagan et al. is that rather than questioning the causes of 
the limited property rights of Aboriginal peoples they would use a statute to try to patch over 
some holes in the existing regime. Their proposal consists of a ―First Nations Property 
Ownership Act‖ (FNPA) that would allow First Nations to adopt a regime that mimics 
                                                 
449
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sovereignty by providing for fee simple ownership of reserve lands combined with powers to 
regulate, to expropriate, and to have an ―ultimate‖ or underlying title to land. This proposal 
denies the inherent rights of sovereignty and self-determination of Aboriginal peoples, and 
merely supplements the Indian Act with another layer of paternalistic legislation. The FNPA will 
always be subject to amendment and repeal, and so even if it gave First Nations something 
labelled ―underlying title‖, the Crown would still retain an ―ultimate‖ underlying title. 
Since the sovereignty of Aboriginal nations has not been extinguished, there is no need for 
legislation such as the FNPA. Indeed, even though most of the work of Flanagan et al. focuses on 
the need for the federal government to delegate greater powers over reserve lands to First 
Nations, important elements of their discussion appear to amount to an unintended endorsement 
of continuing Aboriginal sovereignty, and the book‘s concluding comments implicitly accept the 
sovereignty of Aboriginal nations. First, they recall that First Nations had property rights before 
first contact and they assert that the FNPA would ―recognize and implement underlying First 
Nations title‖.454 If the underlying title already exists then legislation could at best produce a 
weak imitation of what only awaits affirmation under section 35(1) of The Constitution Act, 
1982.
455
 Second, the final paragraphs consist of a lengthy quotation from a presentation made by 
Manny Jules in which he expressed a vision of a ―real partnership between Canada and First 
Nations‖ in which the Indian Act has been replaced by ―First Nation legislation‖ and the 
Department of Indian Affairs has been replaced by ―our own First Nation public institutions that 
protect national standards and provide a third order of government.‖456 Finally, their praise of the 
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Nisga‘a Final Agreement for giving the Nisga‘a Nation an underlying title and therefore 
providing a model for achieving the same ends as the FNPA
457
 amounts to an implicit acceptance 
of continuing Aboriginal sovereignty, since treaties are normally understood to be instruments 
concluded between sovereign nations.  
The Nisga‘a Final Agreement merits attention in its own right in this discussion. The people 
of the Nisga‘a Nation live in the Nass River Valley on the northwest coast of British Columbia. 
They had been seeking a treaty virtually since first contact with Europeans, and these efforts 
motivated the litigation that resulted in the seminal decision in Calder.
458
 A treaty, the Nisga‘a 
Final Agreement (―NFA‖), was finally concluded in the year 2000.459  
Some elements of this Agreement reflect the equality paradigm, which recognizes the 
continuing sovereignty of Aboriginal nations. For example, the Agreement allows some Nisga‘a 
laws to prevail over conflicting federal or provincial laws.
460
 In addition, the Agreement confers 
land rights that exceed common law Aboriginal title rights because the Nisga‘a hold their land in 
fee simple, which the Agreement acknowledges is ―the largest estate known in law‖.461 Several 
provisions in the Agreement appear to affirm that Nisga‘a jurisdiction over their land includes 
some form of underlying title. First, no Nisga‘a land may be expropriated except as permitted by 
the Agreement, thus limiting a usual incident of Crown sovereignty.
462
 Second, the Agreement 
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allows the Nisga‘a Nation to dispose of lands held in fee simple with respect to either the whole 
of the estate in fee simple or any lesser estate, but ―[a] parcel of Nisga‘a Lands does not cease to 
be Nisga‘a Lands as a result of any change in ownership of an estate or interest in that parcel‖.463 
This means that the land will remain ―Nisga‘a land‖ and will remain under Nisga‘a jurisdiction 
even if the Nisga‘a Nation disposes of the whole of its fee simple interest.464 McNeil posed (but 
did not answer) the question of what interest the Nisga‘a Nation retains in that land.465 Whatever 
it may be, it certainly has the appearance of an ultimate or underlying title.
466
 Through the 
exercise of Nisga‘a jurisdiction in areas such as estates, land management and taxation this title 
will either revert to the Nisga‘a Nation or can be expropriated by it.467 The inclusion of a power 
to expropriate is a logical counterpart to the Nisga‘a Nations‘ ability to part with some or all of 
the fee simple estate because it allows the Nation some ability to regain the estate if needed in 
the future. 
The NFA does not expressly state whether the underlying title belongs to the Nisga‘a Nation, 
so this is a matter of interpretation. Opposing such a construction is the fact that the Agreement 
expressly contemplates that land may escheat to the Crown. However, even this reference is 
ambiguous because it provides that if any estate or interest in Nisga‘a land should ―finally 
escheat to the Crown, the Crown will transfer, at no charge, that parcel, estate or interest to the 
Nisga‘a Nation.‖468 It could be argued that having been deprived of escheat, the last remaining 
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feudal incident, the Crown‘s underlying title remains as no more than a legal fiction that has lost 
all practical significance. On the other hand, since federal and provincial governments do retain 
some limited power to expropriate Nisga‘a lands469 perhaps a better characterization would be 
that the underlying title is shared – a conceptualization that would best fit a new paradigm of 
Aboriginal law that envisions a sharing of sovereignty between Aboriginal peoples and existing 
Canadian governments.  
In October 2009, in accordance with its rights under the NFA and after having established a 
modified Torrens title system, the Nisga‘a Lisims Government adopted the Nisga’a Landholding 
Transition Act.
470
  This Act allowed Nisga‘a citizens to hold their residential properties in fee 
simple.  This legislation followed three years of consultations aimed at replacing the previous 
system of granting only possessory rights, known as ―entitlements‖ to Nisga‘a citizens. The Wilp 
Si‘ayuukhl Nisga‘a (the legislative body of the Nisga‘a Limis Government) considered the 
previous system a barrier to economic development. Although the fee simple owner will be able 
to mortgage, transfer, bequeath, lease or sell the property to any person, the Nisga‘a Limis 
Government‘s news release emphasized that the property ―will always remain Nisga‘a Lands and 
be subject to Nisga‘a Laws under the Nisga‘a Final Agreement.‖471 
It should be kept in mind, however, that the Nisga‘a Agreement was negotiated based on the 
paradigm of Aboriginal law that was dominant before the Supreme Court‘s decisions in Haida 
Nation and Taku River acknowledged that treaties are needed to reconcile sovereignties. 
Negotiators seeking to maximize their position will naturally consider what remedies Canadian 
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courts could provide if negotiations broke down. At that time the best indication the Nisga‘a had 
of their rights would have been the decision in Delgamuukw,
472
 a decision which held only the 
promise of an Aboriginal title interest that was no more than a burden on the Crown’s underlying 
title and was subject to numerous limitations. 
Perhaps the Nisga‘a Agreement illustrates the most important weakness in applying the 
existing paradigm of Aboriginal law: while the leaders of Aboriginal nations maintain that their 
nations are sovereign the Crown refuses to recognize that they are sovereign and therefore have 
legal status that is equal to the Crown‘s. A treaty that does not express a genuine mutual 
recognition of sovereignty is likely to leave lingering questions about its fairness and this will 
compromise its capacity to foster reconciliation. In a critical view of the NFA as a model for 
modern treaties the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs (UBCIC) observed that the Nisga‘a 
Agreement ―extinguishes all Aboriginal Title of the Nisga‘a Nation to the entirety of their 
traditional territory, and converts Nisga‘a original title to ‗fee simple‘ title. Nisga‘a settlement 
lands will be approximately 1990 km
2, or roughly 8% of the Nisga‘a original territory...‖473 This 
demonstrates the incommensurable nature of the opposing paradigms. The parties have opposing 
understandings of crucial matters that lie at the heart of treaty negotiations. The UBCIC uses 
―Aboriginal title‖ in the sense of an ―original title‖ that is paramount and to which Crown title is 
subject – a reversal of the priority from the common law position which considers ―Aboriginal 
title‖ as merely a burden on the Crown‘s underlying title. Hence, according to the same UBCIC 
document: 
Aboriginal title to lands and resources existed at the time that the Crown asserted 
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sovereignty. This title was never extinguished. This is why Crown title is uncertain 
and remains subject to Aboriginal Title. Consequently, there is an air of illegality 
about any transactions the Crown makes or authorizes with respect to Lands and 
Resources. These transactions do not acknowledge that Indigenous Peoples own the 
Lands. This policy violates the legal principle that, "You cannot give that which you 
do not own."
474
 
 
 
The Nisga‘a Final Agreement does not acknowledge the full extent of the Nisga‘a Nation‘s 
territorial rights and does not recognize the Nisga‘a Nation‘s sovereignty as equal to the Crown‘s 
sovereignty. The word ―sovereignty‖ appears only once in the Agreement, and that is a reference 
to the call by Canadian courts for reconciliation between ―the prior presence of Aboriginal 
peoples and the assertion of sovereignty by the Crown‖. This one-sided view of sovereignty does 
not sit comfortably with another clause in the Preamble that professes the lofty goal of a 
relationship between the parties that is ―based on a new approach to mutual recognition and 
sharing and to achieve this mutual recognition and sharing by agreeing on rights, rather than by 
the extinguishment of rights‖. If the Agreement had truly been premised on a paradigm 
consistent with the equality of peoples it should have included a mutual recognition of 
sovereignty, combined with terms that truly reflect a philosophy of sharing rather than 
extinguishment. 
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Chapter 4: The Implications and Vision of an Equality Paradigm 
  
Since this paper submits that an equality paradigm will promote reconciliation between 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians, the final chapter will consider some of the new 
paradigm‘s wider implications for Aboriginal law. Although the discussion that follows must 
necessarily be tentative, it suggests that the new paradigm will produce a path that is workable 
and likely to be effective. 
As observed above, under the equality paradigm the courts will allow Crown claims of 
sovereignty to be examined for legitimacy. The ―act of state‖ doctrine will not limit this 
examination except in a manner that is consistent with section 35 of the Constitution.
475
 Indeed, 
in Haida Nation the Court appeared to be looking through the lens of the new paradigm when it 
developed the Crown‘s duty to consult and accommodate as a consequence of ―...the Crown‘s 
assertion of sovereignty over an Aboriginal people and de facto control of land and resources 
that were formerly in the control of that people.‖476 
Kuhn predicted that a new paradigm would cause a field to be reconstructed from its 
fundamentals, causing a change in its generalizations, as well as its methods and applications.
477
  
We should expect, therefore, that in addition to offering an answer to the moral crisis resulting 
from a theory in which Crown sovereignty derives support from ethnocentric assumptions, the 
equality paradigm should also facilitate new methods and applications that will be consistent 
with the reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples promised by section 35. 
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While the shift to an equality paradigm will no doubt bring with it countless subtle 
changes, the discussion in this Chapter will contemplate what might follow if courts applied the 
equality paradigm by ending their unquestioning acceptance of Crown sovereignty and affirming 
that Aboriginal peoples were sovereign entities with claims to jurisdiction and territory that may 
continue to exist. 
 
4.1 Proof of Sovereignty  
 
 The equality paradigm recognizes the sovereignty of Aboriginal nations generally, but to 
establish sovereignty in a particular context an Aboriginal nation would have to demonstrate its 
existence and the boundaries of its territories.
478
 For the reasons discussed above, courts should 
presumptively accept that all Aboriginal peoples have historically lived in nations.
479
 
Establishing the extent of the nation‘s territory should be less onerous than the test for 
establishing ―exclusive occupancy‖ that the courts have developed for Aboriginal title. Slattery‘s 
―Principle of Territoriality‖ indicates that the Aboriginal nation, at minimum, ―had rights to the 
territories they occupied at the time of European contact, to the extent they needed them to 
survive and flourish.‖ 480 or, putting it only slightly differently, all Aboriginal peoples have a 
―presumptive generic right to an ancestral territory.‖481 Recognizing the Aboriginal nation and its 
territories is consistent with the objective of protecting the nation‘s ―cultural security‖ 
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recognized in Sappier/Gray, as well as the Grundnorm posited by Justice McLachlin. It follows 
that an Aboriginal nation‘s territory may be larger than necessary for mere survival, and 
evidence in support of this might include the recognition of boundaries by neighbouring 
Aboriginal nations. Conversely, overlapping claims to territory may arise among Aboriginal 
nations just as may occur under the rights paradigm in relation to Aboriginal title claims.
482
 
 The onus of proof for claims of sovereignty over territory should reflect the principle of 
the equality of peoples. This means that Crown sovereignty cannot be assumed, as it has been in 
Aboriginal title claims, with the principal onus falling on the Aboriginal nation.
483
 In Canadian 
courts the plaintiff normally bears the onus of proof, and if the Aboriginal nation occupies that 
role in the litigation then this would suggest that the onus should lie with that nation. However, 
giving the Crown‘s sovereignty claim a presumptive advantage over the claim of the Aboriginal 
nation is not consistent with the principle of the equality of peoples. A solution to this may be to 
only require the Aboriginal nation to make a prima facie case of sovereignty before the onus 
shifts to the Crown to establish its sovereignty in accordance with fundamental constitutional 
principles. If the Crown cannot meet its onus then a prima facie case of sovereignty should 
suffice to establish sovereignty for the Aboriginal nation, on grounds of both prior Aboriginal 
occupation and the need to avoid a legal vacuum. 
                                                 
482
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4.2 Fiduciary Duties during Negotiations 
  
A court may conclude that the Crown‘s assumption of sovereignty over the territory of an 
Aboriginal nation lacks legitimacy. Although this scenario of competing sovereignties would 
present some challenges, it would also have the constructive effect of compelling negotiations to 
reconcile sovereignties. As observed above, a court that found that Crown sovereignty over a 
particular territory was not legitimate could make an interim order that includes a declaration 
similar to that granted in the Manitoba Language Reference to preserve the rule of law (―the 
interim order‖). This interim order could grant temporary authority to the existing legal regime, 
and it could last as long as it takes to finalize a treaty. A court should only make an interim order 
that grants temporary validity to the Crown‘s de facto government if this is consistent with the 
requirements of the constitutional guarantee of the rule of law.  When considering this it should 
apply the conditions for granting temporary validity to unconstitutional laws set out in 
Ibrahim.
484
 It is likely that the conditions precedent to maintaining the de facto government of 
the Crown will be met, since failing to do so would, among other things, cause uncertainty with 
respect to property and other rights.   
 Borrows agrees that if the Crown‘s assertion of sovereignty were held invalid the rule of 
law would necessitate a temporary recognition of the existing laws, but he reminds us that 
Aboriginal peoples are also entitled to the benefit of the constitutional rule of law guarantee, and 
that the Crown‘s longstanding suppression of Aboriginal governments violates this guarantee. 
Accordingly, even though he concedes that existing laws will need to remain in effect until 
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defects in the Crown‘s sovereignty are rectified, Aboriginal powers of governance should also be 
permitted to promote orderliness within Aboriginal communities.‖485  
Although an interim order that extends the effectiveness of the existing de facto regime 
will secure legal stability, there must be some changes in the manner in which governments 
exercise their authority in an interim period following a declaration that Crown sovereignty lacks 
legitimacy (―the interim period‖) while negotiations are in progress. During the interim period, 
the existing de facto sovereign and its governments will remain in place only as a matter of 
temporary necessity. As confirmed in Haida Nation, when the Crown assumes discretionary 
control over specific Aboriginal interests, it has a fiduciary duty that requires it to act in the 
Aboriginal group‘s best interests when it exercises that control, although the content of that duty 
may take into account the Crown‘s broader obligations.486 
 An interim order that requires the consent of the Aboriginal nation for every decision of 
de facto governments during the interim period would be the strongest possible expression of the 
Crown‘s fiduciary duty and it would provide the greatest motivation for the parties to negotiate a 
more efficient means of sharing sovereignty and jurisdiction. However, this would come with a 
risk of being so cumbersome and subject to stalemate that it might threaten to defeat the purpose 
of the interim order of preventing a legal vacuum and allowing the de facto authority of the 
existing regime to temporarily continue. As to what a more appropriate content of the fiduciary 
duty should be, neither the context of an unproven claim considered in Haida Nation
487
 nor the 
context of an infringement of an established Aboriginal title claim discussed in Delgamuukw
488
 
is perfectly analogous. Since Aboriginal sovereignty, not just the right of Aboriginal title would 
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have been established and would be infringed throughout the interim period, the content of the 
fiduciary duty should be as strict or stricter than was outlined in Delgamuukw. Although the 
Supreme Court has left for another day the question of whether the duty to consult applies to 
legislative action as well as other government conduct,
489
 this duty must apply to legislative 
conduct if Aboriginal sovereignty has been established. A de facto government must demonstrate 
that its temporary legitimacy is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of the rule of law, 
and a failure to consult with respect to legislative action that affects Aboriginal interests would 
not be consistent with minimal impairment of this guarantee, just as it would not be consistent 
with the criteria of proportionality of measures criterion for validating an unconstitutional law.
490
 
It follows that the constitutional principles of the rule of law and the honour of the Crown would 
demand that the scope of the measures requiring consultation would be broad. Further, for 
significant decisions that affect Aboriginal interests, the duty will require more than mere 
consultation and some decisions may be so important that the consent of the Aboriginal nation 
must be obtained.  
 Underlying or continuing breaches of rights associated with Aboriginal sovereignty 
would not be subject to a duty to consult or accommodate during the interim period because this 
would not be consistent with the purpose of granting temporary legitimacy to the Crown‘s 
sovereignty. This is consistent with the ratio in Rio Tinto, in which the Court held that the duty 
arose only when a claim or right may be affected by ―current‖ government conduct.491 
 Brian Slattery‘s theory of the generative structure of Aboriginal rights courts also 
requires negotiation to determine the content of Aboriginal rights. He has proposed that while 
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these negotiations to determine a ―generative Aboriginal title claim‖ are in progress the court 
could only do the following: 
(1) recognize the historical title of the claimant group as it existed at the 
time of Crown sovereignty, as a baseline for modern negotiations; 
 
(2) issue such orders as are necessary and appropriate to protect the 
historical title from further erosion and invasion, while taking 
account of existing private and public interests; 
 
(3) recognize the right of the claimant group to use and possess certain 
portions of its historical territory, either immediately or after the 
lapse of a specified period of time; 
 
(4) enjoin the parties to enter into negotiations aimed at defining the 
modern scope of aboriginal title, as a generative right.
492
 
However, if the generative structure of Aboriginal rights amounts to recognition of continuing 
Aboriginal sovereignty and the need to reconcile it with Crown sovereignty, then negotiations 
must always address jurisdiction and governance. Therefore, while Slattery‘s proposal may be 
reasonable in relation to the use and occupation of land in the interim period, it does not address 
the potential role of the courts with respect to the full range of issues that are at stake. 
Perhaps an Aboriginal nation that has established its continuing sovereignty should be 
entitled to exercise its inherent right of self-government.
493
 To be sure, if it exercised that right 
under s. 35(1) before the declaration, this right would not be weakened by the interim order. 
However, to the extent that any new powers of self-government would need to be grounded in 
sovereignty, the fundamental principle of the rule of law would demand that citizens not be 
subject to conflicting laws and duties. Therefore, new governmental powers should not be 
assumed unilaterally during the interim period. 
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 Onerous fiduciary duties will make governing cumbersome during the interim period. 
Extensive consultation processes will also be costly, and the costs to the Aboriginal nation of 
participating in these processes should be the responsibility of the Crown, since it was the 
Crown‘s unilateral assertion of sovereignty that necessitated the process. These costs, and a 
desire for a more efficient system that allows each of the Crown and Aboriginal peoples to be 
primarily responsible for matters within their own spheres of interest, will serve as incentives for 
the timely completion of a treaty that reconciles sovereignties. 
  The ultimate content of the treaty and a ―just settlement‖ must be determined by the 
parties themselves, and cannot be imposed by a court. In Quebec Secession Reference the 
Supreme Court explained why the Court could not take a supervisory role over the political 
aspects of constitutional negotiations. Negotiation is the responsibility of the representatives of 
the parties, who are responsible to their constituents, and the reconciliation of the parties‘ 
legitimate constitutional interests ―…can only be achieved through the give and take of the 
negotiation process. Having established the legal framework, it would be for the democratically 
elected leadership of the various participants to resolve their differences.‖494 Similarly, the courts 
could not take a supervisory role over the political aspects of negotiations between the Crown 
and Aboriginal peoples. 
 It follows from this that a court cannot force the parties to come to an agreement, nor can 
it impose terms of an agreement if the parties are unable to reach one. However, for all of the 
foregoing reasons and particularly for the sake of ―reconciliation between Aboriginal peoples 
and non-Aboriginal peoples and their respective claims, interests and ambitions‖495 it will be in 
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the best interests of both parties to reach mutually accepted treaty terms. The Crown should also 
be mindful of its obligation at international law to respect the right of internal self-determination 
of the Aboriginal people. 
 While a court could not take a supervisory role over the political aspects of constitutional 
negotiations, the court‘s duty to uphold the rule of law requires it to reserve some jurisdiction 
throughout the interim period. If negotiations drag on too long it may be that maintaining the 
unconstitutional de facto regime can no longer be justified according to the criteria in Ibrahim
496
 
or when weighed against the cost to the rule of law arising from the suppression of Aboriginal 
governments. If maintaining the temporary authority of the de facto regime can no longer be 
justified this need not result in chaos and a legal vacuum. A de jure sovereign may be ready to 
accept a transfer of governmental responsibilities, subject to any restrictions on the ability of that 
sovereign to interfere with existing third party interests that the rule of law guarantee may still 
justify. Once a treaty is concluded and valid laws are in place, the interim order will expire. 
Thereafter spheres of jurisdiction and, likely, some ongoing consultation and accommodation 
requirements will be specified in the treaty. This will not end the reconciliation process, as a 
positive relationship needs to be nurtured. The wisdom of doing this is recognized by the 
Aboriginal tradition of the annual brightening of the covenant chain.
497
 Amendments may be 
needed from time to time as conditions change. All of this would be consistent with Aboriginal 
conceptions of ‗treaty-making‘ as a process, not a one-time agreement.498 
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497
 See Walters, ―Covenant Chain‖, supra note 164. 
498
 Asch & Zlotkin, supra note 163 at 216. This appears to be consistent with the discussion of the role of treaties in 
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4.3 Existing Treaties 
 
This discussion has focused on the consequences of recognizing Aboriginal sovereignty 
in the absence of an existing treaty. The same principles should apply where treaties exist, 
because the extent to which the Crown‘s sovereignty is legitimate or only de facto will depend 
on the interpretation and legitimacy of the treaty. Matters not determined by the treaty would 
have to be resolved through negotiations. 
While a thorough consideration of the effect of an equality paradigm on the interpretation 
and application of existing treaties is beyond the scope of this work, First Nations frequently 
assert that treaties only facilitated sharing the land, and did not relinquish sovereignty.
499
 Patrick 
Macklem‘s suggestion for how an apparent surrender of land in a treaty should be viewed is also 
consistent with treaties serving as a framework for sharing sovereignty. It should be ―…treated 
as the granting of consent to a system whereby land could be shared by native and non-native 
people, with priority of use attaching to one party by virtue of the surrender.‖500 RCAP 
recommended that when historical treaties are implemented they should be guided by a set of 
                                                 
499
 See Chapter 1 above, text accompanying notes 35-42. See also Sharon Venne, "Understanding Treaty 
6: An Indigenous Perspective" in Michael Asch, ed. Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, 
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presumptions of their ―spirit and intent‖501 that reflect sharing of land and jurisdiction between 
treaty nations and the Crown. In particular: 
 treaty nations did not intend to consent to the blanket extinguishment of their 
Aboriginal rights and title by entering into the treaty relationship. 
 treaty nations intended to share the territory and jurisdiction and management 
over it, as opposed to ceding the territory, even where the text of an historical 
treaty makes reference to a blanket extinguishment of land rights; and  
 treaty nations did not intend to give up their inherent right of governance by 
entering into a treaty relationship, and the act of treaty making is regarded as an 
affirmation rather than a denial of that right.
502
 
 
These presumptions are consistent with an equality paradigm that views treaties as having been 
made between sovereigns that intended to share land and jurisdiction; they are not consistent 
with a rights paradigm that views the Crown as the sole sovereign by virtue of the ―discovery‖ 
principle, with treaties serving only to surrender any usufructuary or other rights that remained 
with the Aboriginal peoples. 
The Office of the Treaty Commissioner of Saskatchewan appreciated the significance of 
the Supreme Court‘s description of the purpose of treaties as reconciling sovereignties503 when it 
observed that ―in future treaty parties will have to ―reach an understanding on how the treaties 
reconciled sovereignties, and further, what this reconciliation implies for future governance 
arrangements.‖504 Further, it puts sovereignty within a framework that emphasizes ―sharing, 
accommodation and mutuality…‖, a framework of treaty implementation known as ―treaty 
federalism‖.505 The Office of the Treaty Commissioner anticipated that this will raise issues that 
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 Report, vol. 2, supra note 78 at 58, recommendation 2.2.4. 
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must be negotiated because they are political and therefore non-justiciable,
506
 but this does not 
preclude a role for courts in treaty interpretation and implementation that parallels their role in 
division of power disputes between provinces and the federal government. 
 
4.4 Aboriginal Title or Ultimate Title? 
 
 Another implication of the equality paradigm is that a sovereign Aboriginal nation has 
jurisdiction over its territory, subject only to jurisdiction that it has agreed to share. The Crown 
does not hold ultimate title to land that falls within the territory of a sovereign First Nation unless 
the latter has agreed to cede the ultimate title to the Crown. This means the Aboriginal nation 
cannot also have ‗Aboriginal title‘ in the land as that term has traditionally been understood, 
because, by definition, Aboriginal title is a burden on the Crown’s ultimate title. Although third 
party rights may be preserved by the de facto doctrine (see below) the Aboriginal nation is not in 
the category of a ―third party‖ and its ―reasonable expectations‖ have not been defeated by the 
loss of its Aboriginal title or other Aboriginal rights, since those rights have been replaced with 
more fundamental rights as a result of the successful assertion of sovereignty. 
  In negotiations aimed at reconciling sovereignties, neither the sovereignty nor the system 
of land tenure of either sovereign presumptively takes precedence. Therefore, it cannot be 
presumed that after negotiations either the Crown or the Aboriginal nation will hold the ultimate 
title to any particular land in the territory. This is helpful, because it opens the widest possible 
range of options for finding creative solutions that will accommodate the interests of both 
parties.  
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 Asch and Zlotkin have observed that historically federal government policies seeking 
extinguishment of Aboriginal rights and title have been a barrier to reaching comprehensive 
claims settlements because many Aboriginal peoples seek recognition and affirmation of their 
rights and refuse to agree to extinguishment.
507
 RCAP has also observed that Aboriginal nations 
that are parties to historical treaties are practically unanimous in holding that they did not agree 
to extinguish their rights to their traditional territories but agreed to share them in an equitable 
fashion.
508
  
 The solution Asch and Zlotkin proposed is to recognize that Aboriginal peoples possess 
the underlying title, except where they have consented to an alternative. If the equality of peoples 
is accepted as a self-evident truth, then the underlying title of the Aboriginal nation derives from 
its prior jurisdiction over the land. Recognizing the Aboriginal nation‘s ultimate title would  
…move the discussion away from a focus on title and towards the development of 
political relationships. Aboriginal people have, from the time of European contact, 
promoted a political relationship that is based on sharing and mutual accommodation. 
This approach is based on the philosophical premise that underlying title was gifted to 
Aboriginal people by the Creator, but only on the basis that they maintain an ethic of 
sharing.‖ 509 
Negotiations that proceed from principles that are consistent with the fundamental ethic and 
principles of Aboriginal peoples are more likely to be fruitful and to contribute to reconciliation 
and therefore to fulfilling the purpose of section 35. The option of an Aboriginal underlying title 
exemplifies how the equality paradigm will facilitate methods and applications that will promote 
the reconciliation promised by section 35 that are not available under the rights paradigm. 
                                                 
507
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As discussed above, it appears that the Nisga‘a Nation already holds a form of ultimate title, 
or at least that the Nisga‘a Final Agreement has used some aspects of the concept of an 
underlying title to give the Nisga‘a Nation more practical flexibility in how it exercises its 
jurisdiction over land.
510
 The Agreement does this implicitly, and does not deliberately delineate 
a new conception of the ownership of the underlying title. In view of the importance that 
Aboriginal nations place on a continuing recognition of their sovereignty, an express 
acknowledgement that the underlying title belongs to the Aboriginal nation or is shared with the 
Crown may be a valuable aid to negotiations and ultimately to reconciliation. 
 
4.5 Protection of Third Party Rights 
  
Whether the de facto doctrine would operate to permanently protect interests that were 
acquired by third parties that relied, in good faith, on the acts of the Crown is an important 
question.
511
 Of course, like any doctrine, the de facto principle will only be given effect insofar 
as it is in accordance with the text of the Constitution and fundamental constitutional principles. 
Therefore, it should yield to section 35 and the underlying constitutional value of Aboriginal 
rights if it violates these principles, or violates the rule of law by unjustly dispossessing 
Aboriginal nations of territory or property. This, however, presents a conundrum, because the de 
facto doctrine is itself grounded in the foundational principle of the rule of law.
512
 The Supreme 
Court has stated that the defining principles of the Constitution function ―in symbiosis‖ and that 
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―[n]o single principle can be defined in isolation from the others, nor does any one principle 
trump or exclude the operation of any other.‖513 
 Two approaches to how long rights acquired by third parties that relied on Crown 
assertions of sovereignty ought to be protected appear to be available. The first would attempt to 
justify permanent protection of third party interests on the grounds of a symbiosis between 1) the 
rule of law and the protection of ―justified expectations‖ of the de facto doctrine, and 2) the 
purpose of reconciliation of s. 35. The second approach would guarantee third party interests 
only for the duration of the interim period, and would argue that their ultimate fate should be a 
matter for treaty negotiations. 
The first option receives some support from the view that reconciliation is reciprocal, 
and, as the Supreme Court said in Mikisew Cree, it must take into account the claims, interests 
and ambitions of both Aboriginal peoples and non-Aboriginal peoples, and that it would fail to 
do this if innocent third parties had to fear being dispossessed of their property. Moreover, 
reconciliation is concerned with ―social cohesion, political stability and civic peace‖ and 
―implies a search for a middle ground,‖514 and failing to safeguard third party interests is not 
consistent with realizing these aspects of reconciliation. This approach would also remove a 
thorny and politically-charged issue from the bargaining table which might otherwise make it 
more difficult to reach an overall settlement. 
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The cost of this first approach, however, is that permanent protection of third party 
interests would amount to permanent dispossession of the original Aboriginal interest. The 
Chippewas of Sarnia decision indicates an Aboriginal nation may be no worse off under this 
approach than if it had only an Aboriginal title claim under the rights paradigm – since under the 
rights paradigm courts appeared to favour the rights of innocent third parties over Aboriginal title 
rights even if they had to stretch or contort long-standing legal principles to do so.
515
 However, 
any defence that must ultimately rely on a rejected paradigm must fail.  
 In spite of any merits it may have, the first approach repeats on a smaller scale the 
injustice and arrogance of the Crown‘s unilateral assertion of sovereignty that created the 
problem of third party interests in the first place. It does not heed Borrows‘ warning that an 
appeal to the interests of the broader community ―potentially strips Aboriginal peoples of their 
constitutional protection in the toughest cases, when the majority‘s interests are arrayed against 
them, at the very time they might require the greatest protection‖, and that yielding to such 
appeals may hold the greatest risk to civic peace.
516
  
 Therefore, it appears that greater wisdom and justice lie in a second approach, which 
views protection of third party rights during the interim period as adequate for preserving the 
rule of law and civic peace, and leaves a final resolution of this issue to negotiations. In 
negotiations land in the hands of third parties that is of importance to Aboriginal nations can be 
addressed with sensitivity to the interests of all affected parties, and solutions may be found that 
a court could not impose. For example, the parties might agree to leave existing property rights 
of third parties in place while transferring the ultimate title to an Aboriginal nation, or otherwise 
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placing the land under the Aboriginal nation‘s jurisdiction. The agreement may allow the 
Aboriginal nation to expropriate the property subject to paying compensation to the ―owner‖.517 
 
4.6 Extinguishment of Aboriginal Rights 
 
 Section 35 prevents legislation from extinguishing Aboriginal rights unless the Crown 
could demonstrate that this would be a justified infringement of a constitutional right. However, 
Canadian law continues to recognize that prior to 1982 the federal government could extinguish 
Aboriginal rights by legislation that demonstrated a ―clear and plain‖ intent to do so.518 Borrows 
criticized Delgamuukw‘s unquestioning affirmation of a pre-1982 power to extinguish, and was 
concerned that ―this case leaves a very wide door open‖ for an argument that Aboriginal title was 
quashed before British Columbia entered Confederation in 1871.
519
 He questioned how it would 
be consistent with constitutional principles for ―an alien government [to] give itself the exclusive 
authority to extinguish the distinct rights of another people, without their consent.‖520 
 The grounds for challenging the Crown‘s authority to extinguish Aboriginal rights and 
title are, in essence, identical to grounds for challenging the validity of unilateral assertions of 
Crown sovereignty; the two stand or fall together. If the Crown‘s sovereignty was not legitimate, 
it had no authority to extinguish any Aboriginal rights. More to the point, once the hierarchical 
relationship of the rights paradigm is replaced with recognition that Aboriginal peoples were as 
much sovereign as Europeans, unilateral extinguishment no longer has a place in the discussion. 
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 Unlike the Nisga‘a Agreement, a modern treaty negotiated under the new paradigm 
should include clauses wherein each party recognizes the sovereignty of the other. Although 
many difficult practical issues of how that sovereignty will be shared will remain, such an 
acknowledgement should establish a foundation for other provisions which would not amount to 
an extinguishment of Aboriginal title in parts of the Aboriginal nation‘s territory that is shared 
with other Canadians. By avoiding extinguishment in this fashion, the treaty would address a 
major criticism the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs levelled against the Nisga‘a Final 
Agreement.
521
 
 
4.7 Inalienability of Land 
 
 The inalienability of Aboriginal land except to the Crown was a limitation imposed by 
the colonial power asserting sovereignty. If the assertion is invalid this limitation cannot survive. 
Rationales for inalienability have included the inability of settlers to derive their title from other 
than the Crown, and a desire to protect Aboriginal peoples from unscrupulous European 
settlers.
522
 After the recognition of Aboriginal sovereignty, limitations on alienability no longer 
have a legal foundation unless imposed by an Aboriginal nation on itself.
523
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4.8 Fiduciary Duties and Limitations on Sovereignty 
 
 If Canadian laws that infringe Aboriginal sovereignty are necessarily invalid for 
exceeding Canada‘s sovereign authority,524 then Aboriginal laws that infringe Canada‘s 
sovereignty would also be invalid. Although the justificatory analysis related to s. 35(1)
525
 may 
not be appropriate for determining the limitations on the sovereignty of Aboriginal governments, 
Aboriginal sovereignty is no more immune from scrutiny for consistency with fundamental 
constitutional principles, including federalism, than the federal and provincial governments with 
which they share sovereignty. Just as these principles allow assertions of Canadian sovereignty 
to be scrutinized, they would allow limitations to be placed on Aboriginal sovereignty. 
 In Mitchell,
526
 Justice Binnie recalled that prior to Calder,
527
 the doctrine of 
sovereign incompatibility had been given excessive scope in a manner that denied Aboriginal 
rights, and though it still exists it should be applied with caution.
528
 The manner in which he 
would have applied it in that case may be sufficiently free of hierarchical assumptions that it 
could work in the context of the Crown and Aboriginal peoples sharing sovereignty. At issue was 
a claim of an international trading and mobility right claimed by the respondent as a citizen of 
the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) Confederacy. Justice Binnie would have found that this right, even 
if otherwise established, was incompatible with ―national interests that all of us have in common 
rather than to distinctive interests that for some purposes differentiate an Aboriginal 
community.‖529 He also considered whether upholding the claimed Aboriginal rights would be 
                                                 
524
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consistent with the purpose of section 35. He expressed the purpose of section 35 as 
―reconciliation of the interests of [A]boriginal peoples and Crown sovereignty...‖ and he noted 
that that Aboriginal people ―are themselves part of Canadian sovereignty‖.530 He concluded that 
in this case, ―reconciliation of these interests… favours an affirmation of our collective 
sovereignty.‖531 Accordingly, it appears that in Justice Binnie‘s view, sovereign incompatibility 
can only be invoked a) to protect interests that all Canadians, including Aboriginal peoples, have 
in common, and b) to further reconciliation, which lies at the heart of the purpose of section 35. 
 Any method used to set limits on sovereignty should be guided by principles consistent 
with partnership and the obligations that partners have toward each other when considering 
decisions or actions that can reasonably be expected to affect other partners. A partnership of 
sovereigns suggests a fiduciary relationship similar to the one that flows from the ―honour of the 
Crown‖ that the Courts have developed since Guerin.532 However, the nature of the fiduciary 
relationship should evolve to one based on equality, rather than a hierarchical conception of the 
duty. This may be a fiduciary relationship similar (but not identical) to a business partnership, 
such that each party has a duty to ―act in good faith, fairly, reasonably and honourably towards 
the other.‖533 
 Aboriginal sovereignty and jurisdiction over territory are not compatible with any limit 
on the use of the territory of an Aboriginal nation that would parallel the inherent limit imposed 
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by Delgamuukw.
534
 In Campbell v. B.C., in the context of a discussion of inherent powers of 
Aboriginal self-government, Justice Williamson stated ―manifestly, the choice of how one‘s 
political leaders are to be selected is an exercise of self-government.‖535 Similarly, the choice of 
how land will be used is manifestly an exercise in territorial jurisdiction. 
 
4.9 Sharing Sovereignty 
 
 Recognizing Aboriginal sovereignty and requiring the Crown to find a legitimate source 
for its sovereignty affirms the principle of equality of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples. 
These steps will, finally, shed racist and ethnocentrist conceptions of terra nullius and discovery, 
in accordance with RCAP‘s recommendation that such unilateral assertions must be rejected if a 
renewed relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples is to be achieved.
536
 
 Rejecting unilateral Crown assertions of sovereignty will facilitate honourable 
negotiations by establishing a foundation of mutual respect. These negotiations will need to work 
out just terms for accepting Aboriginal nations into Canada as equal sovereign partners – and an 
Aboriginal nation might see the purpose of the negotiations as seeking just terms for sharing its 
sovereignty with the Crown. The vision offered here of sharing Canadian sovereignty between 
Aboriginal, federal and provincial governments is essentially the same as the vision expressed by 
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RCAP and endorsed by Justice Binnie in Mitchell,
537
 who quoted the following passage from 
RCAP‘s Report with approval: 
Shared sovereignty, in our view, is a hallmark of the Canadian federation and a central 
feature of the three-cornered relations that link Aboriginal governments, provincial 
governments and the federal government. These governments are sovereign within their 
respective spheres and hold their powers by virtue of their constitutional status rather than 
by delegation. Nevertheless, many of their powers are shared in practice and may be 
exercised by more than one order of government.
538
 
Justice Binnie envisaged a partnership between peoples, not a subordination of Aboriginal 
sovereignty. He referred to this as ―partnership without assimilation‖.539 He invoked the ―two-
row‖ wampum from the Iroquois tradition, which also symbolized the Treaty of Niagara.540 He 
observed that RCAP‘s proposal differs from the doctrine of a ―domestic dependant nation‖ in the 
United States, in which the powers of tribal governments, ―whatever their theoretical 
sovereignty‖ can be overridden by Congress.541 Rather, ―the Royal Commission itself sees 
[A]boriginal peoples as full participants with non-[A]boriginal peoples in a shared Canadian 
sovereignty. Aboriginal peoples do not stand in opposition to, nor are they subjugated by, 
Canadian sovereignty. They are part of it.‖542 
 Although the vision is the same, there are differences of process between the proposal 
described by RCAP and Binnie and the proposal outlined here. If the relationship that is 
envisaged is a true partnership, then the terms of that partnership cannot be imposed; they must 
be negotiated and freely accepted. More than one commentator has observed that neither Justice 
Binnie nor RCAP had focused on the need for full consent from Aboriginal peoples to the 
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partnership and to its terms.
543
 It is no longer possible for Aboriginal peoples to reject any kind 
of partnership – per Chief Justice Lamer, ―...we are all here to stay‖.544 We cannot deny that the 
Crown has assumed de facto sovereignty, but we can initiate a process that recognizes 
Aboriginal sovereignty and that seeks to reconcile the peoples and sovereignties in Canada by 
negotiating the terms of the partnership.    
 This vision of Canada has also been described as ―shared‖ or ―merged‖ sovereignty, but 
this discussion has favoured the present tense of ―sharing sovereignty‖. While ‗merged‘ 
describes a Canada that contains multiple sources of sovereignty, it leaves the continuing 
existence of those sources unstated. Describing sovereignty as ‗shared‘ recognizes the ongoing 
vitality of separate sovereignties and identities within a united Canada. Referring to this in the 
present tense as ‗sharing‘ captures the dynamic nature of the relationship and the need to nurture 
it with ongoing co-operation and renewal. It also accords with the general view of Aboriginal 
peoples that treaty making is an ongoing process. 
 By acknowledging that Crown sovereignty is only de facto sovereignty until it gains 
legitimacy through a treaty, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the need for consent from 
Aboriginal nations to the terms of sharing and reconciling sovereignties. Consent can only be 
obtained through honourable treaty negotiations based on the principle of the equality of peoples. 
An examination of existing treaties may reveal some measure of consent to sharing sovereignty, 
but where this is incomplete or where it was not voluntary, further negotiations will be 
required.
545
 It is in this process that the real work of reconciliation will take place. 
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